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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, 
foreign aid has focused on winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states as a 
hedge against insecurity and means to achieve progress in the “war on terror.” Western 
donors, especially the United States, argue foreign aid is an effective tool to expand 
government capacity and control over territory, win public hearts and minds, and 
ultimately mitigate the need and significant military costs of deployment to counter 
insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in weak, fragile and failing states.  
This dissertation uses case studies to explore the unique relationship between 
foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries of 
Afghanistan (2001-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), and 
Kosovo (1999-2017).  This research uses data from surveys and public opinion polls 
conducted by reliable national and international organizations in the four cases under 
consideration in order to address two research questions. First, does foreign aid increase 
positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in an aid recipient 
country?  Second, does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in 
an aid recipient country? The research findings suggest foreign aid is not positively 
associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donors and the aid 
recipient states and has fallen short of winning public hearts and minds in these four 
cases.  These findings, however, do not suggest that foreign aid is not a viable tool in 
winning public hearts and minds toward the state, donors and the “war on terror” in the 
aid recipient states, but should be seen rather as an evaluation of the current state of 
knowledge, peace and state building measures and should guide scholarly debate and 
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policy on exploring alternative approaches to state and peacebuilding outside the existing 
top-down approaches. Implications for policymakers and development practitioners are 
that state legitimacy, service delivery, winning post-conflict peace, and political 
corruption influence public positive and negative attitudes and winning public hearts and 
minds toward the state and donors in aid recipient states. 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
 Donors provide aid to underdeveloped nations for a variety of reasons.  The 
reasons could be wholly altruistic (Berthelemy 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2011), to 
advance foreign policy objectives (Dreher et al. 2008; Dreher et al. 2011; Vreeland 2011) 
and/or a combination of need-based objectives to alleviate poverty, underdevelopment, 
and human sufferings and interest-based objectives driven by the donors’ foreign policy 
concerns and motivations (McKinley and Little 1979; Claessens et al. 2009; Hoffler and 
Outram 2011).  However, since the Al Qaeda terrorist organization’s attacks against the 
United States on 11 September 2001, national security and fighting terrorism have been 
the major driving forces of foreign aid by Western donors, in general, and the United 
States, in particular (Woods 2005; Owusu 2007; Azam and Thelen 2010; Bandyopadhyay 
et al. 2011; Boutton 2014).  Donors use foreign aid as a tool to address the economic, 
political, institutional, and demographic factors that underlay inequality, state weakness 
(lack of capacity or will to provide effective and efficient public goods) and state failure 
(an inability to provide public goods).  Inequality, be it political, economic, social, or 
ethnic, leads to grievances, which fosters insurgency, civil war, extremism, and terrorism 
(Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).  As Burgoon (2006, 177) notes, 
…social welfare policies—including social security, unemployment, and 
health and education spending—affect preferences and capacities of social 
actors in ways that, on balance, discourage terrorism: by reducing poverty, 
inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, thereby diminishing incentives to 
commit or tolerate terrorism, and by weakening extremist political and 
religious organizations and practice that provide economic and cognitive 
security where public safety nets are lacking. 
 
 
 2 
Howard (2016, 4) writes that “bad neighbors often makes for bad 
neighborhoods.”  He argues that extremist and terrorist organizations find weak, fragile, 
failing, and failed states attractive not only because of the absence of a functioning 
government and security forces, but also because of the recruitment potential.  Since such 
states lack the ability or political will to project power or enforce law and order, they 
provide opportunity for warlords, insurgents, extremists, and terrorist organizations 
and/or leaders to set up their bases of operations, generate revenue, recruit and train 
insurgents and/or terrorists, and offer false promises and logic to justify violence against 
their own people and the international community.  As Reinold (2011, 249) writes, “the 
most striking feature of the failed state is the virtual absence of effective government.  
State failure signifies a return to the conditions of the state of nature—in which the 
security dilemma arises anew.  Physical security becomes a commodity that is traded on a 
market run by private actors such as mercenaries, warlords, and militias.”   With respect 
to the case of Syria in particular, President Barack H. Obama on March 22, 2013, stated, 
I am very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremists, 
because extremists thrive in chaos. They thrive in failed states. They thrive 
in power vacuums.  They don’t have much to offer when it comes to actually 
building things, but they’re very good about exploiting situations that are 
no longer functioning.  They fill that gap…And that’s why I think it’s so 
important for us to work as an international community to accelerate a 
political transition that is viable so that a Syrian state continues to function, 
so that the basic institutions can be rebuilt, that they’re not destroyed beyond 
recognition, that we are avoiding what inevitably becomes sectarian 
divisions, because by definition if you’re an extremist, then you don’t have 
a lot of tolerance for people who don’t share your beliefs  (Lucas, CNS 
News, March 22, 2013).   
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 Since the 9/11 attacks, Western donors in general and the United States in 
particular have used foreign aid to not only address the underlying conditions that 
may lead to insurgencies driven by Islamist extremism but also to win public 
hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries by publicizing foreign aid based on 
their established aid branding and publicity mandates.  For example, the U.S. 
Foreign Assistant Act of 1961, section 641, requires that all foreign aid and 
programs under the Foreign Assistance Act be identified overseas as “American 
Aid” and all foreign assistance activities branded in the host countries as “From 
the American People” (USAID, Branding 2016).  Similarly, the U.K. government 
and Department for International Development (DFID) require that all U.K. 
assistance be identified in aid recipient countries as “UK Aid” and branded as 
“From the British People.”  Recent experiences from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other countries have resulted in consensus among 
Western policymakers and practitioners that greater synergy between defense, 
diplomacy, and development (3D) is required for sustainable development and 
counterinsurgency in conflict societies.  As a result, terms such as “3D approach,” 
“whole of government approach,” “comprehensive approach,” “holistic approach” 
and others are used to acknowledge security and development efforts are 
intertwined and cannot be approached separately (Hrychuk 2009).  The 3D 
approach is “the method of combining varying assets [of defense, diplomacy, and 
development] to be used in dealing with failed and failing states” (Hrychuk 2009, 
830).   Constantinou and Opondo (2015, 9) writes, “…the integrated use of 
diplomacy, development and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, 
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and economic tools of statecraft are essential for advancing national and common 
interests, and for maintaining US stewardship of the international system.”   
Donors argue publicizing foreign aid (disseminating information to public in the 
aid recipient country about the identity, financial commitment, sponsorship, and 
implementation of development programs and projects in coordination with local state 
and institutions by a donor) improves their image and leads to feelings of appreciation, 
gratitude, and positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient 
country toward the donor and their own state, which makes it easy to implement the 
development programs and defeat insurgency and terrorism (USAID 2016).  The main 
argument regarding the relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and 
minds in the aid recipient country revolves around the fact that individuals and societies 
recognize and reward positive acts with positive attitudes and behaviors consistent with 
gift exchange and social exchange theories, which argue that individual behaviors are 
contingent on the behaviors and actions of others (Falk 2007; Cropanzano and Mitchell 
2005).  Fehr and Gachter (2000, 159) write, “a man ought to be a friend to his friend and 
repay gift with gift. People should meet smiles with smiles and lie with treachery.  There 
is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to this 
dictum: people repay gifts and take revenge even in interaction with complete strangers 
and even if it is costly for them and yields neither present nor future material rewards.”  
Foreign aid wins hearts and minds by reciprocally changing attitudes and behaviors 
among members of the public toward their own state and donors in the aid recipient 
country.  Positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient country 
toward a donor(s) lead to greater security and stronger political, economic, and social 
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relations between the donor(s) and the aid recipient nation(s), resulting in a win-win 
situation.   Positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient country 
toward their own state lead to greater public confidence in the state and participation in 
and support for the development programs and projects, resulting in greater state 
legitimacy and control of society, both of which are important for sustainable 
development (Banfield 1958; Migdal 1988; Huntington 1993; Putnam et al. 1993; Kohli 
2004; Huntington 2006) and fighting terrorism (Schneider 2015).   
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether or not foreign aid wins 
public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries.  More precisely, it addresses the 
following research questions and assesses the extent of the validity of the corresponding 
central arguments:  
1) Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the 
foreign aid in the aid recipient country? 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 events, the United States and the rest of the Western 
donors have emphasized that winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient 
countries is a key to winning the war against extremism and terrorism and defeating 
insurgencies.  Donors argue foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid 
recipient countries toward the donor(s) of the aid and branding is an effective tool in 
these efforts.  The channel through which foreign aid is argued to win public hearts 
and minds in the aid recipient countries is threefold: 
1. Behavior follows attitudes—by changing attitudes, we can change behavior. 
2. People are rationale calculating actors-- they support whatever side provides them 
more benefits—goods and services that they need and improve their lives.  
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3. Thus, foreign aid wins public hearts and minds through the delivery of 
reconstruction and development programs and projects, the provision of the 
public goods and services, which raises positive public attitudes and behaviors 
toward the donor of the aid and the opportunity cost of engaging in, participating 
in, or supporting insurgency and extremism in the aid recipient countries--in 
appreciation for the goods and services delivered through the implementation of 
foreign-funded development programs and projects, citizens in the aid recipient 
countries demonstrate support for, trust in, and positive attitudes and behaviors 
toward the donor(s), which makes recruiting difficult and drives extremist and 
terrorist organizations out of business. 
2) Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid 
recipient country? 
Donors also argue by working closely with the government(s) or working through 
the government(s) in the design and delivery of reconstruction and development 
programs and projects, foreign aid wins public hearts and minds and boosts the 
trust and confidence of citizens in their government and the capacity and 
legitimacy of the state in the aid recipient countries.  When people see their 
government works closely with a foreign donor(s), seen as a benevolent partner, 
in the delivery of goods and services that they need and positively change their 
day-today life, they demonstrate positive attitudes and behaviors toward their own 
government and the foreign donor, which raises the opportunity cost of supporting 
of and/or engaging in insurgency and extremism against their own government 
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and the foreign donor for lasting security, peace and prosperity in the developing 
and developed nations. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign aid is taken to mean humanitarian 
and/or development aid given by a donor to a recipient nation(s).  Winning hearts and 
minds is taken to mean a positive change in the attitudes of the public in the aid recipient 
countries toward the donor of the aid and their own state.   
The dissertation assesses the extent of the validity of the above two hypotheses 
and their corresponding central arguments by examining the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.  Some characteristics that link all four cases are the 
U.S. and broader Western military intervention and continuing military and institutional 
presences and roles in the provision and distribution of foreign aid and the development 
of economic and political institutions.  Such factors often reflect American and Western 
European values as much or more than local and national domestic ones.  These four 
cases provide an opportunity to examine the link between foreign aid and winning public 
hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries, which has a major policy implication on 
how foreign aid is allocated, implemented, and securitized by the donor nations.   This 
study is important for the following reasons:  
1. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western nations generally and the United States 
specifically have focused foreign aid on promoting development, democracy and 
winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries in its fight against 
extremism and terrorism, whether rooted in economic, ethnic, ideological and/or 
religious factors (Aldrich 2014).  The fight against extremism and terrorism have 
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also involved expensive military interventions and preemptive wars and state-
building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as extensive efforts to instill 
liberal democratic practices, values, and norms among nations that are seen to be 
lacking in these and posing security threat to the United States and the 
international system.  As a result, new policy choices, alliances, and foreign aid 
need and assessment policies and practices are put in place to ensure security and 
the global war against terrorism is won.  However, winning public hearts and 
minds in the aid recipient countries is at the heart of winning the war against 
extremism and terrorism.  This is due to the fact that grievances lead to 
insurgency, extremism, and terrorism, which, in turn, produce insecurity (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).  Extremist and 
terrorist organizations and networks exploit the existing economic factors and 
political grievances in the Muslim world against the West, in general, and against 
the United States, in particular, (especially, the US foreign policy toward the 
Muslim nations) to promote their ideology and views, justify hatred and 
intolerance, and to recruit and justify the use of violence (Allan et al. 2015; 
Cherney and Hartley 2015; Selim 2016; Mirahmadi 2016).   Thus, assessing the 
link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient 
countries is important both from policy and practical point of view.  Testing the 
validity of the foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds hypothesis would 
inform policymakers and development practitioners to make the necessary 
changes in policy and practice to ensure the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
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winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries and the global war 
against extremism and terrorism is on target.  
2. Local support and perception are crucial for the success of sustainable 
peacebuilding and development efforts, in general, but more so in post-conflict 
societies, which are highly polarized and citizens within these societies are highly 
critical, distrustful, and suspicious of foreign driven reforms.  In post-conflict 
societies, divisions within societies mean that public perceptions of 
marginalization, victimization, preference, and merit are heightened so that a 
reform that a foreign donor and the local state see as an effective solution might 
be seen by local citizens or groups in the society as a case of prejudice, 
aggression, interference, or and inequality.  Such perceptions, in turn, can lead to 
violence and insurgency against the foreign-led efforts, reforms, donor nations, 
and the local state.  The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is an excellent 
example.  The U.S.-led development efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 have 
contributed to the Taliban insurgency, resulting in insecurity, human loss, and 
failure of the desired outcome.   The Taliban sees the U.S.-led broader Western 
efforts of state-building in Afghanistan as an act of foreign invasion, hegemony 
and interference in the domestic affairs of the country.  Thus, perception defines 
reality and contending realities define the success of sustainable peace and public 
reaction to foreign-led efforts and aid.   Sustainable development cannot be 
achieved without full support and participation of the local citizens at the local 
level, which is essential for linking aid and development, strengthening 
governance, improving livelihoods, and fighting extremism and terrorism 
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(Mansuri and Rao 2013; Ghai and Vivian 2014; Curini and et al. 2014).  Onuoha 
(2014, 1) writes “…poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures 
make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant 
preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious 
teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. 
Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities 
ranging from errand running to suicide bombings.” By understanding the link and 
role of foreign aid in winning public perceptions, hearts, and minds, we would be 
able to better understand the cycle of action and response to counter the causes of 
underdevelopment and violence. 
3. The United States and its Western allies have invested considerable blood and 
treasure in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the regime of 
President Saddam Hussein in Iraq and replacing them with new regimes and 
political, economic, and social systems that promote the rule of law, equality, 
economic development, and respect for international order and system. The goal 
in both cases has been to create sustainable democracies and stable states free 
from Islamist extremism.  However, how a political system comes into existence 
or how the development and democratization process is initiated and perceived by 
citizens have an important implication for the legitimacy of the political system as 
well as the development and the democratization process (Boix and Stokes 2007).  
Sustainable economic, political, and social development requires a positive link 
between state and society—state provides public goods to society (such as 
legitimate rule, economic opportunity, welfare, and security, to name a few) and 
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society, in return, accepts state’s rules and provides feedback for improving the 
quality and functionality of the state consistent with the needs and aspirations of 
the society (Banfield 1958).  In other words, state legitimacy, defined here to 
mean that citizens accept the rule and authority of the state as true and right out of 
conviction, not fear or personal advantage (Migdal 1988), is derived from the 
interaction of the state with society, as an active and organized social group, 
allows the state to control and mobilize citizens on behalf of the public cause.  
Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohld (265, 2008) write, “legitimacy is key to building 
sustainable peace, and this legitimacy comes not from the timetable of donors 
with blueprints of postconflict reconstruction, but from the points of view of the 
population.”   Specifically, whether or not citizens perceive the state as legitimate 
and accept its authority and rules determine not only the success and sustainability 
of the state and the democracy and development initiatives, but it also determines 
the success of the war on extremism. Assessing the link between foreign aid and 
winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries toward the foreign 
donors and the local state would have important policy and practical implications 
for the allocation of foreign aid, implementation of development and 
democratization initiatives, state legitimacy, and winning the “war on terror.”  
Western donors also use foreign aid to counter the powerful narratives promoted 
and presented by extremist organizations and networks to promote their ideology and 
particular view of the world by presenting the world events in such a way to portray that 
the West is in ongoing war with Islam and Muslims, which has made some headway 
among younger generations of Muslims  (Khan 2013).  Narratives are not the 
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presentation of facts, but the explanation and presentation of circumstances that tell how 
facts came into existence (Al Raffie 2012; Briggs and Sebastien 2013; Schmid 2014).  
The extremist organizations and networks have masterfully built and based their 
narratives on the persistent existence of pitiful political and socioeconomic inequality and 
injustice, lack of direction and hope in daily life for ordinary citizens, and 
underdevelopment that exist in most Muslim countries to blame the West and its support 
for abusive authoritarian regimes and leaders.  The narrative that West is against Islam 
and Muslims has a long history.  However, it came to the forefront after the U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. While various ideological, 
economic, political, and social factors lead a young man, for example in Iraq, 
Afghanistan or Nigeria, to engage in extremist behaviors and activities, extremist 
organizations and networks use narratives to advance their ideology and influence the 
attitudes and behaviors of young men and women, to join their ranks and engage in 
violent actions.  Terrorist and extremist organizations ingrain narratives with cultural, 
historical, social, and religious aspects of a society to make them more appealing, an 
essential part of an individual’s identity, and to win the support, hearts and minds of 
people.  Since the 9/11 political, military, and development scholars, policymakers and 
practitioners have advanced a sophisticated analytical framework of terrorism.  The 
counter-terrorism strategy of the West, in general, and the United States’s, in particular, 
has been to defeat extremists and terrorists in the battlefield, destroy their safe heavens, 
financial means and training camps, and to take away their lifeline—public support—by 
winning public hearts and minds through the development aid.  After the death of Osama 
bin Laden on May 2, 2011, the counter-terrorism strategy of the West and the United 
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States clearly understands that the global war on terror cannot be won only by defeating 
or killing the leaders of the extremist and terrorist organizations, but winning the public 
hearts and minds in the nations where extremists and terrorists operate.  Since 9/11 
foreign aid has been used as a policy tool to counter the opportunity costs and benefits of 
engaging in terrorist and/or extremist activities and behaviors around the world. The 
argument is that foreign aid provides adequate incentives for governments to aggressively 
fight terrorism and extremism within their territories and for public to withdraw their 
support for terrorism and extremism in order to maximize the benefits of foreign aid and 
development programs and projects (Azam and Delcroix 2006; Azam and Thelen 2008; 
Fearon James D. and et al. 2009; Azam and Thelen 2010; Steinwand 2015).   
Complex Ideological, economics, and sociopolitical factors make or contribute to 
extremism and terrorism (Williams et al. 2016). While military and law enforcement has 
a role to play in fighting extremism and terrorism home and abroad,  winning public 
hearts and minds plays a prominent role in winning the “war on terror” (Rajapaksa and 
Dundes 2006; Beath et al. 2016; USAID 2016).  As a first study of its kind, examining 
the link and role of foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient 
nations would provide potential learning points about structuring or re-structuring foreign 
aid and development programs and projects to reflect prevailing local development and 
security needs and confronting insecurity, extremism, and terrorism consistent with 
donor’s policy and military objectives.  Examining the validity of the widely held 
hypothesis that foreign aid, as a soft power, wins public hearts and minds in the aid 
recipient countries, which, in turn, wins consent for the presence of foreign troops, 
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support for local government, and development and security measures is important given 
the securitization of foreign aid in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.  
Chapter 1 provided a very basic introduction as to why developed countries 
provide foreign aid to underdeveloped nations and discussed the conditionality of foreign 
aid to winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries as a hedge against 
insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.   By way of 
introduction, Chapter 2 provides a review of the related literature and Chapter 3 discusses 
the design and methodology of the study. Chapter 4 presents the data and findings and 
Chapter 5 provides data analysis and discussion.  Chapter 6 presents the analysis of 
survey results and examines the link between foreign aid and positive public attitudes 
toward foreign donors and the state in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo and answers the research questions.  Concluding remarks are presented in 
Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
By far, the most common causes of civil wars and terrorism are state weakness, 
fragile, and, ultimately, failure.  Weak and fragile states (states that lack capacity or will 
to provide effective and efficient public services) and failing and failed states (states that 
can no longer provide public services) are the breeding ground for human sufferings, 
crimes, drugs, disease, environmental degradation, insecurity, civil wars, and terrorism 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Coggins 2014; Hendrix and Young 
2014; Rolandsen 2015).  While there are disagreement and debate among scholars 
regarding the definitions of weak, fragile, failing, and failed states, there is a consensus 
among scholars that such entities are the single most important problem facing the 
international order and community in the 21st century (Fukuyama 2004; Patrick 2006; 
Newman 2009).  The most recent cases of state failure growing out of intrastate conflicts 
are Yemen (2015-present), Syria (2011-present), Libya (2011-present), Iraq (2003-
present), Afghanistan (2001-present), Kosovo (1998-1999), and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1992-1995).   
This literature review is organized as follows.  First, the literature review defines 
and discusses weak, fragile, and failing states in general and focuses on Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq in particular and presents the challenges and 
responses of the international community and the United States to state weakness, 
fragility and failure in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.  Against this background, the 
review discusses foreign aid and changes in its focus and objectives, who gets what and 
why, and the United States’ approach to state failure, development, and security—
typically characterized as a “with us vs. against us” approach.  Finally, the review 
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discusses donors’ emphasis on winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient nations 
and the overall effects of foreign aid on governance and public in the four cases of 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.  In doing so, the review 
identifies the critical shift toward securitization of foreign aid and donors’ emphasis on 
winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient nations as a hedge against insecurity, 
extremism, and terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and gaps in extant research.  
 
Weak, Fragile, and Failing States 
Burnell and Randall (2005, 391) define “weak states” as “…states lacking the 
capability to penetrate society fully, regulate social relations, extract and distribute 
resources, or implement policies and plans” and “failed sates” as states that can no longer 
perform these essential functions, which are the foundation of legitimacy and success of a 
state.  Fragile states are “ineffective” or “poor performing” states—states that are unable 
or unwilling to effectively utilize both domestic and international resources to deliver 
essential public goods and services to their citizens (Stewart and Brown 2010; Patrick 
2011). 
 For development practitioners and policymakers, the state plays a central role in 
the delivery of essential public goods and services defined here as the rule of law, 
security, economic opportunity, basic human services, and political participation either 
directly or indirectly by setting rules.  Security, especially human security, is by far the 
most important public good, of all other goods and services, that a state provides, which 
according to Tilly (1992) was the reason for the emergence of the modern state in the 
16th and 17th century Europe.  The Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 not only ended 
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the 30-year war between Protestants and Catholics and put Europe on the path to peace 
and prosperity, but it also (especially the three core points of the Treaty—the principle of 
state sovereignty, the principle of equality of states, and the principle of non-intervention 
of one state in the affairs of another state) placed state sovereignty at the forefront of 
international relations and has continued to serve as a foundation for the international 
system and the system of modern nation-state that we have today (Croxton 1999).  Olson 
(1993) argues that the provision of internal and external security is the very foundation 
for the emergence of popular state and democracy; and Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) 
write that citizens accept state’s monopoly of power and control of society in return for 
providing sociopolitical order that protects them against “banditry” and expropriation to 
realize the full fruits of their investment.  It is therefore not surprising that the rise and 
fall of a state and its legitimacy in the minds and hearts of its citizens and the 
international community is based on its ability and will to deliver public services to its 
citizens.  Many scholars argue that for establishing security, the rule of law, economic, 
political, and social development, and democratic political institutions, a legitimate and 
functioning state is the prerequisite (Fukuyama 2004; Kohli 2004; Kraxberger 2007; 
Zoellick 2008; Collmer 2013).  Failure to deliver public services, especially security, 
leads to a loss of legitimacy, civil war, and international conflict, which can destabilize 
the state, neighbors, and the international community (Feil 2002; Brinkerhoff, 
Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012; Arslan et al. 2015).  The most recent examples of weak, 
fragile, and failing states are Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen, all of which have had regional and international security and 
destabilization implications requiring the United States and the international community 
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to not only act and invest in state-building, political and economic development in these 
cases, but, more importantly, to rethink the policy and practice of dealing with state 
failure and weakness in the aftermath of 9/11. Rotberg (2003, 1) writes, “nation-state fail 
because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive 
political goods to their inhabitants. Their government lose legitimacy, and the very nature 
of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a 
growing plurality of its citizens.”  Fukuyama (2004) and Hamre and Sullivan (2002) 
argue that failing and failed states matter not because of the widespread human sufferings 
and abuse that occur in these states, but because such states pose serious security threats 
to the United States and the international community. 
Donald Henry Rumsfeld, the United States’ Secretary of Defense (2001-2006), 
stated that “in several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies, 
safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary 
to terrorists and criminal organizations poses a threat to stability and places demands on 
U.S. forces.  Afghanistan is but one example of the security implications for the U.S. of 
such weak or ungoverned areas. Conditions in some states, including some with nuclear 
weapons, demonstrate that threats can grow out of the weakness of governments as much 
as out of their strength” (Dorff 2005, 28). 
The most significant threats posed by weak, fragile, and failed states to the 
international community are security threats. Extremist and terrorist organizations and 
leaders use fragile, failing, and failed states as a base to launch acts of terrorism against 
the West in general and the United States in particular.  The tragic events of September 
11, 2001 underscore the point that fragile, failing and failed states provide the terrorists 
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and extremist organizations and leaders with opportunities to establish their base, acquire 
resources and weapon of mass destruction, and recruit and train terrorists to carry out acts 
of terrorism in the United States and elsewhere in the world. 
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it is widely believed in the West 
that religion, particularly the Islamic religion, is the base for the most conflicts and 
extremist views.  Samuel Huntington (1996) in The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order argues that Islam has “bloody boarders” and conflicts in the 
21st Century will be between civilizations, in particular between Islamic and Western 
civilizations, not states.  However, Fox (2004, 59) states that between 1950 and 1996 
conflicts were “…caused by economic, national, political, cultural, psychological, 
postcolonial, modernity, and strategic issues,” not a religion, particularly the Islamic 
religion.  Loza (2007, 142) writes, “Middle-Eastern terrorism rests upon more than 
religion. It is based upon current and historical cultural experiences within the Islamic 
world. These experiences include political and racial conflicts both within and between 
these nations, and the historical relationships between the Islamic world and the West. It 
is maintained through several ideologies, environmental pressures, and its adherents are 
never lacking in justifications.”  Aly and Striegher (2012, 852) write that 
“…radicalization models that give primacy to religion conflate a range of motivations, 
issues, and historically specific contexts into a single interpretation and treat the political 
agenda of Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, Islamist ideology, Arab–Western historical 
relations and jihadist objectives as one.” They argue that “…it is imperative to consider 
that evidence confirms that there is no single pathway to radicalization and no distinct 
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pattern to profile an individual throughout any of the stages of radicalization” (Aly and 
Striegher 2012, 860). 
Extremism and Terrorism are complex phenomena and anti-terrorism policies are 
based on a web of military, social, political, and economic interventions and education.  
To counter the risk and problems of security and the revengeful plots of misguided 
terrorists, the United States and the international community promote economic, political 
and social developments in weak, fragile, and failing states so that the environment and 
conditions for the activities and the ideology of extremism and terrorism are permanently 
put to rest. 
 
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 In 1913 Kosovo was integrated into the Kingdom of Serbia, which in 1918 
became part of Yugoslavia.   Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia (1943-1980), 
granted autonomy to Kosovo in 1963, which it lost after Slobodan Milosevic became 
President of Serbia (1989-1997).  Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to the newly 
formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on October 26, 1918.  At the end of 
World War II, Bosnia and Herzegovina were reunited as a single state and became one of 
the six republics of the new established Yugoslavia.   Post-World War II Yugoslavia 
consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo).  
The death of President Josip Broz Tito (1943-1980), who had kept Yugoslavia together as 
a revolutionary leader, statesman and dictator, ignited the deep mistrust and ethnic hatred 
and rivalry between different ethnic communities that lived together in Yugoslavia, 
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resulting in economic collapse, state failure, and, eventually, the Bosnia and Kosovo civil 
wars of 1992-95 and 1998-99, respectively (Arman 2012; Yarashevich and Karneyeva 
2013; Zejnullahi 2014), both of which prompted military and development interventions 
from Europe and the United States to address insecurity, human suffering, and the spread 
of extremism and terrorism to Europe and the rest of the international community.  
Kosovo’s and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s wars had a crippling effect on the 
infrastructures, governance, and people of both nations.  Foreign aid is used by the 
United States, European Union, and the international community to address the 
humanitarian, economic, political, and social crises and security challenges as a hedge 
against extremism and terrorism.   
 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
 The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, which 
resulted in the installation of a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist government (The 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), led to a series of intrastate conflicts that have 
taken a heavy toll on the country since.  The collapse of security, economy, law and 
order, and state not only threatened the wellbeing of the Afghan people, but also posed 
serious problems to the international community, from security to illegal drugs to 
terrorism.  Al Qaeda and its late mastermind and leader, Osama bin Laden, seized the 
opportunity and established terrorist training camps in Afghanistan after their expulsion 
from a safe haven in Sudan in 1996.  On 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda carried terrorist 
attacks against the United States by flying hijacked passenger airliners into the World 
Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Arlington, VA.  The events of 9/11 changed 
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everything in the United States and beyond, in general, but it has had more profound 
effects on foreign policy and its focus, in particular (Huddy and Feldman 2011; Woods 
2011).   
In the aftermath of 9/11 and subsequent removal of the Taliban regime from 
power in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003.  
The Saddam Hussein regime (1979-2003) posed security threats to the United States, the 
international community, and neighboring states by developing weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) (Monteiro and Debs 2014).  With little or no respect for the laws of 
conventional warfare that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, Saddam extensively 
used chemical weapons, especially mustard gas, against Iran during the 1980-1988 Iraq-
Iran war, which resulted in high deaths, morbidity, and irreversible health problems in 
military and civilians (Bijani and Moghadamnia 2002).    On 2 August 1990, Saddam 
invaded and annexed Kuwait against the international legal order that prohibits the use of 
force by a state against the territorial integrity of another state (Green Wood 1992).  In 
addition, Saddam’s regime was abusive and had little respect for human rights. Saddam 
used the weapon of mass destruction not only against Iran, but also against his own 
people (the Kurds) in March 1989, which is widely known and condemned as the Halabja 
chemical attack or the Halabja massacre (O’Leary 2002).  For these reasons and also for 
the fear of that Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction again or hand them over 
to terrorist organizations for use against the United States and the international 
community, the George W. Bush administration launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
March 2003 to forcefully remove Saddam’s regime from power and replace it with a 
democratic, peace-loving, and progressive regime (Cremer and Thrall 2013).  However, 
 23 
civil war followed the U.S.-led invasion and removal of Saddam from power in Iraq, 
which destabilized and posed serious security threats to the region and the international 
community. 
To counter the threats to the international security and order posed by weak, 
fragile, and failed states, developed countries have been providing aid to underdeveloped 
nations to build state capacity, empower and engage civil society, create liberal 
democratic institutions and the rule of law, control corruption, and promote economic 
development and transparency (Minoiu and Reddy 2010; Younas and Bandyopadhyay 
2011; Savun and Tirone 2012; Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Gibson, Hoffman and 
Jablonski 2015).  Forty-five years ago, in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution, the 
United Nations specified that developed countries should give 0.7% of their Gross 
National Product (GNP), as official development assistance, to underdeveloped countries.  
The following figure depicts net official development assistance (ODA) from members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 
underdeveloped countries, in millions of U.S. dollars, 2000-2016. 
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Figure 1. Official Development Assistance (ODA) From Members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development to Underdeveloped Countries, in Millions 
of U.S. Dollars, 2000-2016 
 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm. 
 
 
 The OECD has 34 member states, and only five (Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) met or exceeded the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target in 2016 (OECD 
2018).   According to OECD (2018), Afghanistan received $3,206.63 million, Iraq 
$1,333.10 million, Bosnia and Herzegovina $155.87 million, and Kosovo $156.71 
million in official development assistant (ODA) from DAC countries in 2016.  The 
United States and the international community have been involved in Afghanistan since 
2001, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, in Iraq since 2003, and in Kosovo since 
1999 to help those states become stable, democratic, and economically viable nations that 
do not pose security threats to the United States, its allies and the broader international 
community.  The roles and support of the European Union and member states in Balkan, 
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Iraq, and Afghanistan have been vital for the success of the peace and development 
projects in these countries.  In particular, after the September 11 attacks against the 
United States, the European Union, and member states have been fully engaged in 
supporting the U.S.-led war on terror.  The 9/11 attacks were perceived by the European 
Union and member states as attacks on Western values of freedom, tolerance, and 
openness and NATO invoked its collective defense provision, Article 5, for the first time 
in its history to openly support the U.S.-led military and development operations in 
Afghanistan (Bensahel 2003).  The European Union and member states have provided 8 
billion Euros in assistance to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2010; and for the 2011 to 2013 
period, the EU alone has pledged 200 million Euros a year to the country (European 
Union 2011).  At the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016), which was co-chaired 
by the European Union and Afghanistan, the European Union and its member states 
pledged €5 billion (USD 5.6 billion) in development aid to Afghanistan from  2016 to 
2020 (European Union 2018). 
A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is 
provided through private donations, which are mainly raised and allocated by 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Buthe, Major and Souza 2012).  
Since the 1960s, there has been a steady increase in private foreign aid from developed to 
developing countries.  In 1964, private volunteer organizations (PVOs) or Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) sent $2.8 billion in foreign aid to developing 
countries; by 1980 that figure had risen to $4.7 billion, a 68% increase, in just 16 years 
(Smith 1990).  In 1979 there were only 137 private voluntary organizations registered 
with USAID, but by December 2013, their number was 593 (Nikolova 2015).  In 2010, 
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the revenue for the U.S.-based private voluntary organizations was $27.8 billion.  
According to the Center for Global Prosperity (2013), 80% of the total financial flow 
from developed to developing countries is private and government aid accounts for less 
than 20%.  The total amount of U.S. charitable private aid to the developing nations is 
three and a half times larger than the U.S. government’s foreign aid (Center for Global 
Prosperity 2006).   The boom in American NGOs came in the aftermath of World War II 
as an alternative for dealing directly with foreign governments and as a mean to establish 
Western democracy and free market economy in the former Soviet bloc in the early 
1990s (Schnable 2015).  Since then, NGOs have been playing a major role in distributing 
humanitarian aids, fighting poverty, and promoting the rule of law, development, and 
democracy in developing countries.  In 2014, 617 NGOs were active in Afghanistan (347 
local and 263 international NGOs) (Mitchell 2017).  The rise in the number and role of 
NGOs, as political agents, is also due to a shift in the development paradigm from state-
based interventions to non-state actors, such as NGOs.  In the later part of the 20th 
century (especially in 1960s and 1970s) policymakers in developed countries have 
questioned whether states in developing countries have authority over their territory to 
deliver public goods and services and implement development programs and projects, 
and even if they do, whether elites in charge of the state functions were concerned with 
addressing social, economic and political inequalities within their territories, resulting in 
a shaft in development paradigm from state-led to market-led (Adam Smith’s notion of 
free market) model of development that give rise to the number and role of NGOs in 
development (Jeffrey 2016).  However, in the 21st century, sustainable development is 
neither a state-led process nor as a market-led process, which cannot be a top-down 
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prescriptive initiatives dictated by foreign experts based on a blueprint of liberal Western 
institutions or experience, but a process that is indigenous and collectively led by a 
healthy and balanced interplay between state, market, technology, and civil society in 
which both Western donors and NGOs have a role to play.  
 
Foreign Aid: Who Gets What and Why? 
 Is the flow of foreign aid from a developed country to an underdeveloped country 
dictated by political and strategic considerations of the donor, or economic needs and 
policy performance of the recipient country, or a combination of the two?  Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) argue that it is the political and strategic considerations of the donor 
country that dictate the flow of foreign aid to underdeveloped countries.  According to 
Alesina and Dollar (2000, 33), “an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-
democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more 
foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, 
but without a past as a colony.”  Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp (2015) note that 
political misalignment and ideological distance between the donor and aid recipient 
countries influence the flow and effectiveness of aid.  During the Cold War period (1945-
1991), the flow of aid from Western donors and Soviet bloc states was influenced by the 
grand strategies of the two opposing economic and political systems, democracy and 
capitalism for the former and autocracy and communism for the latter (Dunning 2004).  
During the Cold War, Western donors ignored human rights abuses and corruption to 
create clients to counter the spread of communism, while the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Pact surrogates emphasized promoting communism and revolutionary communist parties 
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and/or leaders in disbursing foreign aid (Zanger 2000; Neumayer 2003).  Fleck and Kilby 
(2010, 185) contend that “during the Cold War, short term foreign policy decisions 
driven by the State Department strongly influenced the U.S. aid program.  Anti-
communist dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines, and Mobutu 
in Zaire could count on substantial U.S. funding despite widespread corruption, human 
rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies.”  The 1948-1952 Marshall 
Plan, the $13 billion Europe economic recovery plan ($130 billion in 2015 U.S. dollar 
value), was the first U.S. major foreign aid program that came as part of a major effort to 
provide humanitarian aid and helping hand to those in dire need, to promote stability, 
peace, prosperity, trade, and economic cooperation, and to counter the spread of 
communism and the expansion of Soviet Union in Europe (Gimbel 1976; Radelet 2003).  
Given the tremendous success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman (1945-
1953) proposed the creation of an international development program in 1949 with the 
focus of creating market for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing 
productivity in developing countries and countering the spread and threat of communism 
by helping nations to prosper under capitalism (USAID 2015).  U.S. aid in the 1950s was 
designed to provide capital and technical assistance, in the 1960s to promote 
development, in the 1970s to provide basic human needs, in the 1980s to promote 
market-led development and stabilization of currency and financial systems, in the 1990s 
to promote sustainable development and democracy, and in the 2000s to promote security 
and good governance to counter-terrorism (USAID 2015).   
 In the aftermath of 9/11, national security and war on terror are the driving force 
of foreign aid (Miles 2012).  Boutton and Carter (2014, 1160) write that “…both the 
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number of attacks on U.S. targets within a recipient’s borders and the severity of those 
attacks significantly increase the level of aid it receives from the United States.”  The Al 
Qaeda terrorist organization’s attacks brought national security and war on terror to the 
forefront of foreign aid.  As Young and Findley (2011, 365) note,  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration 
elevated foreign aid as a key instrument in the “War on Terror.”  Aid was 
repeatedly identified as a necessary policy option.  In the 2002 State of the 
Union Address, for example, Bush argued that “[w]e have a great 
opportunity during the time of war to lead the world toward the values that 
will bring lasting peace.”  His subsequent budget reflected this claim by 
including a nearly $750 million increase in foreign aid spending. 
 
 In March 2002, President George W. Bush proposed a dramatic increase of 50% 
in foreign aid, over the ensuing three years, through the creation of the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA)—an account to provide $5 billion per year to selected 
countries whose governments were ruling justly, investing in their people, and 
establishing economic freedom (Radelet 2003).  In his State of the Union address two 
months earlier, President Bush called for $10 billion additional funds, over the ensuing 
five years, to counter the problem of AIDS in the most distressed nations of Africa and 
the Caribbean.  In 2008, in the U.S. Congressional hearings, before the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and House of 
Representatives, experts highlighted the importance of foreign aid and ways to make 
foreign aid more effective in the fight against terrorism (U.S. Congress 2008).  
Congressman Howard L. Berman (California) chaired the hearing and stated in his 
opening statement: 
Foreign assistance, including humanitarian development assistance, plays a 
critical role in our foreign policy. While I would support them simply 
because they are the right thing to do, I also support foreign aid because 
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foreign assistance programs can effectively alleviate many of the foreign 
policy problems of the United States. Foreign aid is a powerful weapon in 
the war of ideas. Nothing burnishes our image abroad better than saving 
lives, improving health care, providing education and infrastructure to 
developing countries. It is in our national security interest to provide foreign 
aid. 
 
Congressman David Scott (Georgia) stated: 
This is indeed a very timely and extraordinarily important hearing. There is 
no higher priority for us than fighting terrorism, being successful in winning 
the war on terror, and perhaps the most effective tool that we have is 
leveraging our foreign aid to achieve these goals. We are all aware of the 
importance of a multi-faceted national security and foreign policy. We are 
often told that these consist of a combined approach of what I call the three 
Ds—defense, diplomacy and development. But we are here today to discuss 
how these three elements have been intertwined, particularly in recent years, 
as well as possibilities for the future.  
 
Dell L. Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, in his 
testimony, stated:  
Since September 11, 2001, we have employed all elements of national 
power, including military force, to confront threats posed by terrorism. 
International community has captured or killed numerous senior operatives 
in al-Qaeda and its network. It has thus degraded ability of terrorists to plan 
and mount attacks. But I would like to make one thing clear. Capture and 
kill efforts, while are essential, are just one part of a much broader U.S. and 
global endeavor focused on accomplishing our long-term goals of 
countering terrorism.  
 
Douglas Farah, Senior Investigator, Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation, Senior 
Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, in his testimony stated: 
The changes across the globe have been swift and dramatic. As Mr. Scott 
noted earlier, in 1996, the World Bank judged 11 states to be failing across 
the world. By 2003, the number had risen to 17, and by 2006, the number is 
26 and growing. These changes are important because they give rise to new 
hybrids that make the traditional distinction between terrorism and 
organized crime, particularly drug trafficking impossible to sustain. What 
draws these groups together is overt state sponsorship for terrorism has been 
curtailed or the shadow facilitators who understand how to exploit the seams 
in the international legal and economic structures and who work with both 
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terrorist and criminal groups. Both groups use the same pipelines, the same 
illicit structures, and exploit the same state weaknesses…One cannot fight 
terrorism without fighting the financing that brings social and economic 
collapse and without cutting off the revenue sources of terrorist and criminal 
groups now often drawn from the same pool.  Our approach to combating 
terrorism, and the aid we give, is often limited by our confinement to dealing 
with individual states one at a time, an increasing number that are classified 
as failing…The fact is that on the ground we are still lacking a holistic 
approach that looks beyond single countries to regions into the crippling 
weaknesses of the international regimes that were designed to combat crime 
in bygone eras.  Where a country wants to bring order to its ungoverned 
spaces, the traditional types of aid are viable. Colombia and Mexico in this 
hemisphere are clear examples of states making heroic and costly efforts to 
contain non-state narco actors and terrorists.  In criminal states, such aid is 
neither wanted nor useful. It simply serves to strengthen corrupt and brutal 
regimes, unless it is on such a small scale and so specifically targeted that 
it escapes the predatory state…There is no single answer to the question that 
this subcommittee asked as to whether U.S. aid should be contingent on a 
country’s counterterrorism efforts given the variety of interests in any 
particular state. However, I think the Bout case offers some guidelines for 
saying yes as a general rule. 
 
In 2010, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi cited foreign aid as 
vital in preventing the victims of floods that had submerged 17 million acres of farmland 
from engaging in or supporting terrorism (Varner 2010).  Since 9/11, foreign aid has 
become one of the most vital tools in countering security threats and fighting terrorism.  
As a result, the focus of foreign aid has been on the following two areas—with the United 
States or against it and winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries.  Since 
2001, countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and others that have 
been at the forefront of the war on terror have been the top U.S. foreign aid recipients in 
the world, which punctuates the point. 
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With The U.S. or Against The U.S. 
 After the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and 
overthrew the regimes of the Taliban (1996-2001) and Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) in 
those respective countries. President George W. Bush justified the removal of the Taliban 
from power for that regime allowing the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization to establish safe 
haven and plan the 9/11 attacks from its bases in the country, refusing to hand over 
Osama bin Laden, the group’s leader and the master mind of the 9/11 attacks, abusing 
human and women’s rights, and using terrorism as a tactic to further its military, political 
and ideological goals.  The removal of Saddam from power was based on the reasons that 
Iraq was abusing human rights, had little or no respect for international legal order, 
territorial integrity of the neighboring states, and laws of conventional warfare; and 
Saddam was developing weapon of mass destruction, which Iraq had used in the past 
against Iran and its own people, the Kurds, and he might use these weapons again against 
another nation or supply them to terrorists (Green wood 1992; Bijani and Moghadamnia 
2002; Wedgwood 2003).  Since the removal of Taliban (2001) and Saddam (2003) from 
power, the United States and the international community have poured billions of foreign 
aid dollars into these countries to promote security, the rule of law, and economic, 
political, and social development to foster peace and counter the environment and 
condition that lead to terrorism and/or tyranny.  In his June 2002 speech in West Point, 
President Bush adopted “preemption” as a national security and development/foreign aid 
strategy in dealing with rogue and/or failed states, stressing,  
…America was attacked by a ruthless and resourceful enemy. We will 
defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants…the war on 
terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the 
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enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they 
emerge…the only path to safety is the path of action…our security will 
require transforming the military you will lead -- a military that must be 
ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And 
our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, 
to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and 
to defend our lives…as we defend the peace, we also have an historic 
opportunity to preserve the peace…we have a great opportunity to extend a 
just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the 
world with hope of a better day…the 20th century ended with a single 
surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of 
human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for 
women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious 
tolerance. America cannot impose this vision -- yet we can support and 
reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our 
development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international 
broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will 
promote moderation and tolerance and human rights (White House 2002).  
 
 In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush also demanded that all nations must choose 
whether they are with the United States in its war on terror or they are with the enemy—
the terrorists.  The message was that terrorism is a global phenomenon and the “war on 
terror” cannot be won alone by the United States, developed and developing countries 
must be engaged as well.  The response from the developed and developing countries was 
positive that they stand with the United States in its “war on terror.”  Donors have since 
conditioned foreign aid and have emphasized that aid recipient nations must take actions 
to eradicate the environment and condition that encourage extremism and terrorism—lack 
of education, economic opportunity, security, justice, the rule of law, and grievances to 
name a few.  In September 2001, Bush enlisted Pakistan as a pivotal ally in the U.S.-led 
“war on terror” and offered a $600 million aid package.  In his 2004 budget, Bush called 
for $4.7 billion aid for key states in the war on terror, including $657 million for 
Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million for Pakistan, and $255 million for 
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Turkey (Buckley and Singh 2006).  In closing of the Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism on 18 February 2015, President Barak H. Obama stated,  
…so if we’re going to prevent people from being susceptible to the false 
promises of extremism, then the international community has to offer 
something better.  And the United States intends to do its part…countries 
have to truly invest in the education and skills and job training that our 
extraordinary young people need…just as we address economic grievances, 
we need to face a third challenge -- and that's addressing the political 
grievances that are exploited by terrorists.  When governments oppress their 
people, deny human rights, stifle dissent, or marginalize ethnic and religious 
groups, or favor certain religious groups over others, it sows the seeds of 
extremism and violence…so the essential ingredient to real and lasting 
stability and progress is not less democracy; it’s more democracy…so these 
terrorists are a threat, first and foremost, to the communities that they target, 
which means communities have to take the lead in protecting 
themselves.  And that is true here in America, as it's true anywhere else (The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2015). 
 
 In short, foreign aid and the war on terror have been intimately linked 
since the Al Qaeda terrorist organization’s attacks of 9/11 against the United 
States.  Aid is conditioned to and aid receipts countries are asked to do more in 
solidarity with the United States and the international community in their war on 
terror by addressing the environment and conditions that may lead to grievances, 
resentments, extremism, and/or terrorism against the West.  Howell (2006, 121) 
notes,   
In the field of development, the global war on terror has highlighted the 
strategic relevance of foreign aid to both national interests and global 
security at a time when its ideological rationale in the post-Cold War era 
had almost disappeared. Aware of the perceived threat to global security 
and global markets, a melee of actors including leaders of low-income 
countries, U.S. and European politicians, UN leaders and many 
developmental NGOs have for diverse reasons lobbied for an increase in 
aid.  However, the introduction of repressive measures coupled with the 
increasingly explicit subordination of foreign aid to the military, foreign 
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policy, and economic interests has altered the context in which foreign aid 
is framed and implemented.  
 
Winning Hearts and Minds 
 According to Dixon (2009), the phrase winning hearts and minds is associated 
with the British Counterinsurgency tactics in Malaya (1948–1960) and the U.S. 
counterinsurgency tactics against the communist insurgents in Vietnam (1955-1975).  
These tactics emphasize that the use of less coercive force against the insurgents is 
essential to winning the hearts and minds of the general public within a given country 
under reconstruction.  The logic is that the success of counterinsurgency or any other 
intervention be it military, political, economic, or social, rests on the support, attitude, 
behavior, and perception of the public toward that intervention.  Perception is everything.  
Perception plays a central role in decision making and the choices that one makes in any 
situation (Holsti 1967; Jervis 1976; Betts 1978).  Perception shapes our belief, 
worldview, and how one perceives the actions, interests, and motivations of others.  For 
example, welfare spending by a state shapes a positive perception among the public that 
the government “cares” about citizens and “shares” their feelings and needs, which leads 
to increased legitimacy of the state and decreased support among the public for violence 
against the state (Taydas and Pksen 2012).  Sides and Gross (2013, 596) write, 
“perceptions of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy are a key ingredient in support for 
several aspects of the War on Terror.”  The perceptions among Muslims of Western 
interference, in general, and American interference, in particular, in the political and 
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economic affairs of Muslims are associated with engaging in and supporting terrorism 
among Muslims (Li and Schaub 2004; Moghaddam 2005;  Gupta 2005). 
 However, perceptions and misperceptions alike are shaped by information 
received in any situation and time.  Since the 9/11 attacks, donors not only focus more on 
using foreign aid as a tool to address the economic and political conditions that might 
lead to extremism and terrorism, but they also put more emphasis on publicizing foreign 
aid as a tool to generate positive perception, attitude, and behavior toward the donor 
nation(s) by winning the hearts and minds of the public in the aid recipient countries. 
Donors demand that foreign aid be branded in accordance with their branding policies, 
publicized, and well communicated with the aid recipient citizens.  According to the U.S 
Agency for International Development (2018), “USAID's framework legislation, the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, section 641, requires that all programs 
under the Foreign Assistance Act be identified appropriately overseas as ‘American 
Aid’."  Similarly, the U.K. branding guidelines mandate that all foreign aid should be 
branded as “from the British people.” 
 Donor states see foreign aid as being integral to their national security and the 
success of their foreign policies and argue that informed local beneficiaries of foreign aid 
will reciprocate and reward the donor(s) with their support and positive hearts and minds.  
The argument is that publicity of foreign aid wins the hearts and minds of citizens in the 
aid recipient country, leading to positive attitude, perception, and behavior among the 
public, which not only make the implementation of humanitarian, development, and/or 
social change programs and projects easy, but it also counters extremist attitudes, feelings 
and behaviors toward the donor country that terrorists usually exploit.  At the core of the 
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“winning hearts and minds” is the theory of social exchange, which is deeply rooted in 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, and economic and is concerned with understanding 
exchange of resources and rewards between individuals and groups in social interactions 
(Emerson 1976; Fiske 1992).  The social exchange theory states that social interactions 
and/or relations are based on the perception of relative costs and benefits, which provides 
the foundation and standard for future interactions and relationships (Ward and Berno 
2011).  This theory is based on the assumption of self-interest--actors participate in a 
social exchange to accomplish an individual goal that neither party can accomplish alone 
(Lawler and Thye 1999)—and the rationality and logic of reciprocity.  Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006, 294) define reciprocity as “… a behavioral response to perceived 
kindness and unkindness, where kindness comprises both distributional fairness as well 
as fairness intentions” and argue that reciprocity is “…a powerful determinant of human 
behavior.”  According to Falk and Fischbacher (2006), people evaluate the kindness or 
unkindness of an action based on the evaluation of the consequence of the action and the 
underlying intention of the actor of the given action.  Therefore, the first action of 
kindness or unkindness reciprocates the second or subsequent action of kindness or 
unkindness.  More pointedly, each party evaluates each interaction and it is the balance of 
the past interactions that determines the perception of the relationship and the rule of the 
future exchanges (Ballinger and Rockmann 2010).  According to the social exchange 
theory, social interactions and exchanges between individuals and groups based on 
reciprocity over a period of time lead to a feeling of personal obligations, gratitude, and 
trust (Blau 1964; Honeycutt 1981; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).   However, critics of 
the social exchange theory argue that all social interactions are not based on immediate 
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cost-benefit analysis and the cost-benefit analysis itself is contingent on the context. 
Winschniewski et al. (2009, 306), for instance, argue that “…contextual information is 
vital for an individual’s benefit-cost evaluation in a given situation.”  Trivers (1971) and 
Hammerstein and Leimer (2006)  suggest that in direct reciprocity interactions between 
two individuals or groups are repeated based on the exchange of resources that both have, 
value, and benefit from the exchange. However, in indirect reciprocity the benefit or pay-
off of social interactions lies in the distant future (Nowak 2006).  An example of indirect 
reciprocity is helping strangers, which may not result in immediate direct reward, but 
may yield one in the long-run improved social status, recognition, and approval.  In 
addition to the social exchange theory, the contact theory and the integrated threat theory 
are also applied to analyze social interactions and relationships between individuals and 
groups.  The integrated threat theory, which is deeply rooted in psychology and 
sociology, argues that four types of threats--realistic threats (threats to the very 
existence), symbolic threats (threats based on perceived differences in moral, values, 
standards, and beliefs), intergroup anxiety (threats out of concern for being embarrassed, 
ridiculed, or rejected), and negative stereotypes (threats for fear of negative 
consequences) are operative in any given social interaction situations between individuals 
and groups that result in perceived stereotypes and prejudices (Stephan and Stephan 
2000).   Contact theory contends that frequent and satisfying intercultural contacts 
between individuals and groups result in a lower perception of threat, reduced prejudice, 
and higher positive attitudes toward members of the out-group (Ward and Berno 2011; 
Alperin,  Hornsey,  Hayward, Diedrichs and Barlow 2014).  According to these two 
theories, individual traits, cultural differences, social values and standards, and frequency 
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of contact play a vital role in social interactions, cost-benefit analysis, and the decision to 
defect or continue with social exchange and interactions. However, overall, the social 
exchange theory provides the theoretical foundation to analyze social interactions 
between individuals and groups, and it has been applied widely to business, social, and 
political contexts (Coulson et al. 2014).  
 Donors argue that humanitarian and development aid and projects can win hearts 
and minds by communicating information about the identity, generosity, engagement, 
and commitment of a donor to the cause and wellbeing of local communities and citizens 
in the aid recipient country resulting in feelings of appreciation, gratitude, positive 
attitude, and behavior among citizens toward their own state and the foreign donor 
(Zhang 2008; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010; USAID 2018).  Positive attitudes and 
behavior of citizens toward their state lead to greater compliance with and participation in 
governmental policies and programs, which, in turn, leads to improved state capacity and 
legitimacy (Brinkerhoff et al. 2012).  Positive attitudes and perception among citizens in 
the aid recipient country toward a donor result in a decline in negative perceptions and 
hostile behavior toward the donor country, which, in turn, leads to greater acceptance of 
its peacekeeping forces, political and development programs, and social change projects 
in the short term.  Over the long term, positive and favorable attitudes toward a donor 
country among local citizens are expected to materialize in the form of greater security 
and influence of the donor country on the political, economic, and military affairs of the 
aid recipient country.  Cosmides and Tooby (1989, 52) write, “human beings live in 
groups, and their behavior is affected by information derived from the other individuals 
with whom they live… The behavior elicited by this information reverberates throughout 
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the individual's social group, as information that other individuals may act on in turn.  
The ongoing cycle that results is the generation of culture.”  According to USAID (2018), 
in many Muslim countries favorable opinions of the United States were very low in 2004.  
However, in early 2005 favorable opinions of the United States nearly doubled among 
Indonesians, from 37% to 66%, due to effective branding, communicating, and visibility 
of foreign aid delivery in the aftermath of the U.S. 2004/2005 tsunami efforts.  In 
December 2004, the U.S. government and citizens pledged $1 billion in aid to tsunami-
affected countries of Indonesia, where 107,000 people died, and Sri Lanka, where 30,000 
people died (Becker 2005; VanRooyen and Leaning 2005).  The Pew Global Attitude 
Project (2005), which conducted a large country study in Indonesia in understanding anti-
Americanism, reported that positive opinions of the U.S. in Indonesia increased from 
15% in 2003 (pre-tsunami aid efforts) to 38% in May 2005 (post-tsunami aid efforts) 
(Rajapaksa and Dundes 2006).  Furthermore, Pew researchers also reported that 79% of 
the Indonesians stated that they feel more favorable toward the U.S. due to its tsunami aid 
efforts in the country.   In addition, Rajapaksa and Dundes (2006) also assessed whether 
the U.S. 2004/2005 tsunami aid efforts in Sri Lanka resulted in positive views of the 
United States in the country.  They reported, that 84% of the respondents stated that the 
U.S. tsunami aid was generous, and 60% stated that it was granted altruistically without 
the American self-benefits (Rajapaksa and Dundes 2006).  They also compared post-9/11 
with post-tsunami attitudes in Sri Lanka toward the United States and found that 73% of 
the post-9/11 respondents were anti-American, believing that Washington interfered in 
other countries’ affairs for its own benefits vs. 50% of the post-tsunami respondents 
reporting positive views of the United States and 60% believing that American aid is 
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granted altruistically without self-benefits.  However, Berman et al. (2009), Beath, 
Christia and Enikolopov (2013), Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014), and Renard (2015) 
have investigated, the effects of aid on reducing insurgent violence by winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the public in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines and have 
reported mixed results.  Furthermore, Fishstein (2010), Zurcher et al. (2010), U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (2011), Gompelman (2011), and Gordon (2011) have also 
investigated the effects of development activities on security in winning hearts and minds 
in Afghanistan and reported mixed results.  
 
Effects of Foreign Aid on Government and Public 
 The effects of foreign aid on political and economic development are hotly 
debated.  Moss et al. (2006) and Young and Sheehan (2014) argue that aid inversely 
affects political institutions.  Moyo (2009), Easterly (2006), and Morrison (2012) contend 
that foreign aid enables elites to buy votes, build security apparatus to suppress citizens 
and enrich themselves and their cronies through corruption.  In this view, foreign aid does 
not help the citizens for whom it is intended, but instead gives rise to corruption and 
consolidates the grip and continuity of repressive regimes and elites (Ross 2004; Busse 
and Groning 2009).  However, others argue that foreign aid improves government 
capacity and promotes civil society, resulting in better governance, delivery of services to 
the poor, accountability, and state-society relationship (Wright and Winters 2010; 
Bermeo 2017).  In this view, it is argued that donors have strong control over the aid and 
a final say on how and for what purpose the aid funds can be used.  Therefore, foreign aid 
bypasses corrupt elites and it is put to work consistent with donors’ guidelines, 
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conditions, priorities, and assessments.  Boutton (2014) argues that foreign aid provided 
to states that host terrorism to increase their capacity and willingness to disarm terrorist 
groups is counterproductive in some situations.  States with ongoing interstate rivalry or 
intrastate rivalry use the aid to arm against their rival rather than to counter the threat of 
terrorism.  According to Boutton (2014), such states have less incentive to disarm 
terrorist groups, but rather to play-up the treat from terrorism to secure the continuation 
of foreign aid.  For example, in the past 18 years, Pakistan has used a good portion of the 
U.S. military aid to build up its military and arms in anticipation of a possible 
confrontation with its arch-rival—India rather than fighting terrorism and disarming 
Taliban for which the aid has been intended.  The Pakistan military secret service (ISI) 
has been linked to and accused of supporting extremist and terrorist groups, such as the 
Haqqani network, in Afghanistan as a cash cow.  Boutton (2014, 741) writes, “despite 
billions of dollars in aid over the past 15 years, Pakistan remains host to many terrorist 
groups and is still quite unstable.” After the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, 
President Nouri al-Maliki did little to improve the deteriorating security situation in the 
country, but he appeared in times to intentionally fuel conflicts by randomly arresting 
Sunni opponents, removing Sunni political figures and military officers from their 
positions, and using the U.S.-funded counter-terrorism force against his rivals and 
peaceful demonstrators (Boutton 2016).   In general, aid effectiveness is country specific 
and depends in large on the aid recipient state’s priorities, political structure and quality 
of governance--institutions, the rule of law, accountability, corruption (Herzer and 
Morrissey 2013; Fosu 2013; Boutton 2014; Boutton 2016).  Aid is more effective in 
promoting economic growth, countering terrorism, and winning public hearts and minds 
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in states that are accountable to their citizens and align their priorities more closely with 
the priorities of the donor.     
The international community, especially the United States and the member states 
of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have 
invested a lot of blood and gold in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo to strengthen the rule of law, improve infrastructure, stabilize communities, 
foster economic growth and political development, and help the various levels of 
government to better represent and respond to the needs and aspirations of their citizens 
and to fight insecurity, terrorism, and extremism.  To this end, the USAID alone invested 
$ 1.05 billion in Afghanistan in 2017--$294 million in governance, $175 million in 
health, $167 million in administrative costs, $140 million in infrastructure, $95 million in 
agriculture, and $ 85 million in humanitarian and economic growth, just to name a few.  
The same year, the USAID invested $321 million in Iraq, $50 million in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and $42 million in Kosovo to promote democracy and good governance, 
economic development, education and social services, and peace and security (USAID 
2018).  The overall effects of foreign aid on governance and public in the four cases of 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo are mixed.  For example, 
according to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, Afghanistan is ranked 177, Iraq 169, 
Kosovo 85, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 91 out of 180 countries.  Higher scores mean 
higher levels of corruption in the country.  However, according to World Bank (2017), in 
the past decade or so, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo have 
made significant gains in term of per capita Gross National Income (GNI), a useful 
measure of development — in 2004 GNI per capita for Afghanistan was $210 in 2016 it 
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is $580; in 1996 GNI for Bosnia and Herzegovina was $760 in 2016 it is $4,940; in 2006 
GNI for Iraq was $2,020 in 2016 it is $5,420; in 2006 GNI for Kosovo was $2,510 in 
2016 it is $3,850.  On the Fragile States Index (2017), which measures the level of 
stability, Afghanistan scored 107.3, Iraq 105.4, Bosnia and Herzegovina 73.0, and no 
score was reported for Kosovo.  The Fragile States Index is based on 12 socio-economic 
indicators and the lower the score, the better.  The high scores for Afghanistan and Iraq 
are a reflection of the challenges that both nations face in terms of increased insecurity 
and insurgency that have affected their overall performance of political, economic, and 
social developments since the removal of Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power in the 
fall of 2001 and the spring of 2003, respectively.  The Democracy Index 2017, which 
provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide and is based on five categories 
of electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture, places countries within one of the four types of 
regimes based on their index score—full democracy regimes, flawed democracy regimes, 
hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.  Democracy Index 2017 ranks Afghanistan 
149 out of 167 countries covered by the Index as an authoritarian regime, Iraq 112 as a 
hybrid regime, Bosnia and Hercegovina 101 as a hybrid regime, and no scores are 
reported for Kosovo.  An authoritarian regime, according to Democracy Index 2017, is a 
regime that lacks political pluralism, some formal institutions of democracy may exist, 
but lacks substance, elections are not free and fair, media is state-owned or controlled, 
civil liberties are abused or disregarded, judiciary is not independent, and government 
criticism is repressed; a hybrid regime is defined as a regime in which elections have 
substantial irregularities,  opposition political parties and leaders are pressured by 
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government, corruption is widespread, the rule of law is weak,  civil society is weak, 
journalists are harassed, judiciary system is not independent, and there is serious 
weakness in the functioning of government and political participation.  Human 
Development Index, which is a composite index of life expectancy, education, and 
income per capita (GNI/capita), measures a country’s level of human development and 
places countries within one of the four types of human developments—very high human 
development, high human development, medium human development, and low human 
development. The longer the life expectancy at birth,  the longer the education period, 
and the higher the income per capita, the higher the score and ranking of a country on the 
Human Development Index.  The Human Development Index 2017, ranks Afghanistan 
169 out of 188 countries with low human development, Iraq 121 with medium human 
development, Bosnia and Herzegovina 81 with high human development, and no scores 
are reported for Kosovo. 
 
Contribution to Existing Literature 
 Development aid and projects have long been used to promote economic, 
political, and social development.  Since 9/11, however, they are also required to enhance 
security in weak, fragile, and failing states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, 
and Syria to name a few, that are fighting insurgency to counter the threat and spread of 
extremism and terrorism.  The strategy contends that humanitarian and development aid 
and projects commonly implemented by local government and foreign donors to provide 
basic services in aid recipient countries can win public hearts and minds and build 
support for the local government and the foreign donors and ultimately reduce violence, 
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extremist attitudes and behaviors, and terrorism (USAID 2016).  Despite the on-going use 
of this approach, there is conflicting empirical evidence on the effectiveness of this 
strategy in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations (Berman et al.  
2009; Fishstein 2010; Zurcher et al. 2010; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
2011; Gompelman 2011; Gordon 2011; Wilder 2012; Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 
2011; Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014).   
The conflicting findings from previous studies are the motivation for this 
dissertation, which is intended to add to the existing body of knowledge and literature 
and make theoretical and empirical contributions to the question of whether or not 
foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries.  Previous studies 
have, predominantly, taken a project-based approach in assessing the effects of foreign 
aid on public perceptions and attitudes in aid recipient nations.  In contrast, this research 
assesses the effects of foreign aid and development projects on the national level.  Since 
development projects, in general, are implemented in areas that are relatively secure and 
have less insurgent activities, such project-based approaches might suffer from selection 
bias and control for preexisting local conditions, both of which could contribute to 
conflicting findings reported by previous studies.   The outcome of a project-based study 
(a specific project implemented in a given time and place) depends on the selection of the 
project and the pre-existing local conditions, which is often the case.  In addition, project-
based studies are usually conducted either during or immediately after the 
implementation of the project when the effects of the project are the strongest.  Such data 
might be useful for collecting intelligence or conducting military operations in a given 
insurgency context, but inference based on such data about winning public hearts and 
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minds, which requires a longer time to build trust and confidence and to shape attitudes 
and perceptions, might be less accurate.  Also, a project- based approach may not give us 
a full picture of the public attitudes, perceptions, and hearts and minds in countries such 
as Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Syria and others where 
society is divided along the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fault lines.  In these societies, 
a project-based approach may not capture the effects of a project on the attitudes and 
perceptions of neighboring villages or provinces, which may feel discriminated against, 
marginalized, or unfairly treated for not receiving similar or equal aid and development 
projects resulting in losing hearts and minds one project at a time.  Wilder (2012), 
Research Director of Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, writes that given 
the zero-sum nature of the Afghan society, where one group’s gain is often perceived as 
another’s lose, development projects generated numerous complaints that “they got more 
than we did.”  Therefore, we believe the national level approached should be more 
theoretically and empirically sound approach in assessing the effects of development aid 
and projects in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations. 
Consequently, this research, as the first research of its kind, will make a positive 
contribution to the existing body of knowledge and literature. 
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CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY 
While altruism (the moral obligation of rich to the poor) has always been part of 
the foreign assistance equation, since the end of World War II foreign aid has been 
shaped primarily by two factors—geopolitics and security.  A key geopolitical factor that 
determined and drove foreign aid from 1945 to 1991 was the Cold War (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000).  During this period, foreign aid was widely used by the liberal democratic 
West, in general, and the United States, in particular, as a weapon in their ideological war 
against the communist autocracy of the Soviet Union to ensure a level of economic 
development that was necessary for the existence and continuity of pro-Western 
underdeveloped nations and to win over the uncommitted or neutral underdeveloped 
nations (Gimbel 1976; Radelet 2003).  One of the main objectives of foreign aid during 
the Cold War period was to combat the spread of communist ideology, which the West 
saw as a major threat to its ideals (Zanger 2000; Dunning 2004).  However, in the 
aftermath of Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, 
the war on terror and security objectives have been the driving forces of foreign aid 
(Miles 2012).  Western donors, in general, and the United States, in particular, have used 
foreign aid as a tool to not only alleviate poverty, but also to combat extremism and 
terrorism by winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations (Young and 
Findley 2011).  Fishstein and Wilder (2012, 41) write “one of the most powerful 
assumptions underpinning the belief in the stabilizing effects of aid projects is that these 
projects are popular and contribute to winning the support—or “hearts and minds”—of 
local communities.”  Since perception matters a great deal in international relations, 
peacebuilding, and security, Western donors and the United States has used foreign aid as 
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an instrument of not only economic and political development in underdeveloped nations, 
but also to win public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations as a weapon against 
insurgency, extremism, terrorism, and insecurity in the aftermath of the events of 9/11.   
Donors believe that the provision of the public goods and services wins public “hearts 
and minds” by generating goodwill and positive perceptions and attitudes among public 
in aid recipient nations, which can win public over to the donors’ and local government’s 
sides  (Berman and et al. 2011; Beath and et al. 2017).  Since social behavior is 
contingent on the behaviors of others—people respond to kindness with kindness, smile 
with smile, and lie with treachery (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Cropanzano and Mitchell 
2005), it is argued that foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries, 
which leads to positive attitudes and behaviors toward donors and local governments in 
the aid recipient nations that not only makes the implementation of development 
programs and projects easy, but also counters extremist feelings, attitudes, and behaviors 
toward donor nations and local government that extremist and terrorist organizations and 
leaders usually want to exploit (Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing 2003; Lyengar,  Monten, 
and Hanson 2011).  
 The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether or not foreign aid wins public 
hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries by examining the cases of Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo, in which the United States and the 
international community have been involved and providing state-building, humanitarian, 
development and reconstruction aid to since 2001, 1995, 2003, and 1999, respectively.  
The research for this dissertation was designed in two parts, with the research 
methodology employing two types of survey approaches in a complementary fashion.  
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Part I of the research was designed to use the existing data from national surveys and 
public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in 
Afghanistan (2001-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), and 
Kosovo (1999-2017) that address any issues associated with receiver country 
perspectives on foreign aid.  Part II of the research was designed to conduct a national 
survey in Afghanistan, with an estimated sample size of 2,500, to address the gaps in 
existing data from Part I.  However, Afghanistan is a war zone with a very volatile war, 
violence and security situations and one of the most dangerous countries in the world for 
conducting national surveys.  Due to deteriorations of the security situations in the 
country, which was posing potential risks and harm to both survey administrators and 
survey participants, the survey management team had no choice but to scale back the 
planned scope of the national survey in Afghanistan consistent with the University of 
Southern Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection 
Review Committee’s research guidelines.    
 After the survey instrument was approved by the University of Southern 
Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review 
Committee and the research project approval letter was received, we traveled to Kabul 
City, the capital of Afghanistan, to put together the survey management team and to 
gather security information about the 34 provinces to conduct a safe and successful 
national survey in the country.  Extensive meetings and discussions were conducted with 
locals with security knowledge, telephone calls were placed to contacts living in 
provincial capitals around the country, and informal inputs were solicited from 
government security personals regarding the security situation in the country and the 
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feasibility of conducting a safe and successful national survey in the country.  The survey 
management team also looked into the safety and security of roads and highways that 
connect provincial capitals, the risk to survey administrators for physically carrying 
survey questioners and materials to and from provincial capitals, safety and security in 
provincial capitals for the survey administrators to live in and conduct surveys and for the 
survey participants, the presence of Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords, and any other 
warring factions and groups that oppose the government and its foreign supporters that 
may pose serious security threat to anyone working for or associated with the survey, 
government, the United States, and the international community.   The data and findings 
indicated that not only the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords and other anti-government 
warring factions that oppose the government and the international community in 
Afghanistan, but also government militias, warlords associated with government, and 
rogue government security forces and administrators could arrest, kidnap, imprison, and 
even kill survey administrators and participants  for being part of a survey that is for a 
foreign country or institution or an individual associated with their arch-enemy--the 
United States.   Not only unsafe provinces, roads, and highways posed serious problems 
for conducting a national survey in the country, but also government provincial security 
forces and administrators did not like the idea of surveys and collecting public 
information and opinions for the fear that such information would bring to light public 
complaints and voices and expose their shortcomings in performing their jobs, 
corruption, nepotism, bribery, or any other schemes or issues that they may be involved 
in which they fear would jeopardize their job, reputation, public image, or political 
careers.  The security situation in the country has greatly deteriorated since 2014, after 
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the provision of security was transferred from foreign to Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), and the government has very little practical control in Kabul City, the capital, 
and beyond.  The 2018 reports state that Taliban has presence in over 70% of the country 
and according to the Pew Research Center analysis of the U.S. Department of State data 
(2017) more Afghans than Iraqis, who worked for the U.S. government, have received 
the Special Immigration Visa to the United States (Radford and Krogstad 2017).  The 
Special Immigration visa, which started for Iraq in 2007 and for Afghanistan in 2009, is 
for Afghans and Iraqis who worked as translators, interpreters, or performed any other 
jobs in Afghanistan and Iraq for the U.S. government, putting themselves and their 
families in danger.  The United States has accepted over 70,000 Iraqis and Afghans from 
2007 to 2017 on the Special Immigration visas, but two third of these visas are given to 
Afghans and only one third to Iraqis (Radford and Krogstad 2017).  The majority of the 
Iraqis (68%) issued the Special Immigration visa entered the United States prior to 2014, 
but the majority of the Afghans (92%) issued the Special Immigration visa entered the 
United States after 2014—the year the provision of security was transferred from foreign 
troops to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  Against this background and based 
on our own findings and in puts from locals and government officials about the potential 
risk and harm to survey administrators and participants in conducting a national survey in 
the country, the survey management team had no choice but to scale back the planned 
scope of the national survey in Afghanistan consistent with the University of Southern 
Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review 
Committee’s research guidelines.  Regrettably, we will use secondary survey data, as the 
only alternative, for the Afghan case, as we are doing with other cases.      
 53 
Survey Research Method 
 Forza (202, 155) writes, “…a survey involves the collection of information from 
individuals (through mailed questionnaires, telephone calls and personal interviews) 
about themselves or about social units to which they belong.”  Fink (2003, 1) defines a 
survey as a “…collection [of] information from or about people to describe, compare, or 
explain their knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.”  The survey method is one of the oldest 
and the most widely used existing methods of data collection about the feelings, attitudes, 
views, and perceptions of people in social science research (Rubin and Babbie 2016).  
According to Marsden and Wright (2010, 4), “…surveys have been conducted ever since 
people realized they needed information on the distribution and size of human 
communities and their social characteristics” and Charles Booth is credited for 
conducting the first surveys of modern form in the 1890s in London.  Blair, Czaja, and 
Blair (2014, 1) write, “surveys are used by academic researchers, governments, 
businesses, political parties, media, and anyone who wants insight into what people are 
thinking and doing.”  Vus (2014, 1) states, “many criticisms of surveys are based on 
misunderstandings of what surveys can be and are based on examples of poor surveys 
and the inappropriate use of survey research.” 
Little or no observer subjectivity, good response rate, high representation, greater 
flexibility and convenience to participants, low researcher bias, better capability to collect 
a broad range of data (e.g., opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, etc.), extensive 
flexibility in data analysis, and high reliability are some of the most significant benefits 
of surveys.  In addition, since in face-to-face survey respondents can ask questions for 
clarity, their answers, in most cases, are complete, accurate, and reflect their true feelings, 
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views, opinions, and/or habits.  As a result, face-to-face survey data is closer to truth and 
highly reliable compared to data collected through mailed questionnaires or online 
surveys.  However, compared to telephone or online surveys, in-person surveys are 
expensive and time-consuming (McNabb 2015).  Furthermore, a poorly constructed 
survey instrument such as a badly designed questionnaire, vaguely phrased questions, and 
improper answer choices can result in misinterpretation of questions and misleading 
answers, which may undermine the validity and reliability of the survey findings 
(Bourque and Fielder 2003).  Fowler (2014) writes that the design of the survey 
instrument and the procedure used to conduct a survey have a major effect on the quality 
and accuracy of the data collected, which we take both points serious for this research.  
 A sample survey is defined as a study that involves the study of a well-defined 
subset (or a sample) of a large population (Levy and Lemeshow 2009).  The validity and 
reliability of inference from a sample to a finite population depends on the selection and 
measurement of the sample (Bryman 2016).  Sampling methods are classified as 
probability and nonprobability.  Probability samples are defined as samples in which 
every member of the targeted population has a known, non-zero probability of selection 
and members are selected randomly.  However, nonprobability samples are defined as 
samples in which each member of the targeted population does not have known, non-zero 
probability of selection and members are selected in a nonrandom manner—based on 
availability, accessibility, or convenience.  Unlike in probability sampling, in 
nonprobability sampling, the framework (selection of members and procedures of 
estimates) is different in each case.  Callegaro et al. (2014) write that probability samples 
compared to nonprobability samples have lower bias levels.  Probability sampling 
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methods include random sampling, systematic sampling, and stratified sampling.  
Random sampling is the purest form of probability sampling, through which each 
member of the population has an equal chance of selection.  Systematic sampling, which 
is also known as the Nth order selection, is based on selecting the Nth order member of a 
given finite population.  If all members of the population are known, systematic sampling 
is as effective as random sampling.  However, if the population is large and the total 
number of members is unknown, systematic sampling cannot be used.  Stratified 
sampling is used when the population under consideration has subsets that share one or 
more common characteristics.  In such a case (when a population has subsets that share at 
least one or more characteristics), stratified sampling is superior to a random sampling 
method.    
 Yet, in general, random sampling is the purest form of probability sampling and 
the most commonly used sampling strategies in social since, in general, and in survey 
research, in particular, due to its high degree of representativeness, reduced sampling 
error, and greater generalizability, validity, and reliability compared to other forms of 
sampling (Levy and Lemeshow 2009).  This dissertation uses random sampling, which is 
the most appropriate and widely used and accepted sampling method in survey research 
and making inferences from a sample to a finite population (Rossi et al. 2013).  Because 
of their unknown representation of the population, nonprobability samples have limited 
potential for generalization beyond the sample.  It is the norm and widely accepted to use 
probability samples if the goal is to generalize one's findings (Brown and Coombe 2015). 
 This dissertation gathers the data from a range of surveys and public opinion polls 
conducted by reliable national and international organizations in Afghanistan since 2001, 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, Iraq since 2003, and Kosovo since 1999, which 
address any concerns associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid.  The 
Asia Foundation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Pew 
Research Center, the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research, 
Democracy International, ABC News, and Gallup International have all conducted public 
surveys and opinion polls in Afghanistan, which cover public opinions and views on 
foreign aid, security, and economic and political development in the country.  USAID, 
Pew Research Center, ORB International, the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic 
Studies, and the D3 Systems of Vienna and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey have 
all conducted public opinion surveys and polls in Iraq.  The Office of the UN Resident 
Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, National Democratic Institute, Balkan 
Barometer, and Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina have conducted 
surveys and public opinion polls in Bosnia and Herzegovina that cover general attitudes 
on the direction of the country, security, main problems and challenges facing public, 
economic growth, development and employment, confidence in domestic and 
international institutions and organizations, political participation, and the role of the 
international community and European Union in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The Kosovo Security Barometer, USAID, Pew Research Center, and Balkan Barometer 
have conducted public opinion surveys and polls in Kosovo, which cover national mood 
and attitudes on security, major problems facing the people and country, political and 
economic development, and social issues.  These surveys and public polls are 
scientifically sound, nationally representative, ethnically balanced, and reliable in 
understanding and assessing public perspectives on foreign aid, the direction of the 
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country, and political and economic development.  In addition, these surveys and public 
opinion polls allow us to collect, analyze, compare and contrast public opinions and 
perceptions data on foreign aid from a range of surveys and public opinion polls 
conducted by different reliable organizations and institutions in these countries.  There 
are at least two advantages associated with this approach: 
1. Data from different samples and different surveys and public opinion polls on the 
same topic are collectively more reliable, due to a larger sample size and fewer 
sampling errors, as the weaknesses of one sample are covered by the strength of 
other samples.  Bartlett et al. (2001) argue that the sample size influences the 
detection of significant differences, relationships, and/or interactions.  This is due 
to the fact that as the size of a sample increases, statistical power (defined as the 
probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis or the ability to correctly 
detect an effect, if the effect truly exists (Button et al. 2013; Suresh and 
Chandrashekara 2012)) also proportionally increases and the margin of error 
proportionally decreases—an inverse relationship between sample size and 
margin of error.  Collectively, rich and reliable data from a range of different 
samples and surveys and public opinion polls should lead to in-depth analysis, 
scientifically sound findings, and reliable conclusions (Levy & Lemeshow 2009; 
Borowiak & Shapiro 2014). 
2. Gathering, assessing, and analyzing data from multiple surveys should result in 
large-scale and comprehensive sample size, both in terms of individual 
participants and cases, which should give the researcher more power to properly 
assess, analyze and answer research questions.   Since there is an inverse relation 
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between standard error and sample size—standard error decreases as sample size 
increases—and a positive relation between sample size and power, other things 
being equal, a large sample should be more representative of the population, 
limiting the influence of outliers or extreme observations, and giving us higher 
confidence to interpret significant results and avoid errors.  
 
The Data 
Afghanistan 
 For Afghanistan, the study uses the Asia Foundation’s annual national survey data 
for the period of 2004-2017, Zogby Research Services 2011 survey data, and ABC 
News’s data of five national surveys’ conducted in Afghanistan in 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2009, and 2010.  The Asia Foundation, with financial support from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and other Western donors, has been 
conducting public opinion surveys in Afghanistan, A Survey of the Afghan People, since 
2004.  The annual survey, A Survey of the Afghan People, has gathered the views of more 
than 97,000 adult Afghan men and women, 18 years of age or older, representing more 
than 400 districts and all 34 provinces of the country since 2004.  The Survey is the most 
comprehensive, reliable, and long-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and 
opinions of adult Afghan men and women.  The data is publically available and free for 
download at http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey. 
In December 2011, Zogby Research Services conducted surveys in Afghanistan, 
the United States, six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates) and Iran in an effort to measure public attitudes toward the war in 
 59 
Afghanistan, future of the country, and how Afghans see the world, the impact of war on 
their country, and their future.  The surveys were conducted through face-to-face 
interviews as well as online collecting the opinions and views of more than 9,246 adult 
men and women.  The data is public and free for download at 
http://www.zogbyresearchservices.com.  
As part of its award-winning series, Where Things Stands, ABC News in 
partnership with BBC/ BBC World Service, German network ARD, and the Washington 
Post has sponsored five national opinion polls in Afghanistan (Afghanistan: Where 
Things Stand 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010).  These surveys were conducted through 
face-to-face interviews by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research 
(ACSOR), Kabul, Afghanistan and have gathered the opinion and views of more than 
6,520 adult Afghan men and women.  The data is public and free for download at 
http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistan-iraq-polls-things-
stand/story?id=6627152. 
 
Iraq 
 For Iraq, the study uses the 2018 Public Opinion Survey data, 2017 Arab 
Attitudes Survey data, 2017 National Survey on Iraq, 2016 Arab Opinion Index data, 
2016 Arab Youth Survey data, the International Republic Institute’s annual surveys for 
the period of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 data, the Zogby Research 
Services 2011 survey data, the ABC News in partnership with the German network ARD, 
the Japanese network NHK, Time magazine, USA Today and the German newsmagazine 
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Der Spiegel surveys for the period of 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, World Public 
Opinion.org 2006 survey data, and the 2004 National Survey of Iraq .     
The 2018 public opinion survey was conducted by 
1001IRAQITHOUGHTS.COM. The survey is based on a random sample of 1066 Iraqi 
men and women across all 18 provinces in the country. The data is public and can be 
downloaded at 1001IRAQITHOUGHTS.COM. 
The 2017 Arab Attitudes Survey, which measures Arab attitudes toward the 
United States, U.S foreign policies toward the Middle East, and the American people is 
conducted by the Arab Center in Washington DC and is based on a random sample size 
of 3,200 men and women.  The data is public and can be downloaded at arabcenterdc.org. 
The 2017 National Survey on Iraq was conducted by the National Democratic 
Institute. The survey is based on the face-to-face interviews and gathered the opinions 
and attitudes of 1,338 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at 
www.ndi.org. 
The 2016 Arab Opinion Index, which measures public opinion across the Arab 
World, is conducted by the Washington, DC Arab Center’s office of the Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar in 12 countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
and Tunisia.  The data is based on face-to- face interviews with a random sample of 
18,310 respondents equally divided between men and women and can be downloaded at 
arabcenterdc.org. 
The 2016 Arab Youth Survey was conducted by the International Polling Firm 
PSB in 16 countries in the Middle East and Africa—Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, 
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Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirate (UAE), and Yemen.  The data is based on face-to- face 
interviews with 3,500 Arab men and women, age 18 to 24, and can be download at 
arabyouthsurvey.com.   
The International Republic Institute’s annual surveys of Iraqi people are 
conducted in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, which have gathered the 
opinions and views of more than 26,631 adult Iraqi men and women, 18 years of age or 
older.  The data is public and free for download at www.iri.org.   
In September 2011, Zogby Research Services conducted surveys in Iraq, the 
United States, six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates) and Iran in an effort to measure public attitudes toward the war in Iraq, 
future of the country and people, and the aftermath of a U.S withdrawal.  The surveys 
were conducted through face-to-face interviews as well as online collecting the opinions 
and views of more than 9,246 adult men and women.  The data is public and free for 
download at http://www.zogbyresearchservices.com.  
The ABC News in partnership with the German network ARD, the Japanese 
network NHK, Time magazine, USA Today and the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel 
has conducted annual surveys in Iraq in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009.   These 
surveys are conducted through face-to-face interviews by the D3 Systems of Vienna, Va., 
and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey and have gathered the opinion and views of 
more than 11,088 adult Iraqi men and women.  The data is public and free for download 
at http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistan-iraq-polls-things-
stand/story?id=6627152.    
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The World Public Opinion.org has conducted a public opinion survey in Iraq, The 
Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq in 2006.  The data for the 2006 
World Public Opinion.org survey, The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future 
of Iraq, is based on a face-to-face interviews with a random sample of 1,150 Iraqi adult 
men and women, 18 years of age or older and can be downloaded at 
WorldPublicOpinion.org.   
The 2004 National Survey of Iraq was conducted by Oxford Research 
International with a sample size of 2,652, which measured public opinions and attitudes 
about major social, political and economic issues in the country.  The data is public and 
can be downloaded at www.oxfordresearch.com. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the 2017 public opinion survey 
conducted by the Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2017, 2015, 
and 2013 socio-economic survey conducted by Prism Research & Consulting, the 2017 
survey commissioned by the International Republic Institute’s Center for Insights and 
Survey Research, the 2017, 2016, and 2015 Balkan Barometer surveys, the 2016 national 
survey conducted by IMPAQ International LLC, the 2015 public opinion polls conducted 
by the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
2000 World Bank Survey.  
 The 2017 public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on face-to- face interviews with 1,000 randomly 
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selected adult citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, aged 18 and over.  The data is public 
and can be downloaded at WWW.POINTPULSE.NET.   
 The 2017 socio-economic survey, Socio-economic Perception of Young People in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 2015 and 2013 public opinion polls were conducted by 
Prism Research and Consulting and the data is based on face-to-face interviews with 
4,200 randomly selected respondents age 15 to 35.  The data is public and can be 
downloaded at www.ba.undp.org.   
 The 2017 survey commissioned by the International Republic Institute’s Center 
for Insights and Survey Research is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly 
selected sample of 1,537 respondents, age 18 and older.  The data is public and can be 
downloaded at www.IRI.org.   
 The Balkan Barometer public opinion surveys of 2017, 2016, and 2015 were 
conducted in seven countries-- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia.  The data is 
based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and 
women aged 18 and older and gathers the views and opinions of more than 23,000 
respondents.  The data is public and can be downloaded at www.rcc.int.   
 The 2016 national survey was sponsored by USAID and conducted by IMPAQ 
International, LLC. The data is based on 3,004 face-to-face interviews with a randomly 
selected sample of adult men and women aged 18 and older. The data is public and can 
be downloaded at www.usaid.gov.  
 The World Bank 2000 survey, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Diagnostic Surveys of 
Corruption, is based on face-to-face interviews with 2,250 respondents (700 public 
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officials, 350 enterprise managers, 1,200 general public individuals), aged 18 and over. 
The data is public and can be downloaded at www.worldbank.org. 
 
Kosovo 
 The data for Kosovo is based on the 2018 and 2016 Public pulse, 2018 survey on 
Challenges and Perspectives of Youth in Kosovo, 2018 and 2017 Kosovo Security 
Barometer, the August 2017 Kosovo public opinion poll, the 2017, 2016, and 2015 
Balkan Barometer survey.   
The 2018 and 2016 public pulse, which were supported by USAID and UNDP, is 
based on an opinion poll that surveyed 2,612 randomly selected Kosovo citizens over the 
age of 18. The data is public and can be downloaded at www.ks.undp.org.   
The 2018 survey on Challenges and Perspectives of Youth in Kosovo, which was 
supported by USAID and UNDP, is based on a random sample of 452 Kosovo youths age 
14 to 35. The data is based on a survey and focused groups and can be downloaded at 
www.ks.undp.org. 
 The 2018 and 2017 Kosovo Security Barometer is based on face-to-face 
interviews with a randomly selected sample of 2,218 respondents above 18 years of age.  
The data is public and can be downloaded at www.QKSS.ORG.   
 The August 2017 Kosovo public opinion poll, which was supported by USAID 
and conducted by National Democratic Institute, is based on face-to-face interviews with 
a nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. The data is public and can be 
downloaded at www.ndi.org.   
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 The Balkan Barometer public opinion surveys of 2017, 2016, and 2015 were 
conducted in seven countries-- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia.  The data is 
based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and 
women age 18 and older and gathers the views and opinions of more than 23,000 
respondents.  The data is public and can be downloaded at www.rcc.int. 
 The 2015, 2013, and 2012 public opinion polls were sponsored by UNDP and 
USAID and conducted by Index Kosovo. The data is based on face-to-face interviews 
with a randomly selected sample of adult men and women age 18 and older and gathers 
the view and opinion of more than 3,876 respondents. The data is public and can be 
downloaded at www.ks.undp.org. 
 
.
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CHAPTER IV – DATA PRESENTATION 
The international community in general and the United States and the European 
Union, in particular, have invested billions of aid dolor since 2001 in Afghanistan, since 
2003 in Iraq, since 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since 1999 in Kosovo to win 
public hearts and minds as a hedge against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism through 
the provision of political, economic, and social development and change programs and 
projects.  Chapter 4 presents data collected from national surveys and public opinion 
polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in each of the four 
cases that address any issues associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid. 
The purpose of the chapter is to explore whether or not foreign aid is positively 
associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donors of the foreign 
aid and the aid recipient state in these four cases. Data for Afghanistan is presented first. 
Data for Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are presented next. 
 
Afghanistan 
 To gauge the perceptions and opinions of Afghans on the major problems facing 
their country, respondents were asked by the Asia Foundation survey in 2006, In your 
view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? And after that, what is 
the next biggest problem? Unemployment (31%), insecurity (27%), poor economy 
(24%), corruption (18%), presence of Taliban (18%), and lack of 
education/schools/literacy (10%) were mentioned first or second (Qa & Qb combined) as 
the biggest problems facing the nation as a whole.  In the 2015 Asia Foundation survey, 
insecurity (43%), corruption (24%), unemployment (22%), poor economy (13%), lack of 
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education/schools/literacy (6%), and presence of Taliban (6%) were specified first or 
second (Qa & Qb combined) as the biggest problems facing the country as a whole.  
Table 1 provides a more detailed longitudinal trend of the perceived biggest problems 
facing Afghanistan as a whole from 2006 to 2015.  In addition, respondents were asked, 
Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right 
direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?  In the 2004 Asia 
Foundation survey, 64% of respondents indicated that generally speaking things in 
Afghanistan are moving in the right direction and only 11% said that things in the 
country are moving in the wrong direction.  Peace/end of war (53%) was mentioned as 
the first reason and disarmament (35%) as the second reason for their optimism.  Bad 
government (40%) and bad economy (30%) were mentioned by the respondents as the 
first and second reasons for their pessimism.  However, in the 2017 Asia Foundation 
survey, only 33% of respondents said that things in Afghanistan were moving in the right 
direction and 61% of respondents said that things were moving in the wrong direction in 
the country.  Reconstruction/rebuilding (34%) and good security (24%) were mentioned 
by the respondents as the first and second reason for their optimism.  Insecurity (50%) 
and unemployment (27%) were identified by the respondents as their first and second 
reason for their pessimism.  Age wise, in the same 2017 survey, Afghans over the age of 
55 were less optimistic (27.7%) about the direction of the country compared to Afghans 
between the age of 18 to 25 (34.3%). 
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Table 1 Biggest Problems Facing Afghanistan, 2006-2015 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Insecurity 27% 46% 36% 36% 37% 38% 28% 30% 34% 43% 
 
Unemployment 31% 27% 31% 35% 28% 23% 27% 25% 26% 22% 
 
Corruption 18% 16% 14% 17% 27% 21% 25% 26% 28% 24% 
 
Poor Economy 24% 19% 17% 20% 11% 10% 11% 10% 18% 13% 
 
Lack of 
Education / 
schools / 
literacy 
10% 5% 9% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 6% 
Presence of 
Taliban 
18% 13% 13% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 
 
Question-a: In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole?   
Question-b And after that, what is the next biggest problem? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. 
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 Ethnically speaking, Pashtuns were more optimistic about the direction of the 
country (40.6%) compared to Tajiks (29.3%), Hazaras (26.2%), and other minority 
groups (including Turkmens, Aimaqs and others) (29.8%).  Figure 2 provides the trend in 
public perception about the direction of the country from 2004 to 2017. 
 
Figure 2. Public Perception of the Direction of Afghanistan, 2004-2017 
Question: Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the 
right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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in agriculture, reconstruction programs in industry, building new mosques, humanitarian 
programs].  Fifty-nine percent of respondents in 2006, 2007, and 2008 stated that they 
were aware of one or more foreign-funded development/reconstruction projects/programs 
implemented in their area or district.  In 2016 and 2017, only 34% of respondents said 
that they were aware of one or more foreign-funded development/reconstruction 
project(s) implemented in their area or district.  Figure 3 provides the trend in public 
awareness of the development/reconstruction projects/programs implemented with 
foreign aid in the country from 2006 to 2017. 
 
Figure 3. Public Awareness of Development/Reconstruction Projects/Programs 
Implemented With Foreign Aid, 2006-2017 
Question: Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, or have heard of any project 
or program, implemented with the foreign aid in this area, district, in the following 
fields? [reconstruction/building roads/bridges, water supply, electricity supply, 
healthcare, education, de-mining, demilitarization/disarmament, 
reconstruction/programs in agriculture, reconstruction programs in industry, building 
new mosques, humanitarian programs]   
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.  
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Furthermore, in the same surveys, respondents were also asked, Which country do you 
think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented 
in this area, district? The United States was consistently identified by the majority of the 
respondents as the country that has provided the most aid for the reconstruction and 
development projects and programs that have been implemented in their area or district, 
followed by Japan, Germany, India, China, United Kingdom/Britain, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, and Canada, respectively.  Table 2 provides a more comprehensive view of the 
top 10 donor nations in the order the respondents believe those states have provided aid 
for the development and reconstruction projects and programs in Afghanistan from 2006 
to 2015. 
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Table 2 Top 10 Donor Nations that Have Provided the Most Funding for the 
Reconstruction and Development Projects and Programs in Afghanistan, 2006-2015 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
USA 69% 65% 66% 61% 42% 55% 40% 46% 39% 
Japan 43% 35% 27% 24% 17% 25% 19% 20% 18% 
Germany 36% 31% 27% 25% 16% 20% 14% 13% 11% 
India  32% 24% 20% 19% 11% 17% 11% 16% 16% 
China 15% 11% 11% 6% 5% 9% 5% 7% 7% 
United Kingdom 18% 14% 11% 6% 5% 6% 4% 4% 3% 
Iran 18% 13% 9% 6% 5% 6% 4% 4% 5% 
Turkey 1% 11% 6% 5% 5% 9% 4% 7% 8% 
Saudi Arabia 8% 7% 5% 5% 5% 6% 4% 4% 5% 
Canada 0% 8% 6% 4% 4% 5% 3% 3% 4% 
 
Question: Which country do you think has provided the most funding for these types of 
projects in your area [reconstruction and development projects]? Is there another country 
that you believe has funded these projects?  
Source: The Asia Foundation, Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. 
 
 
 In order to measure public opinion about the role of the Afghan government in 
providing aid for development and reconstruction programs and projects in the country 
since 2002, respondents were asked by the Asian Foundation 2008 survey, Has the 
Afghan government or foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of 
the aid for the projects? The Afghan government is viewed as the primary agency for 
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providing public amenities such as water supply for irrigation (49%), electricity (51%), 
education (49%), reconstruction and development programs in agriculture (48%), 
industry (42%), healthcare (39%), and building new mosques (73%).  Foreign donors are 
believed to play a leading role in funding and delivering humanitarian projects and 
programs (45%), de-mining programs (45%), and large scale infrastructure programs and 
projects such as the development and reconstruction of roads, highways, and bridges 
(37%).  Both the Afghan Government and foreign donors are believed (35%) to have a 
prominent role in demilitarization/disarmament initiatives in the country.  
 In the 2015 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, respondents were also asked 
which country is responsible for implementing the reconstruction and development 
programs and projects in your area or district?  Forty-four percent of  respondents 
indicated they did not know who was responsible for implementing development 
programs and projects in their areas, but among those who knew, the most common 
answer was the Afghan government (including ministries of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development, Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, and  the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) ) (24.5%), followed by the United States (22.6%), Japan (11.9%), India (11.1%), 
German (6.7%), China (5.0%), and Turkey (4.6%).  In the 2010 surveys conducted by 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the Washington Post,  respondents were asked, Overall, 
please say if you think each of these countries is playing a positive, neutral, or negative 
role in Afghanistan now? Thirty-six percent of respondents indicated they believed the 
United States was playing a positive role in Afghanistan, 76% of respondents said that 
Pakistan was playing a negative role in Afghanistan, and 51% of respondents said that 
India was playing a neutral role in Afghanistan.  Figure 4 provides the list of donor nations 
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that respondents in 2010 said were playing positive, negative, and neutral roles in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 4. Countries that Play Positive, Negative, and Neutral Role in Afghanistan, 2010 
Question: Overall, please say if you think each of these countries is playing a positive, 
neutral, or negative role in Afghanistan now? 
Source: ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things 
Stand, 2010. 
 
 
 To gauge public attitudes toward the United States, respondents were asked by the 
Asia Foundation survey of 2004 and the ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the Washington 
Post surveys of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, Is your opinion of the United States 
very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? Sixty-
four percent of respondents in 2004 stated that they have a very favorable or somewhat 
favorable opinion toward the United States and 24% of respondents stated that they have 
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very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the United States.  However, in 
2010,  43% of respondents stated that they have a very favorable or somewhat favorable 
opinion toward the United States and 56% of respondents stated that they have very 
unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the United States—a 21% decline in 
favorable opinion and a 32% increase in unfavorable opinion toward the United States.  
Figure 5 provides a more detailed picture of the public opinions and attitudes toward the 
United States from 2004 to 2010. 
 
Figure 5. Public Opinions and Attitudes Toward the United Sates in Afghanistan, 2004-
2010 
Question:  Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
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 Furthermore, respondents were also asked by both the Asian Foundation surveys 
and the ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Polls, I would like to ask you about 
some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how 
much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or 
no confidence at all?  Eighty percent of respondents stated in 2005 that they have 
confidence in the present government to do its job.  Sixty-five percent of respondents in 
2007 stated that they have confidence in the international NGOs in Afghanistan to do 
their jobs. However, in 2017, 36% of respondents said that they have confidence in the 
present government and 42% of the respondents said that they have confidence in the 
international NGOs in the country to do their jobs—a 44% decline in public confidence 
in the government and a 23% decline in public confidence in international NGOs in the 
country to do their jobs.  As for the United States, 68% of respondents in 2005 stated that 
they have confidence in the United States to do its job in the country, but in 2010 only 
32% of respondents said that they have confidence in the United States to do its job in the 
country—a 36% decline in public confidence in the United States to do its job in the 
country.  Figure 6 provides more details on public confidence in the present government, 
the United States, and the foreign-funded international NGOs to do their jobs in the 
country. 
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Figure 6. Public Confidence in the Present Government, the United States, and the 
International NGOs in Afghanistan to Do Their Jobs, 2005-2017 
Question: I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As 
I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. 
Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
 
 
 In term of security, majority of the survey respondents in 2006 in response to the 
question, How would you rate the security situation in your area: excellent, good, fair, or 
poor?, rated their security situation as excellent (17%), good (49%) and fair (26%).  Only 
a small percentage of respondents (8%) rated their security situation as poor.  
Comparatively, 76% of respondents from urban areas rated their security situation as 
either excellent or good compared to 63% of respondents from rural areas.  Only 4% of 
respondents from urban areas and 9% of respondents from rural areas rated their security 
situations as poor.   However, the security situation in Afghanistan has steadily 
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deteriorated over the past decade or so.  In particular, since 2014, after the provision of 
security was transferred from foreign to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the 
country has witnessed a steady rise in insecurity, violence, and civilian and ANSF 
causalities.  In 2017, survey participants were asked, How often do you fear for your own 
personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you 
always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety?  
Seventy-one percent of respondents stated that they always, often or sometimes fear for 
their own personal safety or security or that of their family.   Regionally, 74% of 
respondents from the South West and East regions, 67% of respondents from the South 
East region, and 80% of respondents from the West region stated that they always, often 
or sometimes fear for their own or their family safety and security.   Respondents from 
provinces with strong Taliban presence and activities such as Uruzgan (94%), Farah 
(90%), Kunduz (89%), Badghis (83%), Ghor (83%), and Herat (76%) reported a much 
higher level of fear for personal or family safety and security in 2017. 
To gauge the effects of development and reconstruction projects and programs on 
the economic prosperity since 2001 in the country, respondents were asked, If you think 
about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less 
prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? Now, going even 
farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family then 
and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or 
about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government?  Overall, fifty-four 
percent of respondents said that their family was more economically prosperous now than 
under the Taliban government and 26% said that their family was less prosperous now 
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than under the Taliban. Twelve percent reported no change in their family economic 
status compared to that of under the Taliban government.  Fifty-nine percent of urban and 
52% of rural reported improvement in their family economic situation compared to the 
Taliban era.  Ethnically, 66% of Uzbeks, 61% of Tajiks, and 42% of Pashtuns said that 
they were more prosperous now than the period under the Taliban.  As for the period 
under the Soviet occupation, 50% of respondents (47% in urban, 51% in rural) said that 
they were more prosperous now than the period under the Soviet occupation. Fifty-five 
percent of Hazaras, 55% of Uzbeks, 54% of Tajiks, and 44% of Pashtuns said that they 
were more prosperous now than the period under the Soviet occupation.  Figure 7 
provides a more complete view of the improvement in economic prosperity at present 
verses the Taliban period.  
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Figure 7. Household Economic Prosperity at Present Verses the Taliban Period, 2006-
2012 
Question: If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more 
prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?, 
Now, going even farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about 
your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less 
prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. 
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said that availability of products in the Market got worse compared to last year.  
However, in 2017, 33% of respondents said that their household financial situation got 
worse compared to last year, 58% of respondents stated that job opportunity got worse 
compared to last year and 36% of respondents said that the availability of products in the 
market got worse compared to one year ago.  Over all, since 2007, more and more 
respondents are stating that their households are worse off in terms of financial 
wellbeing, employment opportunity, and availability of products in the markets.  Figure 8 
below provides more information about the three household’s economic indicators in the 
country from 2007 to 2017. 
 
Figure 8. Economic Indicators Worse Compared to One Year Ago, 2007-2017 
Question: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household 
has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) 
Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of 
products in the market. 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2007 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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 In the 2011 survey conducted by the Zogby Research Services, respondents were 
asked, In your opinion, are the Afghani people better off/worse off than they were before 
NATO entered? Seventy-eight percent of respondents said that the Afghan people are 
worse off than they were before NATO entered the country; 22% of respondents said that 
the Afghan people are the same.  In response to the same question, 27% of Americans 
said that the Afghan people are better off and 17% of Americans said that the Afghan 
people are worse off than they were before NATO entered Afghanistan; 38% of 
Americans said that the Afghan people are the same.  In response to the question, Since 
NATO forces entered Afghanistan, how do you feel the following areas of life have been 
impacted?  Eighty-six percent of respondents said political freedom, 36% said economic 
development and employment, 42% said education, 50% said health care, and 72% said 
personal safety and security of Afghans are negatively affected since NATO entered 
Afghanistan.  Respondents were asked, Who do you feel benefited most from the war in 
Afghanistan? The overwhelming majority (76%) said the United States, 50% said 
Pakistan, 40% said Iran, 26% said warlords, 3% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said India, and 2% 
Taliban benefited most from the war in Afghanistan. In response to the same question, 
33% of Americans said the Afghan people, 26% said the United States, 19% said 
warlords, 8% said Pakistan, 8% said Taliban, 7% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said Iran, and 1% 
said India benefited most from the war in Afghanistan.  In response to the question, When 
NATO leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested 
countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country’s security and 
economic development? Eighty-four percent said the United States will make a negative 
contribution, 46% said India will make a negative contribution, and 60% said Iran will 
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make a negative contribution to the security and economic development of Afghanistan 
after NATO leaves the country.  But 98% said Pakistan, 46% said Turkmenistan, 51% 
said Tajikistan, 47% said Uzbekistan, 50% said China, 67% said Saudi Arabia, and 66% 
said United Arab Emirate will make positive contributions to the security and economic 
development of Afghanistan after NATO leaves the country. In response to the question, 
indicate your attitude towards these leaders.  Eighty-seven percent said that they have 
very unfavorable attitudes toward Hamid Karzai, 97% said that they have very 
unfavorable attitudes toward George W. Bush and Barak Obama, but 77% said that they 
have a very favorable attitudes toward Taliban. In response to the question, Indicate your 
attitude—favorable/unfavorable—toward each of the following countries? Ninety-seven 
percent said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward the United States, 57% said 
that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward Iran, 34% said that they have very 
unfavorable attitudes toward India, and 15% said that they have very unfavorable 
attitudes toward China. 
 
Iraq 
 To gauge public views on the overall direction of Iraq since the U.S.-led coalition 
invasion of the country in Spring of 2003, respondents were asked, Do you think that Iraq 
is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong direction? In 2004, 50.73% of 
respondents said that Iraq is moving in the right direction and 39.32% said that Iraq is 
moving in the wrong direction.  However, in 2012, a year after the complete withdrawal 
of U.S. military forces from Iraq, 35% of respondents said that Iraq is moving in the right 
direction and 55% of respondents said that Iraq is moving in the wrong direction.  In 
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2017, 59% of Iraqi said that things are moving in the wrong direction in the country.  
Lacks of security, services, government corruption, and unemployment have been the key 
issues for their pessimism.  Figure 9 provides more details on the public perceived 
direction of the country from 2004 to 2017. 
 
Figure 9. Public Attitudes About How Things Are Going in Iraq, 2004-2017 
Question: Do you think that Iraq is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong 
direction? 
Source: International Republican Institute, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.  
Question: Generally speaking, do you think that things in Iraq are going in the right 
direction, or do you think things are going in the wrong direction? 
Source: National Democratic Institute, National Survey on Iraq, March – April 2017. 
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respondents said that things are going bad (very bad or quite bad) in their lives.  But in 
2007, 39% of respondents said that things are going good—a 31- point decline from 
2004, and 61% of respondents said that things are going bad in their lives—a 32-point 
increase from 2004.  In 2009, respondents were asked whether foreign aid organizations 
were doing a great deal, some, a little or nothing at all to provide service in their 
community. Seventy-seven percent of respondents said that foreign aid organizations are 
doing very little to nothing to provide services in their community. Twenty-one percent 
of respondents said that foreign aid organizations are doing a great deal or some work in 
providing services in their community.  Figure 10 provides comparative public views 
about the national government, the provincial government, and foreign aid organizations 
in providing service in 2009.  
 
Figure 10. How Each Group is Doing in Providing Services in Your Community, 2009 
Question: For each group I name, please tell me how much that group is doing to provide 
services in your community – a great deal, some, a little or nothing at all? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
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 In 2004, respondents were asked, Which countries/organizations should play a 
role in the rebuilding of Iraq? Japan (35.9%) and the United States (35.70%) were the 
top two countries that respondents said should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq 
followed by France (21.60%), the United Kingdom (21.50%), and Germany (16.70%).  
Figure 11 provides a view of the countries that Iraqis in 2004 said should play a role in 
the rebuilding of their country. 
 
Figure 11. Countries that Should Play a Role in The Rebuilding of Iraq, 2004 
Question: Which countries/organizations should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq? 
Source: Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2004. 
 
 
 However, to gauge public views on which country(s) should not play a role in the 
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Kuwait (17%) and the United States (14%).  Figure 12 provides a view of the countries 
that Iraqis in 2004 said should not play a role in the rebuilding of their country. 
 
Figure 12. Countries that Should Not Play a Role in the Rebuilding of Iraq, 2004 
Question: Which countries/organizations should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?  
Source: Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2004. 
 
 
 To get a sense of the public perception on the effects of U.S. military presence on 
the security situation of the country, respondents were asked, Do you think the US 
military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force or that it is provoking more 
conflict than it is preventing?  Twenty-one percent of respondents in 2006 said that the 
U.S. military force in the country is a stabilizing force. However, the overwhelming 
majority (78%) of respondents said that the U.S. military force is provoking more 
conflicts than it is preventing in the country. Figure 13 provides more details.  To 
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results indicate that Iraqis did not have much confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in 
their country. Seventy-one percent of respondents in 2003, 66% of respondents in 2004, 
78% of respondents in 2005, 82% of respondents in 2007, 79% of respondents in 2008, 
and 73% of respondents in 2009 said that they have no confidence (not very much or 
none at all)  in the U.S. and UK forces in the country.  Only nineteen percent of 
respondents in 2003 and 27% of respondents in 2009 said that they have confidence (a 
great deal or quite a lot) in the U.S. and UK forces in the country.  Figure 14 provides 
public confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2009.  
 
Figure 13. Effects of the U.S. Military Presence on Security in Iraq, September 2006 
Question: Do you think the US military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force or 
that it is provoking more conflict than it is preventing?  
Source: World Public Opinion.ORG, The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the 
Future of Iraq, 2006. 
 
 
 Compared to confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in the country, Iraqis have 
more confidence in their national government.  Thirty-nine percent of respondents in 
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2004 and 61%of respondents in 2009 said that they have a great deal of confidence or a 
lot of confidence in their government. Figure 15 provides more details on public 
confidence in the Iraqi government from 2004 to 2009.  But in a most recent survey 
conducted in 2018, 79% of Iraqis said that they have low or no confidence in their 
government. Lack of security, services, government corruption, and employment 
opportunities were the main reasons for their lack of confidence in the government. 
 
Figure 14. Public Confidence in the U.S. and U.K. Forces in Iraq, 2003-2009 
Question: How much confidence do you have in [U.S. and UK occupation forces] - is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
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Figure 15. Public Confidence in the Iraqi Government/Governing Council, 2004-2009 
Question: How much confidence do you have in [national government of Iraq] - is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
 
 
 To gauge the trend in the provision of basic services in the country, respondents 
were asked, Now I am going to read a list of issues. For each one please tell me whether 
you feel that the situation has gotten better or gotten worse over the last year.  Sixty 
percent of respondents said that security got better, but 60% of respondents said that the 
provision of electricity, 63% of respondents said that unemployment, 62% of respondents 
said that government corruption, 19% of respondents said that wages and salaries, and 
52% of respondents said that basic services such as water, sewage, got worse over the last 
year.  Figure 16 provides more details on the provision of basic services in the country in 
2010. 
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Figure 16. Provision of Basic Services Compared to One Year Ago in Iraq, 2010 
Question: Now I am going to read a list of issues. For each one please tell me whether 
you feel that the situation has gotten better or gotten worse over the last year. 
Source: International Republican Institute, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, June 3-July 3, 
2010. 
 
 
 In August 2010, a year before the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, respondents 
were asked, I am going to read you a list of issues. Please tell me for each one whether 
you think it is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem or not 
a problem at all in Baghdad.  Ninety-six percent of respondents said that bribes and kick-
backs, 96% of respondents said that not implementing the laws, 95% of respondents said 
that wrong person in the wrong position, 95% of respondents said nepotism, 93% of 
respondents said no accountability in the government, and 78% of respondents said lack 
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of transparency in the government were problems with the central government. Figure 17 
depicts public perceived major issues with the Iraqi government in 2010. 
 
Figure 17. Iraqi's Attitudes Toward Issues/Problems in Baghdad, 2010 
Question: I am going to read you a list of issues. Please tell me for each one whether you 
think it is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem or not a 
problem at all in Baghdad. 
Source: International Republic Institute, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, August 30, 
2010. 
 
 
 To gauge Iraqis’ attitudes toward the U.S.-led invasion of their country in Spring 
of 2003, respondents were asked in 2004, From today’s perspective and all things 
considered, was it absolutely right, somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely 
wrong that U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in spring 2003?  In February 2004, 
48% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat right that U.S.-led coalition 
forces invaded Iraq and 39% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat 
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wrong that the U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in Spring of 2003.  However, in 
2009, only 42% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat right, a 6 point 
decline, that the U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq and 56% of respondents said that it was 
absolutely or somewhat wrong, a 17 point increase, that the U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq 
in Spring of 2003. Figure 18 provides more details on the attitudes of Iraqis toward the 
2003 U.S.-led invasion of their country. 
 
Figure 18. Iraqis' Attitudes Toward the U.S.-led Invasion of Their Country in Spring of 
2003, 2004-2009 
Question: From today’s perspective and all things considered, was it absolutely right, 
somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that U.S.-led coalition forces 
invaded Iraq in spring 2003? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
 
 
 Furthermore, in terms of ethnicity, the overwhelming majority of Sunnis (89%), 
about half of the Shi’a (49%), and 19% of Kurds in 2009 said that it was absolutely or 
somewhat wrong for the U.S.-led coalition forces to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003.  In 
the 2011 survey conducted by Zogby Research Services, respondents were asked, Do you 
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think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were before the American 
forces entered their country? Thirty percent of Iraqis, 37% of Egyptians, 25% of 
Jordanians, 16% of Saudis, 22% of Lebanese, 31% of Tunisians, 30% of United Arab 
Emiratis, and 25% of Iranians said that the people of Iraq are better off and 42% of 
Iraqis, 41% of Egyptians, 61 % of Jordanians, 66% of Saudis, 58% of Lebanese, 20% 
of Tunisians, 48% of United Arab Emiratis, and 52% of Iranians said that the people 
of Iraq are worse off than they were before the American forces entered their 
country.  However, 39% of Americans said that the people of Iraq are better off and 
only 18% of Americans said that the people of Iraq are worse off than they were 
before the U.S. forces entered their country. 
 Iraqis were also asked, in the same survey, since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do 
you feel the following areas of life have been affected?  Forty-eight percent of Iraqis 
said political freedom, 66% of Iraqis said economic development and employment, 
47% of Iraqis said education, 48% of Iraqis said health care, 72% of Iraqis said 
personal safety and security, 52% of Iraqis said relations with neighboring 
countries, 59% of Iraqis said government, 37% of Iraqis said women’s right, and 
36% of Iraqis said religious freedom have been negatively impacted since the United 
States entered Iraq.  In response to a question, Who benefited the most from the war in 
Iraq?, the overwhelming majority in Iraq (48%), Egypt (88%), Jordan (66%), Saudi Arabia 
(58%), Lebanon (86%), Tunisia (81%), the United Arab Emirates (47%), and Iran (50%) 
said that the United States, not the people of Iraq, benefited the most from the war in Iraq.  
However, 39% of Americans said that the Iraqi people and 22% said that the United States 
benefited the most from the war in Iraq.  
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 In the same survey, to measure Iraqi attitudes toward the United States and 
neighboring countries, Iraqis were asked in 2011, Indicate your attitude towards the 
following countries. Majority of Iraqis (67%) said that they have an unfavorable 
attitude toward the United States. Only 26% of respondents expressed positive 
attitudes toward the United States.  Figure 19 provides a complete picture of the 
Iraqis’ attitudes toward the United States and neighboring countries. 
 
Figure 19. Iraqis’ Attitudes Toward the United States and Neighboring Countries, 2011 
Question: Indicate your attitude towards the following countries [U.S, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Turkey, UAE, China]. 
Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011. 
 
 
 Looking forward to the future, Iraqis were asked, Which of the following roles do 
you see the United States playing in your country’s future? Thirty-three percent of 
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future of their country.  Figure 20 depicts Iraqis perceived future role of the United 
States in their country. 
 
Figure 20. Role of the United States in the Future of Iraq, 2011 
Question: Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your 
country’s future? 
Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011. 
 
 
 In the same survey, U.S respondents were asked, Do you feel the war in Iraq was 
worth it? Twenty-six percent of respondents (17% of Democrats and 42% of 
Republicans) said yes, the war in Iraq was worth it, but 56% of respondents (75% of 
Democrats and 32% of Republicans) said no, the war in Iraq was not worth it.  
Furthermore, in the 2016 Arab Youth Survey, respondents were asked, do you consider 
[U.S.] a strong ally, somewhat of an ally, somewhat of an enemy, or a strong enemy of 
your country?  The overwhelming majority (93%) of the Iraqis aged 18-24 said that they 
consider the United States as an enemy of their country and only 6% said that they 
consider the United States as an ally of their country. In the 2017 Arab attitudes survey, 
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which measures Arab attitudes toward the United States, American foreign policies 
toward the Middle East, and the American people, 42% of Arabs expressed negative 
attitudes toward the United States, 61% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the 
U.S foreign policies toward the Arab world, and only 25% of Arabs expressed negative 
attitudes toward the American people. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of U.N. Inspector in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, respondents were asked, Who do you find mostly responsible for the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina war from 1992 to 1995?  In general, 39.5% of respondents stated that 
they hold the international community responsible for the war followed by Serbia 
(23.3%), Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.4%), politicians (4.9%), and Bosniaks 
(4.4%).  Ethnically, 33% of Bosnians and 41.7% of Croats blame Serbs for the war, but 
the overwhelming majority of Serbs (74.8%) blame the international community for the 
1992-1995 war.  Respondents were also asked, In your opinion, what are the biggest 
problems and challenges that Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently facing?  Corruption, 
economy, and politicians were listed as the major problems facing the nation.  Figure 21 
depicts the public perception of the top three major problems facing the nation. 
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Figure 21. Top Three Major Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015 
Question:  In your opinion, what are the biggest problems and challenges that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is currently facing? 
Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015. 
 
 
 According to the World Bank Survey (2000), 60% of the general public, 54% of 
the public officials, and 52% of enterprise managers stated that corruption is widespread 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In the 2017 public opinion survey conducted by the Center 
for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of respondents (60%) stated 
that corruption is widespread in government institutions.   Seventy-four percent of 
respondents stated that inspections/inspectorates are the most corrupt in the country.  
Health care institutions and Parliament are in second place (72%) when it comes to 
corruption, according to the survey.  Four institutions, which should be a barrier to 
corruption, share the third place when it comes to corruption in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina—the Police, the Judiciary, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the customs service 
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(71%).  The fourth place is shared by municipal/city authority (68%), the education 
system (64%), the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of the 
Fight Against Corruption and the media (60%).  None-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are placed in fifth place (54%), when it comes to corruption in the country.  In 
the Balkan Barometer 2017 survey, respondents were asked, Did your household face the 
following problems (even at least once) during the past 12 months?  Respondents said 
that they were unable (at least once in the past 12 months) to pay rent or utility bills 
(14%), to pay instalment on a loan (11%), to keep their home adequately warm (11%), to 
afford food, clothes and other basic supplies (10%), and to afford at least one week of 
holiday away from home (if wanted to) (38%).   
 According to the 2017 Survey, Socio-economic Perceptions of Young People in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of young people, aged 15 to 30, (61.1%) believed 
that their quality of life is worse than the quality of life of their parents when they were 
young.  The overwhelming majority of respondents (76.8%) believed that development in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is stagnant and government authority does not properly address 
the economic (87%), social (86.7%), and political (80.3%) problems in the country.  
Furthermore, 75.2% of respondents said that the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities and 
leading political parties do not have the will and capacity to take part in constructive 
politics and social dialogue.  About two-third of respondents (67.3%) said that they 
would participate in peaceful protests for a goal that they care for but 24% among 
respondents who would not participate in peaceful protests said that they believe such 
protests would not change things for the better.   Unemployment 96.8%, increased 
poverty 96.4%, and employment insecurity 95.2% are the top three socio-economic 
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problems facing the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Figure 22 presents youth 
perception of the alarming problems facing the country in 2017 
 
Figure 22. Top Five Major Socio-economic Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
2017 
Question: In your view, how alarming are the following problems for the society in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: Prism Research & Consulting, Socio-econ Perception of Young People in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 2017. 
 
 
 In response to the question, Who do you hold most accountable for those 
problems, respondents in the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of U.N. 
Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that authorities (87.40%), politicians 
(87.20%), the international community (43.90%), citizens (23.00%), media (8.80%), and 
European Union (8.30%) are responsible for the problems in the country.  As for 
confidence in domestic and international institutions, respondents said that they have 
more confidence in their police force (60.80%), followed by religious leaders (55.20%), 
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European Union (48.70%), the army (48.70%), and the U.N. (47.20%) respectively. The 
lowest level of confidence was reported for the political parties (14.30%) in the country.   
Figure 23 provides details about public trust in public institutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2017. 
 
Figure 23. Trust in Public Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017 
Question: How much do you trust the following institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: Public Opinion Survey, Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2017. 
 
 
 In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents were asked, Which countries and organizations 
[do] you believe provide the majority of financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina? The 
E.U. (51.7%), followed by Turkey (51.2%), the United States (44%), U.N. (32.80%), and 
Saudi Arabia (27.90%) were stated by respondents as the top five countries and 
organizations that provide the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Figure 
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24 provides the public perception of the top five countries and organizations that provide 
the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015. 
 
Figure 24. Countries and Organizations that Provide the Majority of Foreign Aid to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015 
Question: Which countries and organizations you believe provide the majority of 
financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015. 
 
 
 In the same survey, respondents were also asked, In your opinion, what are the 
three most important priorities of the international community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina?  The overwhelming majority of respondents (94.6%) stated economic 
development followed by the development of certain sectors such as education and health 
care (65.2%), and institutional development (39.5%) as the three most important 
priorities of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Furthermore, 
respondents were asked, What would most likely happen if all international 
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representatives would give up on the engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Thirty-six 
point seven percent of respondents said that domestic leaders would be forced to take the 
responsibility and move forward, 25.8% of respondents said that the situation would get 
worse, but it would not cause a breakup or conflict in the country, 14.1% of respondents 
said that Bosnia and Herzegovina would fall apart, 11.3% said that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would stagnate, but nothing would happen, 7.2% of respondents said that 
eventually the war would break out again.   In the same survey, respondents were asked, 
Which of the following groups has the most power in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Forty-
three point one percent of respondents said that leaders of major political parties have 
more power in the country, followed by leaders chosen in the elections (19.1%), the 
United States (14.3%), criminals’ underground (8.3%), and the E.U. (7.2%). 
In the 2017 survey, commissioned by the International Republic Institute’s Center 
for Insights and Survey Research, respondents were asked, What is your opinion of the 
role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Bosnia?  Is it mostly 
positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or mostly negative?  Thirty-nine percent 
of respondents said that the United States play mostly or somewhat positive role in the 
country, but 45% of respondents believed that the United States play mostly or somewhat 
negative role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As for the role of Russia in the country, 51% of 
respondents said that Russia plays mostly or somewhat positive role and 42% of 
respondents said that it plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country.  Fifty-five 
percent of respondents said that Turkey plays mostly or somewhat positive role in the 
country and 37% of respondents said it plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the 
country.  As for the role of Saudi Arabia in the country, 38% of respondents stated that it 
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plays mostly or somewhat positive role in the country, but 48% of respondents said that 
Saudi Arabia plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country.  In the same survey, 
in response to the question, Do you agree or disagree that maintaining strong relations 
with the United States, Russia, Turkey, the European Union, Germany, and United 
Kingdom is in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national interest, the majority of respondents 
agreed that maintaining strong relations with the United States (72%), Russia (69%), 
Turkey (73%), the E.U. (86%), Germany (86%), and the United Kingdom (72%) were in 
the national interest of the country.  Furthermore, survey respondents were asked in the 
same survey, In your opinion which of the listed countries is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
greatest ally, Turkey (26%), Germany (24%), Russia (16%), U.S (9%), China (3%), and 
UK (1%) were listed as the greatest ally of the country.  As for the role of NATO, 
respondents were asked, How do you view the role of NATO in the world: mostly positive, 
somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or mostly negative?  Fifty-four percent of 
respondents said that they view the role of NATO in the world mostly or somewhat 
positive and 40% of respondents said that they view it as somewhat or mostly negative.  
Furthermore, 53% of respondents said that NATO is most closely associated with 
stability and security in the world, but 40% of respondents said that NATO is most 
closely associated with conflict and instability in the world. 
 In the 2017 Balkan Barometer survey, in response to the question, In your opinion 
which two assets are most important for finding a job today, personal contact (57%) and 
Network of family and friends in high places (36%) were listed as the two most important 
assets to find a job in the country.  Only 24% of respondents stated the level of one's 
qualification/education and 15% of respondents stated professional experience as two of 
 105 
the most important assets for finding a job.  Respondents were also asked, What are the 
two main obstacles to those in your household who do not work, to get a good job?  
Again, the majority of respondents (56%) said that not knowing the right people and lack 
of jobs (35%) were the two most important obstacles to get a job.  In response to another 
question, Would you consider leaving and working abroad, 50% of respondents said yes 
they would be willing to move and work abroad, but 45% of respondents said no.  Figure 
25 provides more details. 
 
Figure 25. Public Attitudes Toward Leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Live and Work 
Abroad, 2015-2017 
Question: Would you consider living and working abroad? 
Source: Balkan Barometer, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
 
 
 In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents were asked, To what extent are you willing to 
take part in the following activities? Thirty-seven point three percent said that they would 
participate in demonstrations or protests, 2.6% said that they would use violence or force 
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in demonstrations or protests, and 36.7% said that they are ready to leave Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Figure 26 provides a complete picture. 
 
Figure 26. Public Willingness in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Take Part in the Following 
Activities, 2015 
Question: To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities? 
Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015. 
 
 
 In the 2017 survey, commissioned by the International Republic Institute’s Center 
for Insights and Survey Research, respondents were asked, If you could only have one or 
the other, which is more important to you: a democratic system of government or 
prosperous economy?  Fifty-one percent of respondents said that prosperity is definitely 
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or somewhat more important to them than democracy, but 41% of respondents said that 
democracy is definitely or somewhat more important to them than economic prosperity.  
Also, in the same survey, respondents were asked, If you had a choice between a secular 
state or a religious state, which would you prefer to live in? The overwhelming majority 
of respondents (80%) stated that they absolutely or somewhat prefer to live in a secular 
state, but 14% of respondents said that they somewhat or absolutely prefer to live in a 
religious state.  
 
Kosovo 
 In the August 2017 Public Opinion Poll respondents were asked, Are things in 
Kosovo going in the right direction or wrong direction? Only 16% of respondents said 
that things in Kosovo are going in the right direction.  Thirty-nine percent of respondents 
said that things are going neither in the right nor in the wrong direction and 39% of 
respondents said that things were moving in the wrong direction in the country.   
Corruption (74%), unemployment (64%), nepotism in employment (26%), illegal 
migration (6%), political violence (6%), and terrorism (5%) were listed as the major 
problems and reasons for their pessimism.   
 As for corruption, political institutions (executive, parliament, mayors, presidency 
and local government officials) are perceived as the most corrupted followed by the 
judiciary branch in the country.  Eighty-four percent of respondents believe that 
politicians have no real interest in fighting corruption in the country because they benefit 
from it.  According to the Kosovo Security Barometer (2018), which measures public 
trust in security and justice institutions, only 14% of Kosovars trust the government and 
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65% of Kosovars do not trust the government.  In addition, 47% of Kosovars do not trust 
courts and 40% do not trust prosecution in the country.  However, 66% of Kosovars trust 
NATO-led Kosovo Force and NATO missions in the country.  In the same survey, 
respondents were asked how safe they feel at home, in their neighborhoods, in their 
villages or towns, and in Kosovo as a whole.  Eight-five percent of respondents said that 
they feel safe at home and only 14% of respondents said that they do not feel safe at 
home.  In addition, 82% of respondents said that they feel safe in their neighborhoods and 
75% said that they feel safe in their villages/towns.  In contrast, 17% of respondents and 
25% of respondents said that they feel unsafe in their neighborhoods and villages/towns, 
respectively.  As for the country as a whole, 54% of respondents said that they feel safe 
and 46% of respondents said that they do not feel safe, in general, in Kosovo.  
To gauge the household financial situation, in the 2017 Balkan Barometer survey, 
respondents were asked, How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your 
household?  Forty-three percent of respondents said that they were completely or mostly 
satisfied with their household financial situation, but 57% of respondents stated that they 
were completely or mostly unsatisfied with their household financial situation.  
Respondents were also asked, What do you think are the two most important problems 
facing your economy?  Unemployment (67%) and corruption (62%) were the two 
perceived most important problems facing the economy in the country.  In the same 
survey, respondents were asked, Did your household face the following problems (even at 
least once) during the past 12 months?  Twenty-two percent of respondents said that they 
were unable to pay rent or utility bills, 16% of respondents said that they were unable to 
pay installment on a loan, 8% said that they were unable to keep home adequately warm, 
 109 
7% said they were unable to afford food, clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% of 
respondents said that they could not afford one week holiday away from home (if wanted 
to) at least once in the past 12 months.  
In the 2017 public opinion poll, conducted by the National Democratic Institue, 
respondents were asked, Do you expect that the general economic and political situation 
in Kosovo will improve, worsen or remain the same as it is today?  Forty-five percent of 
respondents said that the general economic and political situation in Kosovo will 
improve, 38% of respondents said that they do not expect any changes, and 10% of 
respondents said that it will worsen.   Kosovars are divided on whether or not the country 
is a democracy.  In the same 2017 public opinion poll, 36% of respondents stated that 
Kosovo is a democracy, but there is still room for improvement, 22% said that Kosovo is 
not a democracy, as it only delivers for a small group of individuals, 15% said that 
Kosovo is not a stable democracy, and country risks moving toward autocracy.  
There is optimism among the Kosovars that the Brussels Dialogue can improve 
the quality of life for average citizens in the country.  In response to the question, 
Regarding the Dialogue, how confident are you that discussions between the 
governments of Kosovo and Serbia have the ability to improve conditions in the lives of 
average citizens?  Forty-three percent of respondents said that they are very or somewhat 
confident that discussions between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia have the 
ability to improve conditions in the lives of average citizens.  As for looking ahead, 51% 
of respondents believe that ethnic relations within Kosovo will improve.  
 In conclusion, the data presented in this chapter reveal interesting patterns and 
empirical associations between foreign aid and public attitudes toward the donors of the 
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foreign aid and the aid recipient states in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo.  In Afghanistan and Iraq, the data indicate that initially there was more optimism 
and positive attitudes toward the direction of the country, the international community, 
and the aid recipient states.  However, insecurity, state weakness, corruption, lack of the 
rule of law, transparency and accountability, and poor economy and services have eroded 
aid effectiveness and positive public attitudes toward foreign donors and the aid recipient 
states in both countries.  In 2004, 64% of respondents in Afghanistan and 50.73% of 
respondents in Iraq stated that their countries were moving in the right direction. 
However, in 2017, only 33% of respondents in Afghanistan and 39% of respondents in 
Iraq said that their country was moving in the right direction.  Furthermore, in 2005, 80% 
of respondents in Afghanistan expressed positive attitudes and confidence in the state and 
68% expressed positive attitudes and confidence in the United States to do their job in the 
country. In 2007, 65% of respondents expressed positive attitudes and confidence in 
foreign-funded international NGOs to do their job in the country.  However, in 2011, 
86% of respondents said political freedom, 36% said economic development and 
employment, 42% said education, 50% said health care, and 72% said personal safety and 
security of Afghans are negatively affected since NATO entered Afghanistan.  In the 
same survey, 76% of respondents said the United States, 50% said Pakistan, 40% said 
Iran, 26% said warlords, 3% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said India, and 2% said Taliban 
benefited most from the war in Afghanistan, not the Afghan people.  In 2017 only 36% of 
respondents in Afghanistan expressed confidence in their government and 42% expressed 
confidence in the donors and foreign-funded NGOs to do their job in the country.  
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 In Iraq, in 2006, 78% of respondents said that the U.S. military is provoking more 
conflicts than it is preventing; 77% of respondents in 2009 said that foreign aid 
organizations were doing little to nothing in providing services in their communities.  In 
2010, 96% of respondents said that bribes and kick-backs, 96% of respondents said that 
not implementing the laws, 95% of respondents said wrong person in the wrong position, 
95% of respondents said nepotism, 93% of respondents said no accountability, and 78% 
of respondents said lack of transparency  were major problems with the central 
government in Iraq.   In 2011, eight years after the U.S-led invasion, occupation and 
rebuilding of the country and billions in foreign aid, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis 
(96%) said that the U.S.-led invasion, occupation, and the rebuilding of Iraq did not 
benefit the people of Iraq, which punctuates our findings.  In 2011, 67% of Iraqis 
expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the United States and in 2016, 93% of the Iraqis 
aged 18-24 said that they consider the United States as an enemy of their country.   
However, the data for the Middle East, as a whole, show that Arab public anti-American 
sentiment targets American foreign policies in the Arab region, not the American people 
or the United States as a country. In 2017, 65% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes 
toward the American people, 48% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes toward the 
United States, and only 29% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes toward the U.S. 
policies in the Middle East, which clearly punctuates the findings. 
 The Bosnians blame the International community, Serbia and the Serbs living in 
the country for the Bosnian war (1992-1195).  Both the Bosnians and Kosovars are not 
happy with the direction of their countries. In 2017, only 16% of Kosovars said that 
things were going in the right direction.  Corruption, unemployment, nepotism, and poor 
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economy were the major problems facing both nations.  In 2017, over 50% of Bosnians 
said that they would consider living and working abroad if given the opportunity.  Both 
Bosnians and Kosovars have low trust in public institutions, state, and donors.  In 2017, 
70% of Bosnians said that they do not trust parliament, 65% said that they do not trust 
prosecutors, 64% said that they do not trust the judiciary, 58% said that they do not trust 
customs, and 49% said that they do not trust the police in the country. As for Kosovo, 
only 14% of Kosovars trust the government.  However, 66% of Kosovars trust NATO-led 
Kosovo Force and NATO mission in the country.  As for the role of the donors in the 
country, 39% of Bosnians said in 2017 that the United States, 51% said Russia, 51% said 
Turkey, and 38% said Saudi Arabia are playing mostly or somewhat positive roles in the 
country. However, 45% believed that the United States, 42% said Russia, 37% said 
Turkey, and 48% said Saudi Arabia plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the 
country.   
 Compared to Iraq, initially, there was more optimism and positive public attitudes 
and perceptions toward foreign donors, the international community and the aid recipient 
state in Afghanistan.  Compared to Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign aid and foreign donors 
have achieved some level of security and improved provision of services in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo since 1995 and 1999 respectively.  However, the key issues 
facing foreign aid and foreign donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are state 
weakness, rampant corruption, and poor economy, especially lack of income and 
employment. Overall, state weakness, lack of security, especially human security in the 
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, poor economy and services, lack of transparency and 
accountability, the rule of law, and high-level corruption are the main themes across the 
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four cases.  The data for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo show 
that in the court of the public opinions, foreign aid, foreign donors, the international 
community and the aid recipient states have underperformed in the delivery of state-
building, economic and political development, and the provision of basic services across 
the four cases.
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CHAPTER V – DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The breakup of the Yugoslavian state led to the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995) 
and the Kosovo War (1998-1999), which left both countries devastated and dependent on 
foreign aid to rebuild. The European Union with support from the United States and other 
Western donors has played a significant role in the rebuilding and development of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo to provide the much-needed services to their citizens and to 
fight poverty, crimes, corruption, and extremism.  The overthrowing of the Taliban 
regime in the fall of 2001 and the Saddam Hussein regime in the spring of 2003 by the 
U.S.-led coalition forces compelled the United States to take a leading role and shoulder 
the largest portion of the military and economic costs of rebuilding and reintegrating both 
countries into the international community.  Western donors in general and the United 
States and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union 
alike have provided billions of dollars of aid and funded and implemented thousands of 
development, reconstruction, and welfare programs and projects in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  The principal objective of foreign aid for 
the United States, its European allies and the European Union more broadly, and the 
international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, in Kosovo since 1999, in 
Afghanistan since 2001, and in Iraq since 2003 has been to win the hearts and minds of 
citizens in these countries, as a hedge against extremism and terrorism, through the 
provision of improved services and establishment of a legitimate and functioning state 
based on liberal democratic principles of governance.  Since social behavior is contingent 
on the behaviors of others (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), 
donors argue foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries, 
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which leads to positive attitudes and behaviors toward donors and the local state and 
combats grievances that extremist and terrorist organizations and leaders usually exploit.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013), Hafez and Mullins 
(2015), and Bhatia and Hafez (2017) argue that grievances are the leading cause of 
insurgency, extremism and terrorism. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, foreign aid has made a range of 
accomplishments in the areas of poverty reduction, democratic governance, human 
security, and sustainable environment in a post-conflict political, economic, and human 
development context.  Under the guidance of donors (especially the European Union and 
the United States) policy reforms are underway to stabilize administrative, political, 
economic, and legal institutions in an effort to align Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
with the European standards.   Donors are supporting economic structural changes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to skew public policies and incentives from the 
public to the private sector, from consumption to investment and production, and from 
import to export to create an environment conducive for private investment and to 
generate the much-needed private sector employment.  In Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign 
aid and foreign donors have made some political, economic, and social progress 
compared to the past periods under regimes controlled by the Taliban and President 
Saddam Hussein, respectively.  Today, between them, Afghanistan and Iraq have new 
constitutions, publicly elected presidents, a chief executive, prime ministers and 
parliaments, and they are fully integrated into the international community, which are 
remarkable accomplishments given not too long ago they were both autocratic states, 
isolated from the rest of the world.  In spite of the remarkable political, economic, and 
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social transitions and achievements that the United States, the European Union and the 
rest of the donor states and inter-governmental organizations have accomplished in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, these states are all far from the 
finish line--critical security, especially human security, administrative reforms, state 
capacity and legitimacy, political, economic, and social development and reconstruction 
challenges still remain in these countries.  However, where donors stand in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo as far as winning public hearts and minds is 
concerned?  Has foreign aid increased positive public attitudes toward the donors and 
their own states in these four cases?  Answering these questions requires an appraisal of 
the opinions and attitudes of the Afghans, Iraqis, Bosnians, and Kosovars at present and 
over time toward foreign donors in general and the United States and the European Union 
in particular, as the leading donors in Afghanistan and Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo respectively. 
 
Afghanistan 
 The data clearly indicate that respondents who are aware of the development 
programs and projects implemented with foreign aid in the country also consistently 
identify the top 10 donor nations in the country as the United States, Japan, Germany, 
India, China, the United Kingdom, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, respectively.   
Since 2001, survey respondents in Afghanistan have consistently identified the United 
States as a leading donor that has provided more foreign aid and has funded more 
humanitarian, development and reconstruction projects and programs in the country 
compared to any other foreign donor nation(s).  Also, the data reveal that the Afghan 
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people see their government (24.5%) not the United States (22.6%) or any other foreign 
donor nation(s) as an agency primarily responsible for the implementation of 
reconstruction and development programs and projects in the country.  This means that 
the Afghan government has successfully coordinated the implementation of foreign-
funded humanitarian, reconstruction and development projects with foreign donors, by 
working closely with them, to brand these projects as its own in order to garner public 
confidence and build the much-needed image and legitimacy of the state.  Building 
legitimacy of the Afghan state has been one of the key objectives of the United States, 
other foreign donors, and the government of Afghanistan alike since 2001.  While, 
overall, the government of Afghanistan is perceived as a top implementer of the foreign-
funded programs and projects in the country, the United States is still perceived as the top 
implementer, among all foreign donors, of the foreign-funded humanitarian, development 
and reconstruction programs and projects in the country. Furthermore, in the 2004 
survey, 64% of respondents stated that they have a favorable opinion toward the United 
States, unheard of it in any Muslim country.  In the 2005 survey, 68% of respondents said 
that they have confidence in the United States and 80% of respondents said that they have 
confidence in the Afghan Government to do their job in the country.  In the 2007 survey, 
65% of respondents indicated they had confidence in the international NGOs to do their 
job in the country.  These findings give support to the United States’ and other donors’ 
claims that “branding” of foreign aid programs and projects improve the image of donors 
in the aid recipient country.  The findings also give support to donors’ claim that foreign 
aid improves the legitimacy and image of the aid recipient state and builds public 
confidence in and positive attitudes toward the donor(s). 
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However, while the United States is identified consistently as the top donor in the 
country and the Afghan government as the top implementer of the humanitarian, 
development and reconstruction programs and projects in the country, public confidence 
in both those actors has been declining since 2005.  In 2005, for example, 68% of the 
public indicated that they have confidence in the United States and 80% said that they 
have confidence in the Afghan government to do their jobs in the country.  But in 2010, 
only 32% of respondents said that they have confidence in the United States and in 2017 
only 36% of respondents said that they have confidence in the Afghan government to do 
their jobs in the country.  In addition, the data show that 64% of respondents in 2004 and 
83% of respondents in 2005 had a favorable opinion toward the United States, unheard of 
it in any other Muslim country.  Only 24% of respondents in 2004 said that they have an 
unfavorable opinion toward the United States, again unheard of it in any other Muslim 
country.  However, in 2010 only 43% of the respondents said that they have a favorable 
opinion of the United States—a 21 point decline in a favorable opinion, and 56% of 
respondents said that they have an unfavorable opinion toward the United States—a 32-
point increase in unfavorable opinion in the country.  Surprisingly, the United States has 
provided $707 million in economic aid to Afghanistan in 2004 (USAID, 2018) and 
$3.058 billion in economic aid to the country in 2010 (USAID, 2018)—an over threefold 
increase in foreign aid from 2004 to 2010.  Figure 27 provides a complete picture of U.S. 
economic aid to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017.  
 If one compares the data for American economic aid to Afghanistan from 2001 to 
2017 (Figure 27) below with data on public opinions and attitudes toward the United 
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States in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010 (Figure 28) below, the following observations 
are reasonable:  
 
Figure 27. U. S. Economic Aid to Afghanistan, 2001-2017 
Source: United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/AFG?fiscal_year=2001&measure=Disbursements. 
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Figure 28. Public Opinions and Attitudes Toward the United Sates In Afghanistan, 2004-
2010 
Question:  Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
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3. Interestingly, 54% of respondents in 2010 said that they are aware of one or more 
foreign-funded development and/or reconstruction programs or projects 
implemented in their area or district.  
 Surprisingly, a steady increase in foreign aid (humanitarian and development aid) 
from the United States to Afghanistan, public awareness and acknowledgement of the 
United States as a top donor, implementer and foreign aid provider to the country, and 
public knowledge and awareness of foreign-funded humanitarian, development and/or 
reconstruction programs or projects implemented in the country did not result in a steady 
increase in public confidence and positive attitudes toward the United States. An increase 
in foreign aid resulted in an increase in unfavorable opinions toward the United States in 
Afghanistan from 24% in 2004 to 56% in 2010—a 32 point increase in unfavorable 
opinions compared to 2004. 
 Further, when considering public confidence in the United States, international 
NGOs, and the government of Afghanistan to do their jobs, one can clearly see a negative 
trend in public attitudes toward the United States, NGOs, and the Afghan government to 
do its job in the country from 2005 to 2017. 
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Figure 29. Confidence in the Present Government, the United States in Afghanistan, and 
the International NGOs in Afghanistan to Do Their Jobs, 2005-2017 
Question: I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As 
I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. 
Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
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attitudes toward the United States, as a top donor, the government of Afghanistan, or 
foreign-funded international NGOs in Afghanistan since 2001.  Furthermore, in 2004, 
64% of respondents said that Afghanistan was moving in the right direction and only 
11% of respondents said that Afghanistan was moving in the wrong direction. However, 
in 2017, the majority of Afghans surveyed (61.2%) said their country was moving in the 
wrong direction and only 32.8% of respondents said that their country was moving in the 
right direction, which is a clear indication of a downward trend in public confidence and 
positive attitudes toward the country and its foreign supporters. 
 
Iraq 
 In 2004, a year after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003, 51% of 
Iraqis believed that their country was going in the right direction and only 39% of Iraqis 
felt their country was moving in the wrong direction.  Initially, the Iraqis, like the 
Afghans, had high expectations from the U.S-led coalition for the reconstruction and 
development of their country.  However, in 2006, 30%, and in 2012, a year after the U.S. 
forces completely withdrew from Iraq, 35% of respondents said that their country was 
moving in the right direction—a 16-point decline in positive public attitudes/perception 
toward the direction of the country since 2004.  In addition, in 2006, 52% of Iraqis and in 
2012, 55% of Iraqis said that their country was moving in the wrong direction—a 16-
point increase in negative perceptions about the direction of the country since 2004.  This 
32 points change in public perception and confidence in the direction of their country 
means that after a decade of U.S. aid, presence, and contribution to the rebuilding of Iraq, 
the people of Iraq believe that the U.S.-led coalition has put Iraq on a path that is not 
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consistent with their aspirations and expectations.  This is in spite of the fact that in 2004 
the United States was one of the top two countries (the other country was Japan 36%) that 
the Iraqis said should play a major role in the rebuilding of their country.  
  In terms of the U.S. military presence and the provision of security, peace and 
stability, the Iraqi people do not see the U.S. and U.K. forces having a positive impact on 
the situation in their country.  In September 2006, three years after the U.S.-led coalition 
invaded Iraq, only 21% of Iraqis surveyed said that the U.S. military forces were a 
stabilizing force in the country.  But the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (78%) said that 
the U.S. military forces were not a stabilizing force, but one that provoked more conflicts 
in the country than it prevented.   Also, in 2006, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis 
(79%) said that the United States had had a mostly negative effects on the situation in 
Iraq and only 14% said such effects were mostly positive ones.  Ethnically speaking, 96% 
of Sunnis, 87% of Shi’a, and 34% of Kurds surveyed said the United States had a mostly 
negative influence on the situation in Iraq.  Figure 30 below punctuates the point. 
 
Figure 30. Influence of Iran, Syria, and The United States on Situation in Iraq, September 
2006 
Source: WorldOpinion.Org, The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq, 
September 2006. 
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 Furthermore, since 2003, Iraqis’ confidence in the U.S. and U.K. forces remained 
low.   In 2003, only 19% of respondents said that they had confidence in the U.S. and 
U.K. forces and in 2009, 27% of Iraqis surveyed said that they had confidence in the U.S. 
and U.K. forces in the country.  Surprisingly, in 2004, 56%, in 2007, 61% and in 2009, 
73% of Iraqis said that they had confidence in the Iraqi military force, which has been put 
together, equipped and trained by U.S. and U.K. forces and heavily relied on the support 
of U.S. and U.K. forces in the battlefields.  In 2011, eight years after the U.S. occupation 
and the rebuilding of Iraq, 72% of Iraqis said that their personal safety and security were 
negatively affected since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.  This again means that the 
Iraqi people do not believe that the U.S. and U.K. forces have positively contributed to 
the overall security situation in the country since 2003, leave alone bringing peace, 
stability and safety to their country and daily lives.  Figure 31 provides Iraqis attitudes 
and confidence toward the U.S. and U.K. forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. 
 
Figure 31. Public Confidence in the U.S. and U.K. Forces in Iraq, 2003-2009 
Question: How much confidence do you have in [U.S. and U.K. forces] - is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
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 In terms of the provision of basic services, in December 2010, a year before the 
U.S. military’s complete withdrawal of all combat forces from Iraq, 60% of Iraqis said 
that the provision of electricity, 60% unemployment, 62% government corruption, 52% 
basic services such as water and sewage, etc., and 19% wages and salaries had worsened 
over the previous year.  In addition, in 2011, 48% of Iraqis said political freedom, 66% 
economic development and employment, 47% education, 48% health care, 72% personal 
safety and security, 52% relations with neighboring countries, 59% government, 37% 
women’s right, and 36% of religious freedom had been negatively affected since the 
United States invaded Iraq in 2003.  In 2009, 77% of Iraqis said that foreign aid 
organizations were doing little or nothing in providing services in their communities.  
Overall, the Iraqi people do not believe the U.S.-led invasion has benefited them in any 
way.  In 2011, in response to the question of who benefited the most from the war in Iraq, 
only 4% of Iraqis said the people of Iraq, but 51% said Iran and 48% said the United 
States benefited the most from the war in Iraq.  In response to the same question in 2011, 
40% of Americans said no one had benefited from the war in Iraq.  In addition, that year, 
56% of Americans (75% of Democrats and 32% of Republicans) in 2011 said that the 
war in Iraq was not worth it.    
 In terms of Iraqis’ perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, in 
2007, 77% of Iraqis said that the United States was playing a negative role in Iraq 
compared to only 12% who stated that the United States is playing a positive role in 
Iraq.  In 2009, 64% of Iraqis said that the United States is playing a negative role and 
18% of Iraqis said that the United States is playing a positive role in Iraq.   Looking 
to the future in 2011, 33% of Iraqis said they expected the United States to be a source of 
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interference in their country.  The overwhelming majority of Iraqis (67%) in 2011, eight 
years after the U.S. presence in (and rebuilding of) Iraq commenced, said that they had 
unfavorable attitudes toward the United States.  Only 26% of Iraqis said that they have 
favorable attitudes toward the United States.  Figure 32 provides more details. 
 
Figure 32. Iraqis’ Attitudes Toward the United States and Neighboring Countries, 2011 
Question: Indicate your attitude towards the following countries. 
Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011. 
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Figure 33. United States' Economic Aid to Iraq, 2004-2017 
Source: USAID, 2004-2017. 
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kickbacks, not implementing laws (96%), wrong people in the wrong positions (95%), 
nepotism (95%), no accountability (93%), and lack of transparency (78%).  In September 
2006, 62% of Iraqis (85% Sunnis, 66% Shi’a, 17% Kurds) surveyed said they had no 
confidence in the U.S. military forces to provide them security.  As a sign of growing 
Iraqi people’s impatience with the presence of U.S. forces in the country, in September 
2006, 37% (57% Sunnis, 36% Shi’a, 11% Kurds) said that they would like for the Iraqi 
government to ask the United States to withdraw its military forces from Iraq within six 
months.  Only, 9% of Iraqis (2% Sunnis, 5% Shi’a, 31% Kurds) surveyed said that their 
government should ask the United States to reduce the U.S.-led security forces in the 
country after the security situation improves in the country.  In spite of the billions of 
dollars in foreign aid and the loss of thousands of military and civilian lives, the majority 
of Iraqis have negative attitudes and feelings toward the United States, the American-led 
security forces in that country, and label negative charges of rampant corruption, 
unaccountability, nepotism, lack of transparency, lack of merit-based appointments, and 
not fairly and effectively implementing and upholding the laws of the country against the 
central government of Iraq that the United States has installed, backed, and supported 
since 2003.  Like in Afghanistan, foreign aid has not increased positive public attitudes 
toward foreign donors and the Iraqi government in Iraq since 2003. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina indicate that, on balance, Bosnians blame 
the international community for the 1992-1995 civil war devastated the country.  Like in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, corruption is a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 
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2000 World Bank survey, 60% of the general public, 54% of the public officials, and 
52% of enterprise managers stated that corruption was widespread in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  In the same survey, 36% of the public officials admitted that they had been 
offered money or expensive presents by their clients in the previous two years in return 
for the service delivered.  All respondents said that corruption endangers government 
security and public confidence in the state, limits foreign investment, and increases 
crimes and inequality in the country.  In 2015, corruption was stated by Bosnians as one 
of the major problems facing the country (69.4%), followed by a bad economy (48.3%), 
and bad politicians (47.3%).  Seventy-one percent of respondents in 2017 stated that the 
judiciary, the prosecutor’s office, and the customs, which should be fighting corruption in 
the country, are really corrupt.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are ranked fifth 
overall (54%), when it comes to corruption in the country.  As a result, the majority of 
respondents in 2017 said that personal contact (57%) and network of family and friends 
in high positions (36%) are the two most important assets in finding a job in the country.  
Only 24% of respondents in the same 2017 survey said that one’s level of education and 
15% of respondents said that one’s professional experience are important assets in 
landing a job.  This clearly indicates that the international community and donors, 
especially the European Union and the United States, need to push for more governance 
reforms, check and balance, and state-building initiatives to improve the delivery of 
services, the image of the state, and positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign 
donors. 
 As for the socio-economic situation in the country, the majority of Bosnian youths 
(61.1%), age 15 to 24, believe that their quality of life is worse compared to the quality of 
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life of their parents when they were young.  The five major socio-economic problems 
facing the country in 2017 were unemployment (87.3%), increased poverty (81.9%), and 
employment insecurity (79.6%), an ineffective fight against corruption (70.2%), and 
inadequate implementation of the rule of law.  Figure 34 presents very alarming problems 
facing the country in 2017. 
 
Figure 34. Very Alarming Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017 
Question: In your view, how alarming are the following problems for the society in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: Prism Research & Consulting, Socio-econ Perception of Young People in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 2017. 
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(11%), keep their home adequately warm (11%), afford food, clothes and other basic 
supplies (10%), and afford at least one week of holiday away from home (if wanted) 
(38%), which again indicate that in spite of some gains in economic development and 
prosperity, more work on poverty reduction and raising household employment and 
income are needed.  As for who the Bosnians think is responsible for the country’s 
problems, blame in 2015 fell on the governmental authorities (87.40%), politicians 
(87.20%), the international community (43.90%), citizens (23%), media (8.80%), and the 
European Union (8.30%).   This means Bosnians, like the Afghans and Iraqis, have high 
expectations of the Bosnian government, the international community, donors, and 
foreign-funded non-governmental organizations for the delivery of services and blame 
them for any shortcomings.   
 As for confidence in domestic and international institutions, Bosnians in 2017 
said that they had more confidence in their police force (60.80%), followed by religious 
leaders (55.20%), European Union (48.70%), army (48.70%), and the United Nations 
(47.20%) respectively. The lowest level of confidence was reported for political parties 
(14.30%) in the country.  In 2016, only one in 10 Bosnians said that things are moving in 
the right direction in the country. The overwhelming majority of respondents (86%) in 
2016 said that things are not moving in the right direction. When asked to state their 
overall level of satisfaction with public service delivery, less than half of citizens (45%) 
stated some level of satisfaction with government services in the country.  In 2016, a very 
small percentage of citizens said that they are represented by local government (12%), 
represented by political parties (6%) represented by state parliament (5%), and state 
government (5%).  This is consistent with the 2017 survey findings that the 
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overwhelming majority of the Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens said that they did not 
trust their institutions—including parliament (70%), the prosecutor’s office (65%), 
judicial system overall (64%), or the police (49.2%).  Overall, Bosnians have very low 
favorable attitudes (6%) toward the state-level government and institutions for the work 
and services that they provide.  
 In response to the question of which countries and organizations should have most 
influence on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union (66.90%), United 
States (62.30%), United Nations (40.30%), Turkey (14.80%), and Saudi Arabia (3.40%), 
respectively, were stated in 2013. 
 
Figure 35. Countries and Organizations that Should Have Most Influence on the Future of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013 
Question: Which of the following countries and organizations should have most influence 
on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2013. 
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 Furthermore, in response to the question of which country or organization 
provides the most financial aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union (51.7%), 
followed by Turkey (51.2%), the United States (44%), the United Nations (32.80%), and 
Saudi Arabia (27.90%) were stated in 2015 as the top five countries and organizations 
that provide the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 
 
Figure 36. Countries and Organizations that Provide the Majority of Foreign Aid to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015 
Question: Which countries and organizations you believe provide the majority of 
financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015. 
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the European Union (51.7%) provides more financial aid than the United States (44%), 
they perceive the United States (14.3%) to have more relative power in the country than 
the European Union (7.2%).  However, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of Bosnians in 2013 stated that the United States should play a major role in the 
future of the country (62.3%) and in 2015 the United States was rated as the third top 
donor to the country (44%), close to half of the Bosnians in 2015 stated that overall the 
United States was playing a negative role (45%) rather than a positive role (39%) in the 
country.  More surprisingly, the majority of Bosnians in 2017 did not perceive the United 
States and the European Union, the top perceived donors to the country, as their country’s 
most significant allies, but they agreed that maintaining strong relations with the United 
States (72%), Russia (69%), Turkey (73%), European Union (86%), Germany (86%), and 
the United Kingdom (72%) are in the national interest of the country.   
 
 
Figure 37. Public Perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Greatest Allies, 2017 
Question: In your opinion which of the listed countries is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
greatest ally? 
Source: International Republic Institute’s Center for Insights and Survey Research, 2017. 
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 In short, like the Afghans and Iraqis, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina blame 
their state, the international community and donors for their economic, political, and 
social struggles and shortcoming of the state in the delivery of services--rampant 
corruption, nepotism, lack of accountability and meritocracy in employment, ineffective 
implementation of laws, and inadequate fight against corruption.  Foreign aid has not 
resulted in an increase in positive public attitude toward the state and foreign donors, 
especially the European Union and the United States, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
1995. 
 
Kosovo 
 Kosovars are not happy with the overall direction of the country. In the 2017 
survey, only 16% of respondents said they believed Kosovo was moving in the right 
direction and 39% of respondents said that things were going in the wrong direction in 
the country.  The main reasons for their pessimism were the presence of corruption 
(74%), unemployment (64%), nepotism in employment (26%), illegal migration (6%), 
political violence (6%), and terrorism (5%).  
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Figure 38. Biggest Risks/Threats Facing Kosovo, August 2017 
Question: What is the biggest risk/threat for Kosovo in the near future? 
Source: Kosovo Public Opinion poll, August 2017. 
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2018 stated that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic direction of 
the country.  This means that in spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid in economic 
and political development in the country, more work and challenges remain to win public 
hearts and minds in the country.  
 With respect to the household financial situation, 43% of Kosovars in 2017 said 
that they were completely or mostly satisfied and 57% said that they were completely or 
most unsatisfied with their household financial situation. Unemployment (67%) and 
corruption (62%) were stated as the two main problems facing the economy in the 
country. Twenty-two percent (22%) of Kosovars said that they were unable to pay rent or 
utility bills, 16% said that they were unable to pay a loan installment, 8% said that they 
were unable to keep home adequately warm, 7% said they were unable to afford food, 
clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% said that they could not afford one week 
holiday away from home (if wanted to) at least once in the past 12 months. 
 In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that they would consider 
leaving the country in the next three years. They said the lack of job opportunities (60%), 
poverty (49.3%), and corruption/nepotism (43%) were the reasons for their pessimism.  
Further,  the 2018 youth survey data also show that only 45% of younger Kosovars (age 
18 to 24) compared to 59% of older Kosovars (age 25 to 35) are currently employed.  In 
total, 48% of all respondents surveyed in 2018 stated that they were unemployed.  More 
than half of the respondents (55%) stated that they received financial support from 
parents and close to half (46%) of respondents stated that they received financial support 
from other family members to make ends meet.  Respondents stated that lack of available 
jobs (43%), corruption (42%), and the lack of required professional qualifications (41%) 
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make it difficult to get a job in the country. Eighty percent of the respondents who said 
that they were employed stated that they were satisfied with their jobs, but 30% also 
indicated that a low level of income is the major challenge of their current jobs. 
  With respect to public safety and security in Kosovo, 67% of respondents in 2018 
stated that they felt safe and 33% of respondents said that they did not feel safe while out 
on the street. More importantly, since October 2008, more and more Kosovars indicated 
feeling unsafe while out on the street. In October 2008, 18.3% of respondents stated that 
they felt unsafe while out on the street. However, in April 2018, 33.1% of respondents 
stated that they feel unsafe while out on the street—a 15-point decrease in public attitude 
toward safety and security in the country. Regarding the interethnic relation, 28% of 
respondents stated the relation between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb ethnic groups 
has improved in recent years, but 27% of respondents stated that the relation between the 
two groups is still very intense and will remain intense for a long time. Forty-five percent 
of respondents (age 18 to 35) stated that the impact of conflict memories is that the 
interethnic relation between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs is intense.  
 As for trust in public and international institutions and foreign-funded 
organizations and donors, Kosovars believe that political institutions (executive, 
parliament, mayors, the presidency, and local government officials) are the most 
corrupted in the country.  Since 2007 public satisfaction with central institutions in 
Kosovo is very low.  In 2007, 30.5% of citizens stated that they were satisfied with 
central institutions, but the public satisfaction dropped to 30% in 2018. In 2007, more 
than half (52%) were satisfied with the work of the president, but in 2018 only 39.1% 
expressed their satisfaction—a 13-point decline in public perception and attitude toward 
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the president. Satisfaction with courts and prosecutor’s office in 2007 was 20% and 
22.7% respectively, but 31.2% of respondents in 2018 stated that they were satisfied with 
courts and 29.2% of respondents said that they were satisfied with the work of the 
prosecutor’s office in the country.  However, in spite of a slight increase in the level of 
satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the courts and prosecutor’s office, the overall 
public satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the judiciary branch of the country is 
low. As a result, only 14% of Kosovar in the 2018 survey said that they trust the 
government and the overwhelming majority (65%) said that they do not trust the 
government.  Also, 47% of Kosovars said they did not trust courts and 40% did not trust 
prosecution in the country. This means that the decline in public attitudes and satisfaction 
with the rule of law and governance have influenced public attitudes and overall 
satisfaction with all other institutions, including the international organizations and 
donors in the country.  Figure 39 provides more details on public satisfaction with central 
institutions in Kosovo 2007-2018. 
 
Figure 39. Satisfaction with Central Institutions in Kosovo, 2007-2018 
Source: Public Pulse XIV, June 2018. 
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 In 2018, public perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in different Kosovo 
government institutions varied with the highest level of corruption (39%) reported for the 
customs and the lowest level of corruption (24.5%) reported for the international 
organizations. However, Kosovars attitudes and confidence in international organizations 
and donors are on a steady and sharp decline since 2010. In 2010, only 14.7% of 
respondents said large-scale corruption existed in international organizations.  However, 
in 2018, 24.5% of respondents stated that a large-scale corruption existed in international 
organizations in the country—a 10-point decline in public attitudes and confidence in 
international organizations and donors. This means that the low level of the public 
satisfaction with domestic institutions and the Kosovo state has also affected public 
confidence and positive attitudes toward the international organizations and donors in the 
country—guilty by association.  It is therefore not surprising that 38% of Kosovars in 
2018 said that they were willing to join public protest for political reasons. This speaks 
volumes about the effectiveness of foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds toward 
the state and its foreign donors and supporters in the country.  
 In general, the data for Kosovo show a decreasing attitudes and satisfaction with 
the government, foreign donors, national and international institutions since 1999.  
Furthermore, the data also show public dissatisfaction with the effects of large scale 
corruption in national and international organizations, meritocracy in gaining 
employment in public and private scores, the provision of the rule of law and public 
safety and security, and the overall economic and political direction of Kosovo.  
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Conclusions  
 The United States with support from the rest of the international community and 
donors has played a leading and significant role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq 
since 2001 and 2003 respectively. As a leading donor and player, the United States alone 
has provided billions of dollars in foreign aid and has implemented hundreds of 
reconstruction and development programs and projects in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Initially 
(2001-2005) foreign aid contributed to an increase in positive public attitudes and 
opinions toward the state, the United States and the rest of the donors and players in the 
country. Like the Afghans, the Iraqis also initially (2004) had positive attitudes and 
opinions about the United States, as a leading donor and player, and wanted the U.S. to 
play a major role in the rebuilding and reconstruction of their country. However, public 
favorable attitudes and opinions in Afghanistan and Iraq toward the state, the United 
Unites as a leading donor and player and the rest of the international community and 
donors that have been involved in the rebuilding of these countries have been on the 
decline since 2005 and 2004 respectively. In 2011, nine years after the U.S.-led state-
building and development, Iraqis said that their personal safety and security (72%), 
political freedom (48%), economic wellbeing and employment (66%), education (47%), 
relations with neighboring countries (52%), women rights (37%), religious freedom 
(36%), and government (59%) were all negatively affected since the U.S.-led invasion of 
their country in 2003.  In 2017, the majority of Afghans (61%) and Iraqis (59%) said that 
their country was moving in the wrong direction. This means that the U.S.-led state-
building and development in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003 have not 
lived up to public expectations and needs to win their hearts, minds and positive attitudes.  
 143 
 Similarly, the European Union with support from the rest of the international 
community and donors has played a significant and leading role in the rebuilding of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo since 1995 and 1999 respectively. Although the 
European Union, the United States, and the rest of the donors have provided billions of 
dollars in foreign aid and implemented hundreds of development and reconstruction 
programs and projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the overwhelming 
majority of the public in both countries have unfavorable opinions and attitudes toward 
the state, the European Union and the United States, two of the top perceived donors to 
both countries. In 2017, the majority of Bosnians did not perceive the European Union 
and the United States as the most significant allies of their country. Also, Bosnians 
believe, overall, the United States is playing a negative role rather than a positive role in 
the country. In 2018, over 50% of Kosovars stated that they were either dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied with the political and economic direction of their country. The same 
year, over 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that they would consider leaving the 
country in the next three years. 
 In general, the data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
show that foreign aid has not contributed to an increase in positive public attitudes and 
opinions toward the state and foreign donors. State weakness, lack of security, especially 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, bad economy, ethnic hostility and tension, and rampant 
corruption have deteriorated public confidence and positive attitudes toward the aid 
recipient state and its foreign supporters and donors. In the court of the public opinion, 
the international community in general and foreign aid and donors, in particular, have not 
put Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo on a path of state-building, 
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reconstruction and development consistent with the aspirations and expectations of 
citizens in these countries. More pointedly, citizens in these four cases do not perceive 
foreign aid to be making a consistent improvement in their daily lives and wellbeing. 
This could be due to citizens’ high expectations, donors’ top-down approach to state-
building and development, and/or the need for longer time frame for foreign aid and 
donors to address state weakness, underdevelopment, and deficiencies in service delivery 
consistent with public expectations and needs to win positive public attitudes toward the 
state and donors. Chapter 6 examines the link between foreign aid and positive public 
attitudes toward foreign donors and the state in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo and answers the research questions. 
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CHAPTER VI – ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 
 Foreign aid plays a central role in the United States’, European Union’s, and other 
donors’ foreign policies.  Since Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against America on 11 
September 2001, more emphasis has been placed on foreign aid to fight state weakness, 
poverty, underdevelopment, and political, economic, and social inequalities as a hedge to 
address the condition and attitudes that may lead to insecurity, extremism, and terrorism.  
Donors argue foreign aid is an effective tool in winning public hearts, minds, and positive 
attitudes and influencing behavior in the aid recipient states toward the state and donor(s) 
and the fight against extremism and terrorism compared to military deployments and/or 
invasions to fight insecurity, extremism, and terrorism around the world.  This chapter 
assesses the extent of the validity of this argument by specifying and then explaining in-
depth answers to the research questions that are the basis for the dissertation.  It builds on 
the analysis put forward in Chapter V. 
 The first research question under consideration was as follows: Does foreign aid 
increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid in the aid recipient 
country? The data and findings for Afghanistan indicate that, initially, the people of 
Afghanistan had high hopes, confidence and positive attitudes and perceptions toward the 
United States, as a major donor and player, in the country.  In Afghanistan, from 2001-
2005,  foreign aid did increase positive public attitudes toward the United States—from 
64% in 2004 to 83% in 2005. However, 2005 was the turning point in terms of positive 
public perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, as a major donor, in 
Afghanistan.  In 2010, only 43% of the public had positive attitudes toward the United 
States in the country—a 40-point decline in public favorable attitudes toward Washington 
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compared to 83% in 2005. Furthermore, if one considers unfavorable Afghan public 
attitudes toward the United States, the evidence indicates that such attitudes steadily 
increased from 14% in 2005 to 56% in 2010--a 42-point increase.  In addition, positive 
public attitudes toward foreign international organizations, funded by and representing 
various foreign donors, also steadily declined in the country from 2005-2017.  In 2005, 
80% of the public had positive attitudes and confidence in foreign-funded international 
organizations in the country. However, in 2017, public confidence in foreign-funded 
international organizations dropped to 36%-- a 44-point decline in public confidence and 
positive attitudes toward foreign aid organizations since 2005.   The answer to research 
question one, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an 
increase in positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid to Afghanistan 
from 2001-2017. 
 With respect to the second research question, does foreign aid increase positive 
public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?, the data for Afghanistan 
indicate that initially there were high levels of the public trust, confident and positive 
attitudes toward the state in Afghanistan, but over time public confidence in and attitudes 
toward the state gradually declined.  In 2005, the overwhelming majority of the public 
(80%) expressed confidence and positive attitudes toward the central government in 
Kabul. However, public attitudes and confidence in the central government gradually 
declined from 80% in 2005 to 36% in 2017—a 44-point decline in public confidence over 
that period.  Figure 40 depicts trends in public attitudes and confidence in the government 
in Afghanistan from 2005-2017. 
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Figure 40. Public Confidence and Attitudes Toward Government in Afghanistan, 2005 - 
2017 
Source: ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things 
Stand, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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States. This number is very low, if compared with attitudes toward other donors in the 
country.  In the same survey, 39% of Iraqis said they had positive attitudes toward Saudi 
Arabia, 43% said that they had positive attitudes toward Turkey, 46% said they had 
positive attitudes toward China, and 65% said that they had positive attitudes toward the 
United Arab Emirates.  Surprisingly, in the same survey, 26% of Iraqis said they had 
positive attitudes toward Iran--a country that has provided little to nothing in foreign aid 
to Iraq compared to the United States and a country that in 2004 Iraqis said should not 
play a role in the rebuilding of their country. Ethnically speaking, Shi’a are more likely to 
state favorable attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates (58%), Turkey (53%), China 
(45%), Iran (41%), Saudi Arabia (39%), and the United Sates (26%).  However, Kurds 
are more likely to sate favorable attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates (88%), China 
(71%), the United States (63%), Saudi Arabia (49%), Iran (5%), and Turkey (5%).  
Sunnis, on the other hand, are more likely to state favorable attitudes toward the United 
Arab Emirates (67%), Saudi Arabia (59%), China (36%), Turkey (40%), the United 
States (7%), and Iran (2%). This division in opinion is fueled by competition for power, 
resources, status, and disagreement on the political direction and national identity of Iraq 
between Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds. The Iraq war is seen as a liberation from tyranny and 
an opportunity to seek and consolidate significant political power by Shi’a and Kurds, but 
the Sunnis see it as loss of power, marginalization, victimization, sectarian polarization, 
and de-Baathification. In post-Saddam Iraq, the Kurds demand a high degree of 
independence and control over the northern region and support a secular federalist 
government that grants them full autonomy.  The Shi’a and Sunnis are engaged in a bitter 
rivalry over the control of the state and want a geopolitical, cultural and social 
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transformation of Iraq in line with their own theologies—Shi’a-centric vs Sunny-centric.  
State weakness, political Islam, and geopolitical rivalries have molded competing and 
contradicting perceptions of state-building, direction, ownership, identity, and power 
between the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd elites and masses in Iraq, which are reflected in 
public perceptions toward foreign donors and aid.  
 In terms of the international community, 77% of Iraqis in 2009 said they believe 
foreign-funded international organizations do little to nothing in providing services in the 
country.  In addition, in 2011, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (96%) indicated that 
the U.S.-led invasion and the rebuilding of Iraq did not benefit the people of Iraq.  
Furthermore, in the 2017 survey, which measures Arb attitudes toward the American 
people, the United States, and the American policies toward the Middle East, 42% of 
Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the United States, 61% of Arabs expressed 
negative attitudes regarding the U.S. foreign policies toward the Arab world, and only 
25% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the American people. This means that 
Arabs have negative attitudes toward the United States, mainly due to its policies toward 
the Middle East, but have mostly positive attitudes toward the American people. In the 
2016 Arab youth survey, 93% of Iraqi youths (age 18-24) expressed extreme negative 
attitudes toward the United States, perceiving it as the enemy of the Iraqi people and 
country. The answer based on the data in regard to the research question one (Does 
foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the 
aid recipient country?) is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in 
positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid to Iraq from 2003-2017. 
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  As for the second research question (Does foreign aid increase positive public 
attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?), the data for Iraq indicate that 
initially foreign aid increased positive public attitudes toward and confidence in the Iraqi 
government from 2004-2009, but since 2010 public attitudes toward and confidence in 
the Iraqi state have declined in spite of the continued foreign aid and the U.S. support.  In 
2004, 39% of Iraqis said that they had a great deal or a lot of confidence in the Iraqi 
government, which steadily increased over time.  In 2009, 61% of Iraqis said that they 
had confidence in the central government of Iraq—a 22-point increase in positive public 
attitudes toward and confidence in the state compared to 2004.  Figure 41 depicts trends 
in Iraqis attitudes toward and confidence in the government of Iraq from 2004-2009. 
 
Figure 41. Public Confidence in Iraqi Government, 2004-2009 
Question: How much confidence do you have in [national government] - is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009. 
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 However, since 2010, Iraqis have grown more concerned about the problems in 
the central government of Iraq and the direction of the country as a whole.  In November 
2010, 45% of Iraqis said that events in Iraq were moving in the right direction and 44% 
indicated that they were moving in the wrong direction. In 2011, the public approval rate 
for the Iraqi national government was 49% and Iraqis labelled charges of high-level of 
corruption, bribery, nepotism, and mismanagement of foreign aid against the central 
government in Baghdad.  In September 2011, 50% of Iraqis said that Iraq was moving in 
the wrong direction versus 37% who said the opposite. In 2017, 59% of Iraqis said events 
were going in the wrong direction in Iraq versus only 39% who indicated they were 
moving in the right direction. Figure 42 depicts public attitudes with respect to how 
things are going in Iraq from 2010-2017. 
 
Figure 42. Public Attitudes about How Things Are Going in Iraq, 2010-2017 
 Question, do you think things in Iraq are going in the right/wrong direction? 
Source: Almustakilla for Research, 2017. 
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 In addition, based on the results of the 2018 nationwide public opinion polls in 
Iraq, 79% of Iraqis said they had low or no confidence at all in the national government 
in Baghdad. Lack of security, provision of services and job opportunities were the three 
major public concerns. The answer to research question two, based on the data, is that 
foreign aid was not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes 
toward the state in Iraq from 2003-2017. 
 With respect to the first research question for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Does 
foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the 
aid recipient country?), results and findings are consistent with those for the cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The European Union, Turkey, United States, United Nations and 
Saudi Arabia are perceived as the top foreign aid donors to the country, which clearly 
indicate that Bosnians are well aware and informed about the financial contributions of 
foreign donors to the rebuilding and economic and political development of their country. 
However, overall, Bosnians see Turkey, Germany, Russia, the United States, and China 
as their greatest allies, which is not consistent with their perception of the top donors to 
their country. Surprisingly, the United States, which is the second perceived top donor to 
the country, after the European Union, is not perceived by Bosnians as one of the top 
three most significant allies to their country.  Even more surprisingly, the European 
Union, which is the top perceived donor to the country, is not considered by Bosnians as 
the top ally of their country. Instead, Russia, which is not a perceived top donor, is 
perceived as the top ally to the country. Furthermore, close to half of Bosnians (45%) in 
2017 stated that, overall, the United States was playing a negative role in the country.  
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Ethnically speaking, 69% of Serbs, 36% of Croats, and 30% of Bosniaks said that the 
United States was playing a negative role in the country. Figure 43 provides more details. 
 
Figure 43. Public Perception About the Role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ethnicity, 2017 
Question: What is your opinion of the role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia in Bosnia? 
Source: International Republic Institute, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Attitudes on Violent 
Extremism and Foreign Influence, January 4 – February 3, 2017. 
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Arabia (38%). Both the United States and Saudi Arabia, which are two of the top five 
perceived donors to the country, are perceived by Bosnians to be making more negative 
than positive contributions to the country.  Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks are more likely 
to state Turkey (80%), the United States (64%), Saudi Arabia (57%), and Russia (29%) 
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(27%) are making a positive contribution to their country. Serbs are more likely to state 
Russia (89%), the United States (26%), Turkey (24%), and Saudi Arabia (15%) are 
making a positive contribution to their country.  State weakness, nationalism, ethnic, and 
geopolitical rivalries have contributed to differences in public perceptions and attitudes 
toward foreign aid and donors in the country. The answer to research question one, based 
on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive 
public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 
to 2017. 
 With respect to the second research question, (Does foreign aid increase positive 
public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?), the data indicate that 
Bosnians have very little trust and confidence in the state.  In fact, the overwhelming 
majority of Bosnians (87.4%) blame the state authorities for all of the country’s problems 
and 60% of Bosnians in 2017 said that corruption was widespread in government 
institutions at that juncture.  The overwhelming majority of Bosnians (76.8%) believe 
that development in Bosnia and Herzegovina is stagnant and government authority has 
failed to properly address the country’s economic (87%), social (86.7%), and political 
(80.3%) problems. In the 2017 survey, the overwhelming majority of the Bosnia’s 
citizens said that they did not trust their institutions, including parliament (70%), the 
prosecutor’s office (65%), judiciary system (64%), and police (49.2%).  Overall, 
Bosnians have very low favorable attitudes (6%) toward the state-level government and 
institutions for the work and services they provide. It is therefore not surprising that in 
2017, 50% of Bosnians said that they would be willing to leave the country, if given the 
opportunity to live and work abroad.  The answer to research question two, based on the 
 155 
data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public 
attitudes toward the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period of 1995 to 2017.
 With respect to the first research question for Kosovo (Does foreign aid increase 
positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient 
country?), the research findings are consistent with those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  In 2017, only 16% of respondents said that things in Kosovo were 
going in the right direction.  Furthermore, more than half of the respondents in 2018 
stated they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic (50.1%) and political 
(50.5%) direction of the country.  In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that 
they would consider leaving the country in the next three years. Lack of employment 
opportunity (60%), increased poverty (49.3%), and rampant corruption (43%) were the 
reasons for their pessimism. As a result, Kosovars attitudes toward and confidence in 
international organizations and donors is on a steady and sharp decline. In 2010, for 
example, only 14.7% of respondents said large-scale corruption existed in international 
organizations.  However, in 2018, 24.5% of respondents indicated that a large-scale 
corruption existed in international organizations in the country—a 10-point decline in 
positive public attitudes toward and confidence in the international organizations and 
donors. 
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Figure 44. Perceived Prevalence of Large-scale Corruption in National and International 
Organizations and Institutions in Kosovo, 2010-2018. 
Source: UNDP Kosovo, Public Pulse XIV, June 2018. 
 
 
 The low level of the public satisfaction with and confidence in domestic 
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state, political, economic, and social institutions and organizations in the country.  This 
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and the delivery of services that Kosovars want and expect from their state and the 
international community and donors in order to win public confidence, satisfaction, and 
attitudes toward the state and foreign donors. The answer to research question one, based 
on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive 
public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid to Kosovo from 1999-2018.  
 As for the answer to research question two (Does foreign aid increase positive 
public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?), since 2007 public 
satisfaction with central institutions in Kosovo has been very low.  In 2007, 30.5% of 
citizens stated they were satisfied with central governmental institutions, but public 
satisfaction had dropped to 30% by 2018. In 2007, more than half (52%) of citizens were 
satisfied with the work of the president, but in 2018 only 39.1% expressed their 
satisfaction—a 13-point decline in public perception and attitude toward the president. 
Satisfaction with courts and prosecutor’s office in 2007 was 20% and 22.7%, 
respectively, but 31.2% of respondents in 2018 stated that they were satisfied with courts 
and 29.2%  indicated they were satisfied with the work of the prosecutor’s office in the 
country.  However, in spite of a slight increase in the level of satisfaction and positive 
attitudes toward the courts and prosecutor’s office, the overall public satisfaction and 
positive attitudes toward the judiciary branch of the country is low. As a result, only 14% 
of Kosovar in 2018 said that they trust the government and the overwhelming majority 
(65%) said that they do not trust the government.  The answer to research question two, 
based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in 
positive public attitudes toward the state in Kosovo for the period of 1999-2018. 
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 In sum, the data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo do 
not indicate a positive association between foreign aid and positive public attitudes 
toward the donors of the foreign aid, the foreign-funded international organizations and 
the aid recipient states.  Nevertheless, the data reveal an inverse relationship between 
foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward the donors of the foreign aid, the foreign-
funded international organizations, and the aid recipient states in these four cases. The 
data indicate that the overwhelming majority of Afghans, Iraqis, Bosnians, and Kosovars 
have very low favorable attitudes toward the foreign donors and their own states in spite 
of the billions of dollars in foreign aid and human lives that the international community 
and donors have invested and continue to invest in these states.  
 However, these findings are contrary to the expectations and arguments of foreign 
donors—who contend that foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient 
state(s)—and the theory of Social Exchange (Emerson 1976), which asserts that an action 
of kindness leads to positive attitudes and gratitude, and reciprocates a response of 
kindness in terms of attitudes and behaviors (Blau 1964; Lawler 2001; Cropanzano and 
Mitchell 2005).  To explain this contradiction between the theory of Social Exchange and 
the findings in these four cases, one needs to consider the origin of the public trust and 
attitudes toward the state.  Since 2000, policymakers and practitioners have argued that 
state legitimacy, understood as citizens accepting state monopoly over the use of violence 
and regulating social transactions in exchange for providing public services, has a 
prominent place in state-society relationship, public loyalty and attitudes toward the state, 
international development, and post-conflict peace-building (Olson 1993; Kohli 2004; 
Fukuyama 2004; Kooy, Wild and Mason 2015).  The legitimacy deficit of the state is 
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seen, in the post-conflict state-building, development and peace-building literature, as a 
wedge between state and society and a key driver of state fragility, weakness, violence 
and civil war (Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum 2015).  There are many theoretical 
explanations for the origin of individual trust and positive attitudes toward the state —the 
proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice theory, and the 
performance theory in particular.  The proximity theory (Schneider and Jacoby 2003; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and the social capital theory (Boix and Posner 1998; 
Putnam 1993) argue that close relation between citizens and state yields higher public 
trust and positive attitudes toward the state—close interactions between government or 
public institutions and people enable the government to deliver programs and projects 
that are specific and produce the greatest impacts on the day-to-day lives of the citizens 
resulting in greater public trust, confidence, and positive attitudes toward the state.  The 
rational choice theory (Satz and Ferejohn 1994; Roelofsma 1999) and the performance 
theory (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Citrin 1974) see public trust and positive public 
attitudes toward the state as citizens’ rational response based on their evaluation of the 
performance of the state institutions in providing services that citizens need and expect 
from their government—more pointedly, the fact that the state is an institution created by 
citizens to serve them.  The proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice 
theory, and the performance theory link public trust and positive public attitudes toward 
state to government performance--the delivery of services that citizens need and expect.  
Consequently, government performance (delivery of services that citizens need and 
expect) not only defines public trust and positive public attitudes toward the state and its 
foreign supporters by virtue of association, but it also greatly influences the relationship 
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between the governor and the governed and the critical derivatives such as state control 
of the society and citizens loyalty and attitudes toward the state.  Lee et al. (2014), 
Wantchekon (2004), Olson (1993), Tilly (1992), and North (1977) argue that the 
provision of services is the very foundation for the emergence and legitimacy of the 
modern state and public loyalty and confidence in the state. 
 This dissertation tests these theories in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo by assessing the provision of services, in particular, security, 
economic prosperity, and the presence of rampant corruption, which have trumped aid 
effectiveness, state legitimacy and positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign 
donors in these four cases. 
 
Security 
 Since 2001, the United States, the international community, and the Afghan 
government have been less than successful in providing security to all of Afghanistan’s 
citizens, whether in the cities or rural areas.  Security means that citizens feel safe and 
warlords, militias, extremist and terrorist organizations, and state and non-state actors are 
not able to intimidate, mistreat, or violate their constitutional rights.  In Afghanistan, 
respondents were asked, how often do you fear for your own personal safety or security 
or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, 
rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety?  Since 2006, fear for personal or 
family safety and security has been on the rise across Afghanistan.  In 2006, 40% of 
respondents stated that they fear always, often or sometimes for their personal safety or 
security or for that of their families.  However, by 2017, this number had almost doubled, 
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with 71% of respondents indicating that they feared for their personal or their family 
safety and security—a 31-point increase in fear for personal or family safety and security 
across the country since 2006.   Figure 45 provides a longitudinal trend in public fear for 
personal safety and security in the country from 2006 to 2017. 
 
Figure 45. Fear for Personal or Family Safety and Security in Afghanistan, 2006-2017 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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the international community, and the Afghan government in the process.  In addition, all 
roads and highways in Afghanistan and the majority of those in the rural parts of the 
country are either under the direct control of government opponents (i.e., Taliban, Daesh, 
or warlords) or battlefields, which has made the life of citizens and the presence and 
delivery of government services very difficult, if not impossible.  In 2010 surveys 
conducted by ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the Washington Post, support for the presence 
of US forces was 74% among those who blamed the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or other Jihadi 
groups, not the U.S. or NATO forces or the Afghan government, for the violence in the 
country, but was down 19 points where coalition air strikes were reported, down 17 
points where Taliban forces were active, down 16 points where local security rated 
negatively, and down 15 points where local causalities occurred.  Coalition casualties of 
war are a good measure of the intensity of war and violence in Afghanistan, which has 
had a heavy toll on the country since 2001.  If one plots favorable attitudes toward the 
United States against the coalition causalities, one can clearly see an inverse relationship 
between the two—as the war and violence intensified,  claiming more and more coalition 
and civilian lives and creating collateral damages, public confidence and positive 
attitudes toward the United States and the international community declined in the 
country.  Figure 46 depicts this relationship. 
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Figure 46. Favorable Attitudes Toward the United States Verses Coalition Causalities in 
Afghanistan, 2004-2010 
Question:  Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
http://www.icasualties.org/ 
 
 
 Furthermore, if one plots the civilian war deaths against the unfavorable attitudes 
toward the United States in Afghanistan, a positive relationship between the two is 
evident, which clearly indicates that the inability of the United States, the international 
community and the Afghan government to provide security has contributed to a decline 
in positive public attitudes toward all of those actors.  Further, as the civilian casualties of 
war continue to rise, unfavorable attitudes toward the United States, seen by Afghans as a 
leading player, donor and development partner of the Afghan government, also rises in 
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government to put an end to insurgency, violence and insecurity in the country is placed 
squarely on the shoulders of the United States. Figure 47 demonstrates the relationship 
between the civilian war deaths and unfavorable attitudes toward the United States. 
 
Figure 47. Civilian War Deaths Verses Unfavorable Opinion Toward the United States in 
Afghanistan, 2004-2010 
Question:  Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
The Washington Post, June 3, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-
died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-
says/?utm_term=.1170a85c3532 
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2004, only 413 civilian deaths were reported, but in 2017 10,453 casualties of war were 
reported (3,438 deaths and 7015 injuries).  Figure 48 demonstrates the inverse 
relationship between civilian war deaths and public confidence and positive attitudes 
toward the government of Afghanistan to do its job effectively. 
 
Figure 48. Civilian War Deaths Verses Public Confidence in Government to Do Its Job in 
Afghanistan, 2005-2017 
Question: I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As 
I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. 
Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010. 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Reports on the Protection of Civilian 
in Armed Conflicts.  https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports  
The Washington Post, June 3, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-
died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-
says/?utm_term=.1170a85c3532 
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 In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003 resulted in a bitter sectarian, ethnic 
and religious rivalries and hostilities that led to insecurity and civil war in the country and 
presented serious challenges to the U.S. policies and interest in Iraq and peace and 
stabilities in the Middle East.   The overthrowing of the Saddam Hussein regime 
unleashed chaos, ethnic hostility and division, and civil war in the country.  The Kurds 
have been involved in bitter territorial and political disputes with Baghdad since 
establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2005.  The Sunnis have 
resented the Shi’a-dominated and American backed central government in Iraq, which 
has translated itself into the rise of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) in the country.  The Islamic State has terrorized the Iraqi people by carrying out 
public executions, kidnapping for ransoms, forcing women into marriage or selling them 
for sex slaves, looting banks and museums, destroying and looting ancient sights, and 
engaging in an unconventional warfare with the Iraqi government and the rest of the 
civilized world, especially the United States and Europe, by carrying out devastating 
suicide bombings and sponsoring terrorism. Although in December 2017, the Iraqi 
government announced that ISIS was defeated and the Iraqi military has “fully liberated” 
all of Iraqi’s territory from the “ISIS terrorist gangs,” the return of security, peace and 
prosperity in Iraq is still a farfetched conclusion.  Iraq remains today a nation devastated 
by civil war, bitter ethnic and religious hostility and mistrust, and with little hope or 
economic optimism for the future.  According to the Gallup International’s 41st Annual 
Global End of the Year Survey (2017), which measures happiness, hope, and economic 
optimism, Iraq is the second least happy country in the world after Iran.  In the 2018 
nationwide survey, security was the number one major concern for the Iraqi people. 
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 The return of peace and stability in Iraq cannot be achieved only by defeating 
ISIS and/or the Al Qaeda terrorist organizations in the country, but until and unless the 
conflicting and contradicting views of Shi’a-centric and Sunni-centric state-building, 
ownership, and legitimacy are addressed and ironed out.  After the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq, the rise of Al Qaeda organization and ISIS was fueled by the Sunnis, Baathists, and 
other powerful actors who were left out of the state-building project in the country.  The 
return of peace and security and the end of political violence in Iraq require addressing 
the dynamics of intensely violent political conflicts and the balance of power between the 
Kurds, Shi’a, and Sunnis to collectively define and rebuild Iraq according to the views 
and aspirations of both Iraqi elites and masses. It is only then that security will return to 
Iraq and the Iraqi state will be able to provide the much-needed services to its citizens in 
return for public loyalty, trust and positive attitudes toward the Iraqi State and its foreign 
donors and supporters, especially the United States. 
 Security, stability and social protection are also problems in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo.  In 2017, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians (61%) said 
that they were mostly or completely dissatisfied with the security situation in the country. 
Only a small number of Bosnians (14%) stated that they were mostly or completely 
satisfied with the security situation.  In 2017, the majority of Bosnian youths (age 15 - 
35) said that street crimes (73.7%) and terrorist threats (58.3%) were the most alarming 
security issues facing the country. In the same survey, 77.4% of Bosnian youths indicated 
they believed European Union membership would result in better human and minority 
rights (80%) and increased safety and security in the country.  In response to the question 
in 2017, In your opinion, what is the biggest security threat facing our country today?, 
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respondents identified organized crime (31%), the conflict between ethnic groups (21%), 
and conflict between religious groups (11%) as the top three threats facing the country.  
Figure 49 presents more details about the security situation in the country. 
 
Figure 49. Perceived Biggest Security Threats Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017 
Question: In your opinion, what is the biggest security threat facing our country today? 
Source: Center for Insight for Survey Research, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Attitudes on 
Violent Extremism and Foreign Influence, January 4 – February 3, 2017. 
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leaving the country to fight in foreign conflicts?, more than half of the respondents in 
2017 said that they evaluated the work of the government security agencies mostly or 
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survey, in response to the question, Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens 
who are returning from fighting in foreign conflicts represent a security threat?, 66% of 
respondents said yes and only 12% of respondents said no.  This means that public safety 
and security remain a work in progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 As for safety and security in Kosovo, in 2017, only 26% of respondents said that 
they were mostly or completely satisfied with the security situation in the country, but 
40% of respondents said that they were mostly or completely dissatisfied with the 
security situation in the country.  Furthermore, one in four (25.3%) Kosovars said that 
they felt very or somewhat unsafe at their workplace, going out (24.4%), at school 
(15.7%), and their neighborhoods (24.3%). In the same 2017 survey, respondents said 
that Kosovo’s security institutions were not doing enough to provide safety and security 
on the streets (28.1%), at their workplaces (31%), at schools (30.8%), and in 
neighborhoods (28.5%).  Furthermore, in the 2018 survey, one in three Kosovars (33%) 
said that they did not feel safe while out on the street. More importantly, public safety 
and security are on a decline since 2008 in the country. In October 2008, 18.3% of 
respondents stated that they felt unsafe while out on the street. However, in April 2018, 
33.1% of respondents stated that they felt unsafe while out on the street—a 15-point 
decrease in public attitude toward safety and security in the country. 
 In conclusion, the delivery of the public safety and security that the international 
community have supported and funded in the four cases have not been effective in 
winning positive public attitudes toward the donors and the aid recipient states.  Whether 
citizens credit or blame the state and its foreign supporters is conditioned on their 
expectations of what the state should provide, a subjective assessment of security.  The 
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delivery of the public safety and security in the four cases under consideration at best 
remain “unfinished business” that demonstrates the difficulty of delivering security and 
the rule of law in post-conflict societies, which are vital for state legitimacy, post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconstruction process, and winning public hearts and minds toward 
the state and its foreign supporters. 
 
Economic Prosperity 
 Economic development, in the context of post-conflict peace-building and 
development, is closely linked to improving household income, employment and 
reducing poverty.   As the security situation since 2001 continued to deteriorate in 
Afghanistan, so did household financial wellbeing, job opportunities, and availability of 
products in the markets—key economic indicators of household prosperity in the country.  
Respondents were asked, compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for 
your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the 
following:  a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) 
Availability of products in the market?  In 2007, 10% of respondents reported that their 
household financial situation got worse compared to last year, 40% reported that job 
opportunity got worse compared to last year, and 23% of respondents reported that the 
availability of products in the market worsened compared to one year ago.  However, in 
2017, 33% of respondents reported that their household financial situation got worse 
compared to a year ago, 58% of respondents reported that job opportunities got worse 
compared to a year ago, and 36% of respondents reported worsening of availabilities of 
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products in the market compared to a year ago.   Figure 50 provides a complete view of 
the three economic indicators in the country from 2007 to 2017. 
 
Figure 50. Economic Indicators Worse Compared to One Year Ago in Afghanistan, 
2007-2017 
Question: Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household 
has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) 
Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of 
products in the market. 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2007 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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given the opportunity.  Lack of security and unemployment were two of the main reasons 
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2012, 39.9% in 2015, and 38.8% in 2017.  Reflecting on the overall worsening of 
security, living and economic conditions in the country, there was no province in the 
country in 2017 where at least 20% of respondents did not express their willingness to 
leave Afghanistan if given opportunity.  This speaks volumes about the Afghan 
government and its foreign supporters in providing security, employment, household 
economic prosperity, and delivering the very basic services that define the link between 
the governor and the governed and the effectiveness of foreign aid in the country since 
2001. 
 Economic prosperity is a problem in the Greater Middle East as a whole, but it is 
even a bigger problem in Iraq.  According to the Arab Opinion Index 2016, only 69% of 
Arabs surveyed said that their income is sufficient for living, 49% indicated that they 
cannot save money, 29% said that they cannot cover their expenses and rely on handouts 
and family and friends to make ends meet.  In Iraq, over 90% of Iraqis surveyed in 2016 
said that economic conditions are poor or very poor in the country.  According to the 
Arab Youth Survey 2016, 18% of Arab youths said that lack of jobs and economic 
opportunities are the main reasons that people join Daesh (an offshoot of Al Qaeda).   In 
the 2012 survey conducted by the International Republic Institute, Iraqis were asked, not 
personally, but in terms of your province, what is the single biggest problem facing it as a 
whole?  Unemployment was stated (22%) to be the second major problem on the 
provincial level, after lack of water and electricity (27%), and the fourth biggest problem 
(15%) on a national level, after water and electricity (21%), security (19%), and 
corruption (19%) respectively.  On the individual level, 54% of respondents said that 
unemployment got worse in the country compared to a year ago.  The civil war, 
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insecurity, and violence since 2003 in Iraq have not only contributed to destruction, brain 
drain, and capital flight in the country, but they have also contributed to increased 
poverty, ethnic and religious tensions and inequality, and corruption, which have reduced 
the opportunity cost of terrorism.  The government of Iraq and its foreign supporters are 
faced with a daunting challenge, greater than defeating the ISIS, to provide the much-
needed services, economic opportunities, and security in the country to win the trust, 
hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens in the country. 
 As for economic prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to half of the 
respondents in 2015 stated that a bad economy (48.3%) was the second major problem 
facing the country after corruption (69.4%). Furthermore, the majority of Bosnian youths 
(61.1%), age 15 to 24, in 2017 stated that their quality of life is worse compared to the 
quality of life of their parents when they were young.  The top five problems facing the 
country, according to Bosnian youths, are unemployment (87.3%), increased poverty 
(81.9%), employment insecurity (79.6%), ineffective measures to mitigate corruption 
(70.20%), and inadequate implementation of the rule of law.  In addition in 2017, 
Bosnians said that their household was unable (at least once in the past 12 months) to pay 
rent or utility bills (14%), to pay an installment on a loan (11%), keep their home 
adequately warm (11%), afford food, clothes and other basic supplies (10%), and afford 
at least one week of holiday away from home (if wanted to) (38%). 
 In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths aged 14-35 stated they would consider leaving 
the country in the next three years. Lack of job opportunities (60%), poverty (49.3%), and 
corruption/nepotism (43%) were the key reasons for their pessimism.  The 2018 youth 
survey data show that only 45% of younger Kosovars (age 18-24) compared to 59% of 
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older Kosovars (age 25 - 35) are currently employed.  In total, 48% of all respondents 
surveyed in 2018 stated that they were unemployed.  More than half of the respondents 
(55%) stated that they receive financial support from parents and close to half (46%) 
admitted that they receive financial support from other family members to make ends 
meet.  Respondents stated that the lack of available jobs (43%), corruption (42%), and 
lack of required professional qualifications (41%) make it difficult to get a job in the 
country. Eighty percent of the respondents who said they were employed stated that they 
were satisfied with their jobs, but 30% said that a low level of income is the major 
challenge of their current jobs.  As for the household financial situation, 43% of Kosovars 
in 2017 said that they were completely or mostly satisfied and 57% said that they were 
completely or most unsatisfied with their household financial situation. Unemployment 
(67%) and corruption (62%) were stated as two of the main problems facing the economy 
in the country. In addition, 22% of Kosovars said that they were unable to pay rent or 
utility bills, 16% said that they were unable to pay an installment on a loan, 8% said that 
they were unable to keep home adequately warm, 7% said they were unable to afford 
food, clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% said that they could not afford one week 
holiday away from home (if wanted to) at least once in the past 12 months.  In general, 
only 12% of respondents in 2018 said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the 
economic direction of the country.  However, more than half (50.1%) of respondents in 
2018 stated that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic direction of 
the country. 
 In short, economic prosperity, poverty, lack of jobs and gainful employment are 
the central issues facing the citizens and their households in the four cases. As a result, 
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more work needs to be done by the state, the international community, and foreign doors 
on the economic development, employment and service deliveries in these four countries 
consistent with public expectations and needs in order to win positive public attitudes, 
hearts and minds toward the state and foreign donors. 
 
Corruption 
 Corruption undermines the public sector’s ability to deliver services fairly and 
effectively, leads to mismanagement, is an obstacle to the implementation of the rule of 
law, undermines reform and development agendas, diverts foreign aid funds into private 
pockets and bank accounts, breeds instability and renews violence in post-conflict 
societies, is destructive of state functionality and legitimacy, and erodes the effectiveness 
of foreign aid and public confidence in the state and its foreign supporters. Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017 ranked Afghanistan 177th out of 
180 countries as one of the most corrupt nations in the world.  Corruption is a big 
problem and it is getting bigger in the country.  In answer to the question, please tell me 
whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all 
in the following areas. (a) In your daily life. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole, 77% of 
respondents in 2006 reported that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a 
whole and 42% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in their daily lives.  
However, in 2017, 84% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in the 
country as a whole and 70% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in 
their daily lives—a 7-point increase in corruption as a major problem in the country as a 
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whole and a 28-point increase in corruption as a major problem in citizens’ daily life.  
Figure 51 depicts a public perception of corruption in the country from 2006-2017. 
 
Figure 51. Corruption as a Major Problem in Daily Life and in Afghanistan as a Whole, 
2006-2017 
Question: Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor 
problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your 
neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In 
Afghanistan as a whole. 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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in the government, and 84% of respondents said that corruption was a major problem in 
the country as a whole, a 7-point increase in public perception of corruption as a major 
problem in the country as a whole.  Figure 52 depicts the relationship between corruption 
and public confidence in the government in Afghanistan to do its job. 
 
Figure 52. Public Confidence in the Government to Do Its Job Verses Corruption as a 
Major Problem in Afghanistan as a Whole, 2006-2017 
Question: Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor 
problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your 
neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In 
Afghanistan as a whole. 
Question: I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As 
I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. 
Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
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Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia were asked, how prevalent is corruption in your home 
country? Seventy-nine percent of respondents said that corruption was widespread in 
their home countries.  In response to the question, how is the rule of law applied in your 
home country, 54% of respondents said that state applies the rule of law, but favors some 
groups of citizens over the others and 20% of respondents said that the state does not 
apply the rule of law, at all.   Iraqis were asked in 2010, Would you say that the issue of 
corruption in Iraq is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem 
or not a problem at all? Ninety-six percent of respondents said that corruption is a 
significant or somewhat a problem in the country.  In 2011 and 2012 respondents were 
asked, has the situation regarding government corruption gotten better, gotten worse or 
stayed the same over the last year?  Sixty-six percent of respondents in 2011 and 61% of 
respondents in 2012 said that government corruption got worse over the last year. 
 The Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017 ranked 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 91st and Kosovo 85th out of 180 countries in the world.  
Corruption is a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.  In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 60% of the general public, 54% of the public officials, and 52% of 
enterprise managers in 2000 stated that corruption is widespread in the country. In the 
same survey, 36% of the public officials have admitted that they have been offered 
money or expensive presents by their clients in the past two years in return for the service 
delivered.  A full 100% of respondents said that corruption endangers government 
security and public confidence in the state, limits foreign investment, and increases 
crimes and inequality in the country.  In 2015, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians 
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(69.4%) stated that corruption was the top major problem facing the country.  Seventy-
one percent of respondents in 2017 stated that the judiciary, the prosecutor’s office, and 
the customs, which should be fighting corruption in the country, are really corrupt.  Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were ranked fifth overall (54%), when it comes to 
corruption in the country.  As a result, the majority of respondents in 2017 said that 
personal contact (57%) and network of family and friends in high positions (36%) are the 
two most important assets in finding a job in the country.  Only 24% of respondents in 
the same 2017 survey said that one’s level of education and 15% indicated that one’s 
professional experience are important assets in landing a job in the country. 
 As for corruption in Kosovo, in the 2017 survey, only 16% of respondents said 
that the country is moving in the right direction and 39% of respondents said that things 
are going in the wrong direction in the country.  The top three reasons for their pessimism 
were the presence of corruption (74%), unemployment (64%), and nepotism in 
employment (26%). In 2018, public perception of the prevalence of corruption in 
different Kosovo government institutions varied with the highest level of corruption 
(39%) reported for the customs and the lowest level of corruption (24.5%) reported for 
the international organizations. Kosovars believe that political institutions (executive, 
parliament, mayors, presidency and local government officials) are the most corrupted in 
the country.  As a result, only 14% of Kosovar in the 2018 survey said that they trust the 
government and the overwhelming majority (65%) said that they do not trust the 
government.  In addition, 47% of Kosovars do not trust the courts and 40% do not trust 
the country’s prosecutors. 
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 In short, corruption is a major problem in all areas of lives in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (2017) ranked all of the four countries as highly corrupt.  Corruption 
has negatively affected the image and legitimacy of the state, effectiveness of the foreign 
aid, delivery of services, and goodwill of the international community and donors to win 
positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign donors in Afghanistan since 2001, in 
Iraq since 2003, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, and in Kosovo since 1999. 
 
Conclusions 
 Survey analysis and data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo do not indicate a positive association between foreign aid and positive public 
attitudes toward foreign donors, foreign-funded international organizations and the aid 
recipient states.  The data indicate that the overwhelming majority of Afghans, Iraqis, 
Bosnians, and Kosovars have very low favorable attitudes toward foreign donors and 
their own states in spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid and thousands of human 
lives that the international community and donors have invested and continue to invest in 
these states, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, these findings are contrary to 
the theory of Social Exchange and the expectations and arguments of foreign donors that 
foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states.  To explain these 
contradictions, this dissertation tested the proximity theory, the social capital theory, the 
rational choice theory, and the performance theory, which link public trust and positive 
public attitudes toward state and donors to government performance (the delivery of 
services that citizens need and expect) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
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Kosovo by assessing the provision of services, in particular, security, economic 
prosperity, and the fight against rampant corruption. The results indicated that the 
international community, donors and the aid recipient states in these four cases have been 
less than successful in building a legitimate state to deliver public services, especially, 
safety and security, economic opportunity and income, and an effective fight against 
rampant corruption that have tramped aid effectiveness and positive public attitudes 
toward the state and foreign donors. 
 The weakness of the state in these four cases has contributed to deficits in state 
legitimacy due to lack of visibility in terms of service delivery and enforcement of law 
and order, which has allowed internal and external agents of violence and extremism, 
especially in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, to perpetuate insecurity as a cash cow at 
the cost of the Afghan and Iraqi people, the United States and the international 
community and donors.  Pakistan’s continued support and finance of extremist networks 
and proxy war in Afghanistan, which have had a heavy toll on the Afghan society and the 
United States and the international community involved in the reconstruction and 
development of the country since 2001, and Iran’s support for the Shi’a Iraqi government 
as an avenue for regional dominance, weakening of Sunni influence, and reducing the 
effects of international sanctions, which has fueled ethnic violence and rivalry and 
confronted American policies and interests in the country and region, are good examples 
of the consequences of state weakness and lack of legitimacy.  
 A resilient state not only provides public goods and services, but also claims a 
monopoly over the use of legitimate force, regulates social transactions, and commands 
public loyalty and compliance.  Successful delivery of services is not only a measure of 
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internal and external legitimacy of the state, but also a mechanism through which state 
connects with its citizens, deliver services based on their needs and expectations, and 
garners public trust, confidence and positive attitudes toward itself and its foreign 
supporters and donors.  A deficit in the provision of the public services results in 
disconnect between the state and citizens, which erodes public confidence in the state 
authority and its foreign supporters, leading to public distrust and negative perceptions 
and attitudes toward the state, its institutions, and foreign supporters, as evident in 
Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, and 
in Kosovo since 1999. The lack of economic opportunities and gainful employment, 
coupled with rampant corruption and insecurity, have eroded public confidence in aid 
effectiveness and positive public attitudes toward the state and its foreign supporters and 
donors in these four cases.  More pointedly, successful delivery of the public services in 
post-conflict societies depends on two interrelated key principles:  the international 
community’s and donors’ understanding of the local context in which they support change 
and development and the ability of the aid recipient state to take ownership of the 
foreign-funded initiatives and reforms and deliver them in a dynamic political, economic, 
and social contexts, without fear or favor, consistent with public definitions, expectations 
and needs.  Whether citizens credit or blame the state and its foreign supporters is 
conditioned on their expectations of what the state and foreign donors should provide, 
which constitutes a subjective assessment of services.  When in the court of the public 
opinion, foreign aid does not amount to an improvement in citizens’ wellbeing; instead, it 
falls short of winning public hearts and minds toward the aid recipient state and its 
foreign donors. 
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CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSIONS 
 Donors see foreign aid as a policy tool and soft power measure to address the 
human suffering, insecurity, insurgency, and extremist attitudes and behaviors in weak, 
fragile, and failing states.  After Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on 
September 11, 2001, foreign aid is exclusively focused on defeating the threat and 
countering the conditions and ideology of extremism and terrorism. Foreign aid funds a 
wide range of resources, services, development and/or reconstruction programs and 
projects in unstable, weak, failing, failed, and otherwise conflict-affected states to address 
the economic, political, social, religious, and demographic factors that underlay 
inequality, grievances, extremism, conflicts, and state weakness and/or failure. 
 Donor states see foreign aid as being integral to their national security, the success 
of their foreign policies and countering the political and/or economic grievances in the 
aid recipient state(s) toward them and the local actors that the extremist and terrorist 
organizations and leaders usually exploit.  The argument is that foreign aid improves state 
capacity, service delivery, standard of living, and wins public hearts and minds in the aid 
recipient country leading to public positive attitudes and perception toward the donor(s) 
of the foreign aid and the aid recipient state(s).  Positive public attitudes toward the aid 
recipient state and foreign donor(s) lead to greater acceptance and support for the 
peacekeeping forces and successful implementation of foreign-funded political, economic 
and social development programs and projects in the weak, fragile, and failing states in 
the short term.  Over the long term, positive and favorable attitudes toward the aid 
recipient state(s) and the donor nation(s) among the local citizens are expected to 
materialize in the form of greater security and influence of the donor state(s) on the 
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political, economic, and military affairs of the aid recipient state.  In short, winning 
public hearts and minds in the aid recipient state(s) is intimately linked to security and 
winning the “war on terror” and foreign aid is used by policy and development 
practitioners as an important “soft power” tool for this purpose, especially in the 
aftermath of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization’s attacks of 9/11 against the United 
States. 
 The flow of official development assistance (ODA) from members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to underdeveloped 
countries more than tripled from 2000 to 2017, which reflects the increasingly important 
position of foreign aid in the counterinsurgency efforts.  Donors argue aid is an effective 
way to expand government capacity and control over its territory and to win the hearts 
and minds, loyalty, and support of local population toward the donors and the aid 
recipient state compared to enduring the massive military costs of deployment to 
counterinsurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, failing, and failed states.  Since 
9/11, the aid provision has become an essential component of the international 
community’s response, in general, and the United States’ response, in particular, to state 
weakness, insecurity, extremism, and violent conflicts and terrorism around the world.   
 Given the human costs associated with conflicts and terrorism, the security threats 
they pose, and the billions of dollars annually devoted to humanitarian, development, and 
reconstruction programs and projects in unstable, weak, failing, and failed states, it is 
important to understand the effects of foreign aid on winning public hearts and minds in 
the aid recipient state(s).  This dissertation has undertaken a first cut at assessing the 
relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient 
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countries of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.  More pointedly, 
does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid 
in the aid recipient country? Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the 
state in the aid recipient country? 
 Using data collected from surveys conducted by reliable national and international 
organizations in Afghanistan (2001 - 20017), Iraq (2003 - 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1995 - 2017), and Kosovo (1999 - 2018), the research findings show that foreign aid is 
not positively associated with an increasing positive public attitudes toward the aid 
recipient state and foreign donor(s) in Afghanistan (2001 - 2017), Iraq (2003 - 2017), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 - 2017), and Kosovo (1999 - 2018). 
 The data and findings for Afghanistan and Iraq reveal that initially the Afghans 
(2001 - 2005) and Iraqis had positive attitudes and feelings toward foreign donors (2003 
– 2004) and the state (2003 – 2009), but the inability of the Afghan and Iraqi states and 
their foreign supporters and donors to end conflicts, violence and civil wars and to 
provide public services, especially human security, gainful employment, and economic 
prosperity, have led to decline in positive public attitudes toward the international 
community, foreign donors and the aid recipient states.  Furthermore, the data and 
findings for the Middle East as a whole show that Arabs have positive attitudes toward 
the American people and the United States as a country.  However, anti-American 
sentiment in the region, based on the data, is provoked by the American foreign policies 
toward the Arab world. Despite close cooperation between the United States and most 
Middle Eastern states, Arabs blame the United States for the lack of economic and 
political development in the region due to its support for regimes that are perceived as 
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corrupt, oppressive, and/or un-Islamic, and its bias toward Israel.  Figure 53 depicts Arab 
attitudes toward the United States’ Middle Eastern policies, country and people in 2017. 
 
Figure 53. Arab Attitudes Toward the United States’ Middle Eastern Policies, Country 
and People in 2017 
Source: Arab Attitudes Toward President Trump and His Middle Eastern Policies and 
Positions, Arab Center Washington DC., 2017. 
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donors across the four cases.  The data show that the overwhelming majority of citizens 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo perceive their states as highly 
corrupt, detached from the public, and weak in service delivery.  In addition, the data 
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and Kosovo, low public confidence in the political and economic directions of the 
29%
48%
65%
61%
42%
25%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
U.S. foreign
policy
toward
Middle East
United
States
(country)
American
people
U.S. foreign
policy
toward
Middle East
United
States
(country)
American
people
Positive attitudes Negative attitudes
 187 
country, lack of meritocracy in employment, implementation of the rule of law, and 
improvement in household income, gainful employment and economic prosperity are 
major issues in both countries that have negatively affected public trust and confidence in 
the state and its foreign donors. This means that donor-driven state-building and 
development initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have the support of the 
state executive elites, but are detached from the daily lives, needs, and expectations of 
citizens in these countries. The low level of confidence in and support for the state and its 
foreign donors in both countries also mean that public voices are not fully integrated into 
the political, economic, and state-building framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, which is essential for the local legitimacy of the development framework, state 
and the democratic process. The challenge for the international community and donors, 
especially the European Union and the United States, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo is to adopt a state-building and development framework that is more locally 
legitimate and takes serious local ownership, voices, and needs, rather than relying on 
consultation with and support of the state executive elites that are not well connected with 
the people on the ground. The ability of post-conflict state-building and development to 
win public hearts and minds toward the state and foreign donors in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo depends in large on its provision of political, economic, and 
social services that meet the needs and expectations of citizens.  Despite of the focus and 
emphasis of peace and state-building on European standards, the state in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo is neither capable of effectively responding to local needs nor 
sufficiently compatible with European Standards. The lack of progress toward EU 
standards and membership in both countries is a good indication that more work needs to 
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be done on the current development framework and approaches, fragmented structure of 
the state, and mainstreaming local ownership and voices in both countries. The 
disconnect between the current state-building and development framework and public 
voices, ownership, and support has also forced the international community and donors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to tolerate illiberal practices, for example, rampant 
corruption perpetuated by powerful state and non-state actors in these countries. 
 State-building and development in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular have not 
lived up to their promises.  Continued civil war and violence have forced millions of 
Afghans and Iraqis to live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refuges.  According 
to the UN Refugee Agency (2018), 2.1 million Iraqis are displaced and over 360,000 
Iraqis are living in informal settlements such as unfinished, abandoned and/or damaged 
buildings. There are 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan with over one 
million IDPs, which makes the largest refugee population in Asia and the second largest, 
after Syria, in the world.  Despite spending billions of aid dollars on state formation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and creating new or rebuilding the existing institutions, weak and 
corrupt governance in both countries have failed the Afghan and Iraqi people and have 
contributed to insecurity and antigovernment insurgency.  The Iraqi and Afghan people 
are quick to point out that the inclusion of certain ethnic groups, warlords with 
questionable past, tribal, and/or religious leaders and the exclusion of other ethnic groups 
and/or leaders in the state formation from the start have created winners and losers and 
have pitted the government against those who rebelled against it.  Corrupt (in some cases 
incompetent) government administrators and leaders with serious lack of technical 
knowledge or experience, but employed based on political deals or nepotism, have 
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resulted in weak governance, abuse of power, and widespread corruption that have 
shaken public trust in government, democracy, and the commitment and intention of the 
international community in general and the United States in particular to state-building 
and development in Afghanistan and Iraq.  State weakness and corruption have allowed 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq to rise and get the support of the 
disillusioned, disappointed and stranded citizens with little support or services from their 
governments.  The international community in general and the United States in particular 
in partnership with the Afghan and Iraqi governments have injected massive foreign aid 
to win public hearts and minds through the provision of humanitarian, development, and 
reconstruction and peacebuilding projects and programs with the hope of improved state 
legitimacy, service delivery, and defeating insurgencies in both countries.  However, the 
data show that in the court of the public opinion the U.S.-led state-building, peace and 
development initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq delivered neither peace nor prosperity for 
most of the citizens and did not win their hearts and minds since 2001 and 2003 in these 
countries respectively.   
 In the context of post-conflict state-building and development, solutions to 
problems in aid recipient state(s) should be developed in consultations with local citizens, 
for whom the changes are intended and who are going to live with them, not just the state 
elites who are in power or foreign donors and Western experts.   In 2017, Syrian, Afghan, 
and Iraqi refugees accounted for one-third of the total of 705,000 first-time asylum 
seekers in Europe. The same year, over 50% of Bosnian and 60% of Kosovar youth said 
that they want to leave the country if given an opportunity.  Citizens from Afghanistan 
and Iraq leave their countries mostly to flee conflict, political persecution and lack of 
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safety and security, but citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo leave their 
countries to flee poverty, bad economy, unemployment, and rampant corruption. In 2016, 
family members (brother, nephews, and nieces) of Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Isa Mustafa, 
applied for political asylum in Europe. Prime Minister, Isa Mustafa, said that his family 
was faced with and left the county for the same problems as other Kosovars.  Winning 
public hearts and minds in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo 
hinges on the ability of the state and the international community and donors, especially 
the United States and the European Union, to deliver public services in line with public 
needs and expectations consistent with the proximity theory, the social capital theory, the 
rational choice theory, and the performance theory, which link public trust and positive 
public attitudes toward the state and its foreign supporter(s) to government performance--
the delivery of services that citizens need and expect.  The main challenge for foreign aid 
and donors, in the context of winning public hearts and minds, in these four cases is to 
take local needs, voices and diversity serious as a foundation and measure of aid 
effectiveness, local ownership of the development and peacebuilding initiatives, 
empowering local institutions, and improving local legitimacy of the state—state is an 
institution created by citizens to serve them. While the international community and 
donors have worked on state-building and improving its capacity and legitimacy, over a 
decade, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, the policy and 
practice of state-building, however, have not improved the delivery of basic services 
consistent with the needs, definitions and expectations of citizens in these countries. In 
the court of the public opinion, it is the delivery of the public services such as security, 
political participation, equality, justice, economic opportunities, gainful employment, and 
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the implementation of laws and orders without fear or favor by the state to improve daily 
life on the street that wins public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign 
supporters. From a policy perspective, there are at least three main implications of these 
findings. 
 First, a key task for the international development policymakers and practitioners 
and foreign donors, in post-conflict societies, is to build a credible state capable of 
mending political, economic, religious, and social grievances and delivering public 
services, especially, security, the rule of law, economic opportunities, gainful 
employment, and political participation, which are the foundation of a healthy state-
society relations, aid effectiveness, sustainable peace and development, and winning 
public hearts and minds.  If foreign intervention and development aid are to have any 
hope of winning public hearts and minds and effectively countering insecurity and 
extremism in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies, they must be able to 
build a state that can provide security, uphold the rule of law without fear or favor, 
deliver public services effectively, and implement development and social change 
projects and programs that cut a cross ethnic, regional, and social boundaries—a 
legitimate state (antithesis of a fragile state) is pre-requisite for sustainable peace and 
stability in conflict-affected societies, which can win public hearts and minds toward the 
state and its foreign supporter(s). State-building means (re)establishing and strengthening 
of the public structure and institutions to deliver public goods in accordance with the 
needs and expectations of citizens. One should be under no illusions to think that building 
a legitimate state in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies to deliver the 
much-needed services is an easy task.  However, experience and data from over a decade 
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from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo clearly dictate that aid 
effectiveness and winning public hearts and minds in war against extremism and 
terrorism are intimately linked to state legitimacy, strength and capacity to deliver 
services that relate to and improve daily life on the street.    
 Second, “winning post-conflict peace” is a prerequisite for security, state-building 
and legitimacy, aid effectiveness, and winning public hearts and minds in fragile, failed, 
and/or conflict-affected societies.  Winning post-conflict peace in this discourse is taken 
to mean that foreign driven policies, practices and approaches designed to change a 
regime, end a war, form and build a post-conflict state, or promote development and 
democracy are sensitive to local dynamics and do not compromise social order. 
Sustainable post-conflict peace is not simply a function of the implementation of foreign-
funded development and reconstruction programs, projects, agreements, and roadmaps, 
but a function of social order, which cannot be imposed from outside or generated 
through foreign aid or public policy. The data and experience from over a decade of state-
building and development from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
are a good testament to the role of local dynamics and social order in establishing post-
conflict peace, stability, good governance, development, and democracy. 
 War and violence lead to winners and losers, grievances, loss of welfare to the 
public, and divide society along the fault lines, which lays the foundation for rivalry, 
animosity, mistrust, and competing and contradicting visions, perceptions and attitudes.  
The legitimacy of the state, the effectiveness of the foreign aid in winning public hearts 
and minds toward the state and foreign donors in the aid recipient state, and winning the 
peace in post-conflict societies are shaped by the interplay between the local dynamics 
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and the state formation and building projects, programs and initiatives.  Therefore, 
greater awareness and attention to local dynamics from the start of the peace negotiations 
to end the war, the design and implementation of regime change and the road map to 
(re)building and development are key to ensure long term peace and stability are not 
compromised by short term solutions to end the war or change a regime.  The experience 
and data from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo show that divisive 
peace, political solutions, and top-down state-building interventions and framework that 
are less sensitive to local dynamics and social order are counterproductive to winning the 
peace, state legitimacy, aid effectiveness, and winning public hearts and minds.  The 
United States and European Union have demonstrated overconfidence in the applicability 
of military and technical solutions to the very complex process of state-building and 
transferability of the Western liberal institutions, values and experiences to the very 
complex social, political, and economic problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo to the point of ignoring local dynamics and social order, which 
have challenged winning the peace, (re)building the state, and winning public hearts and 
minds in these countries. 
 The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 in Bonn, Germany, put in motion a post-
Taliban political transition in Afghanistan that divided the Afghan society along the 
ethnolinguistic fault line, pitting the ethnic Tajiks (approximately 25% of the population) 
against the ethnic Pashtuns (approximately 45% of the population).  Giving the Northern 
Alliance, a loose coalition of Tajik ethnic groups, especially members of the Shura-e-
Nezar, an arch rival of the Taliban, a leading role to dictate the Bonn Agreement and the 
subsequent government formation in Afghanistan and leaving out the Taliban from this 
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process created winners and losers, which set in monition bitter ethnic rivalry, division, 
and hostility between the Tajiks and Pashtuns from the start to this day.  The Pashtuns in 
general and the Taliban in particular saw the reinstatement of the Northern Alliance, 
which was overthrown by Taliban in 1996, in a dominant role in the Afghan government 
by the United States and the international community not due to its past record or 
character, but as a reward for its cooperation with the United States and support in 
overthrowing the Taliban regime.  Haji Abdul Qadir, a prominent Pashtun politician, 
protested and bitterly complained during the Bonn Agreement in Bonn, Germany, that the 
over representation of Northern Alliance and under-representation of Pashtuns were 
inconsistent with Afghan history and unacceptable to Pashtuns.  Pamela Constable, in the 
July 13, 2002 edition of the Washington Post, wrote that Pashtuns are unhappy with the 
ethnic makeup of the post-Bonn government and the rise to power of warlords and 
Northern Alliance. She quoted an ethnic Pashtun cabinet mister bluntly stating, “The 
Americans made them [Northern Alliance] strong, and only the Americans can make 
them weak again.” Johnson (2006, 8) writes, “Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun 
warlord who reportedly controlled the three southeast provinces of Khost, Paktia, and 
Paktika in Spring/Summer 2002 summed up the sentiments of many Pashtuns when he 
asked, ‘Why are they [the Americans] humiliating Pashtuns? We’re the majority.  They 
[the Americans] placed Hamid Karzai at the top as representative of Pashtuns.  But in 
reality he’s no longer a Pashtun. He’s sold himself out. He is a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit 
around waiting.  They will react and will claim their rights.” 
 The Taliban have not only rejected the U.S.-led political transition in Afghanistan 
from the start and called it unfair, one-sided, and politically motivated, but, more 
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importantly, they have used it as a reason and a rallying point to regroup and fight the 
Tajik dominated Afghan government and its foreign supporters.  As a result, the United 
States, the international community and the government of Afghanistan have been 
fighting a resilient Taliban insurgency for the past 17 years with heavy civilian, military 
and economic costs and causalities.  The 17-year war and violence, which are still going 
on, have not only destroyed ethnic cooperation and social cohesion, but they have also, 
more importantly, destroyed public trust and positive attitudes toward the state, foreign 
donors and the international community.  The rivalry, division, and tension between the 
ethnic Tajik and the ethnic Pashtun were on full display when at the end of the 2014 
second round of Presidential elections (run-off between front runner Dr. Ashraf Ghani, 
Pashtun vs. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Tajik) the Independent Election Commission named 
Dr. Ashraf Ghani the winner.  Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who was nominated by the 
National Coalition Party (a predominant Tajik coalition) refused to accept the defeat and 
accused Dr. Ashraf Ghani and the Independent Election Commission of fraud and ethnic 
bias. The international community and the United States had to step in to pressure both 
sides to create a coalition government and avoid ethnic conflict and confrontation in the 
country.  The United States’ ex-President Barak H. Obama had to place direct calls and 
his Secretary of State, John Kerry, had to travel to Afghanistan to personally meet with 
both sides (more than once) to overt major ethnic confrontation and civil war.  A new 
position of Chief Executive was created for Dr. Abudullah Abdullah.  However, to this 
day, the mistrust, disagreement, tension, and ethnic division between the President Dr. 
Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, continues, which is one of 
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the key reasons for state weakness, corruption, insecurity, and ethnic division and rivalry 
in the country. 
 In Iraq, the U.S. –led invasion has divided the country across the religion fault 
line, pitting Shias against the Sunnis. First, regime change in Iraq was welcomed by Shias 
as an opportunity, which makes up about 60% of the society, but resented and rejected by 
Sunnis, which make up about 40% of the country.  Second, regime change in Iraq not 
only toppled Saddam Hussein from power, but it also, more importantly, toppled the 
Sunni political dominance and the Iraqi Socialist Baath Party that have ruled the country 
for decades, which empowered the Shias to turn the tides against the Sunnis by creating 
the first Arab Shia government. Third, the U.S. support for the rise of Shia and the Shia 
dominant government in Iraq directly challenged the Sunni socio-political identity, 
concept of sectarian balance, and vision of statehood, which set in motion bitter sectarian 
rivalry, angry Sunni insurgency, and bitter sectarian warfare leading to ethnic division, 
the rise of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq, and civil war in the country.  
 The Tajiks political ascendency in Afghanistan and the Shias political ascendency 
in Iraq will continue to define and shape the Afghan and Iraqi political landscapes for a 
foreseeable future.  To win peace and public hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
ending sect-centric warfare is the key for social order, aid effectiveness, stability, and 
state-building in both countries—aid is more effective in promoting economic growth, 
countering terrorism and/or insurgency, and winning public hearts and minds in states 
that are accountable to their citizens with less internal rivalry and political divisions.  In 
states with internal political rivalry and divisions aid is counterproductive in winning 
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public hearts and minds toward the donors and the aid recipient state because aid is used 
by elites for priorities other than serving the public, such as arming against rivals.         
 Post war Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are characterized by ethno-political 
rivalries, segregation, polarization and nationalist interests and policies that run contrary 
to social order and the development and democratization process funded by foreign 
donors and the international community, especially the European Union and the United 
States.  Identification and institutionalization of ethnicity, by the international 
community, while may have been necessary to protect the rights of minorities and end the 
war, have divided ethnic groups and instead of encouraging cooperation to rebuild their 
common homeland have given rise to nationalism, territorial and inter-ethnic rivalry and 
conflicts in both countries. Political elites, leaders, and parties in both countries since 
independence have been unable or unwilling to abandon ethno-nationalist campaigns and 
policies to engage in a democratic political process, negotiations, compromise, and 
cooperation to reunite and rebuild their war-torn countries. Unable to reconcile the legacy 
of war and violence, Kosovo Serbs and Bosnian Croats and Serbs have sought 
connections with neighbors outside the country. The Kosovo Serbs, especially in the 
north, do not recognize Kosovo’s independence from the start and rigorously resist 
governance by the Kosovo state.  The Serb community, especially in the North, has been 
asking for territorial autonomy, separation and unification with Serbia, a move that would 
encourage Serbs in Bosnian and Albanians in Macedonia to follow in the footsteps.  
Furthermore, the inter-ethnic relation between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is heavily 
burdened by nationalism and dictated by the inter-state relation between Kosovo and 
Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo as an independent republic. In fact Serbia still 
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considers Kosovo as an integral part of its territory. Although the international 
community, especially the European Union and the United States, has been trying to 
facilitate dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia to peacefully resolve their differences, the 
relation between the two countries remains intense and burdened with deep mistrust and 
animosity. The international community and donors have used a two-pronged approach to 
state-building and peacebuilding in Kosovo. They have used state-building to address the 
needs and aspirations of the Albanian majority and peacebuilding to address the needs 
and demands of other minorities, especially the Serbs, in the country. However, this 
policy has failed to engineer a multi-ethnic collective identity to resolve state ownership, 
ethnic and territorial conflict and loyalty, and divided political agendas in the country.  
As a result of territorial and ethno-nationalist rivalries and animosity between the two 
countries and the two ethnic groups, Albanian and Serb elites, parties, and leaders in 
Kosovo have used fear to justify nationalist discourse and policies that are pulling the 
country apart and run contrary to foreign- funded state-building and democratic process. 
Peaceful resolution of territorial and ethnic segregation, division and disputes are pre-
requisite for social order and winning peace and aid effectiveness in Kosovo. 
 With two entities (Federation of Bosnian and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) 
and three national ethnic identities (Bosniak, Serb, and Croat), Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
stuck in its democratic transition process—lack of a common vision for ethnic unification 
and consensus regarding the reform and building of the state and country ravaged by 
three years of bloody war, a bad economy, and rampant corruption. Although the 
international community and donors, compared to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, have 
achieved a level of peace, development, and democratic transition in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, the effectiveness of foreign aid in building social cohesion (positive 
connectedness to country, solidarity with and trust in fellow citizens regardless of ethnic, 
political or religious orientations, and civil participation for the common good) and 
winning peace and stability are work in progress. As a compromise between a unitary 
state and secession, the international community imposed federalism on political parties 
representing the people of Bosnia in the 1995 peace negotiation. As a result, post-war 
political parties have been unwilling to accept or identify with imposed federalism that 
has resulted in a very complex institutional structure and conflicts between ethno-
nationalist parties. Political parties have continued to obstruct concrete progress toward 
democratic political process needed to end ethnic division, polarization and conflicts by 
exclusively focusing on ethno-nationalist interests and politics that have pulled away the 
country and people from a national vision of state-building and service delivery 
consistent with the needs and expectations of citizens and foreign donors in the country. 
For example, in the 2018 presidential elections, political parties aggressively focused 
their campaigns on nationalist interests, fear and rhetoric, which the U.S. Embassy in 
Sarajevo in a press release called “very poisonous atmosphere” and “entirely dominated 
by fear-based rhetoric” (The U. S. Embassy in Sarajevo, press release, 27 September, 
2018).  In response, some political parties and media outlets in the country accused the 
United States of interfering in the 2018 presidential elections. The United States Embassy 
in Sarajevo, in response, released the following statement to defend and clear its position 
in the country. 
The U.S. Embassy in BiH roundly rejects the completely ridiculous 
conspiracy theories being disseminated by certain politicians and media 
outlets in their service.  It is shocking that these individuals would stand at 
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a podium and deliver outright lies, especially when their unfounded 
allegations are so easily disproved.  Such rhetoric is irresponsible, 
inflammatory, and out of line with democratic norms.  Certain political 
groups in BiH obviously fear that their illegal and corrupt activities will be 
investigated and prosecuted.  Instead of focusing on issues of actual 
importance to the citizens of BiH, their selfish logic is to try to delude 
citizens by creating false enemies.  The United States will not allow itself 
to be portrayed as an enemy of the people of BiH when it is clearly others 
who are actively working against citizens’ interests.  In keeping with our 
longstanding commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and stability and the well-being of its citizens, we will 
continue to press for measures to build a justice sector to fight terrorism and 
counter corruption, as well as improve the credibility and transparency of 
elections, including by calling out electoral fraud when we see it (The U.S. 
Embassy in Sarajevo, press release, 19 October, 2018. 
https://ba.usembassy.gov/). 
 
 Ethnic segregation, rivalry, and animosity and territorial disputes have allowed 
political elites and parties (Muslim, Serb, and Croat alike) to escape accountability and to 
use fear and nationalism to further their political agendas and grip on power, which have 
resulted in elite predation and negative effects on aid effectiveness and foreign-led state-
building and democratization in the country.  As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
characterized by a bad economy, rampant corruption, high unemployment, and very low 
public confidence and trust in the state and its foreign supporters.  Although the 1995 
U.S.-led NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended the war, killings, ethnic 
cleansing, and violence against women and minorities, the conflicting and contradicting 
agendas between the local and foreign actors in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have undermined social order, winning the peace and fragmented the state-building and 
development project in the country. 
 Third, ignoring corruption to buy peace, safeguard the state-building process, 
and/or attend to “more pressing issues” is storing problems for the future.  Corruption 
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should be a focus of attention from the start of the peace agreement, regime change 
and/or state-building initiatives.  Corruption erodes state legitimacy, public trust and 
confidence in the state institutions and foreign donors, aid effectiveness and donors’ 
goodwill.  Corruption has economic, social, and cultural reasons, but the political reason 
is the critical reason for the epidemic of corruption in Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. 
 The cost of corruption is not the bribes themselves, but the distractive 
consequences to the state, donors and society.  In weak, fragile, failing, or conflict-
affected societies foreign actors usually negotiate a role in the formation of the state with 
political leaders, warlords, ethnic groups or leaders, and powerbrokers (in some cases 
with questionable past) to end violence, achieve peace, and kick start the state-building 
process. However, in most cases, political or ethnic leaders, warlords and powerbrokers 
not only influence the political structure of the state and balance of power, but they also 
resist changes that weaken their power base and position themselves and their loyal right-
hand men to top political and military posts to forward their individual or group interest 
and carefully stream foreign funds to themselves rather than adopting policies and 
practices that are in the best interest of the country and people. With the little capacity to 
deliver public services and meaningful check and balance, post-conflict states in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo have been a pawn for corrupt 
officials, warlords, and powerbrokers from the start. 
 The Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks countries 
from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 100 (perceived to be the least corrupt) 
according to public opinion surveys and expert assessments.  The 2017 Corruption 
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Perception score for Afghanistan was 15/100, for Iraq 18/100, for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 38/100, and for Kosovo 39/100, indicating a high-level of corruption.  In 
2017, 84% of Afghans, 60% of Bosnians, 79% of Iraqi, and 74% of Kosovars said that 
corruption in the government is a major problem in the country.  In response to a request 
by the U.S. Congress, the watchdog charged with tracking government spending in 
Afghanistan (The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR 2018) 
estimates that a staggering total of $15.5 billion is wasted over the last 11 years in 
Afghanistan, which it said as “likely…only a portion of the total waste, fraud, abuse and 
failed efforts." According to the Iraq corruption watchdog (2018), $320 billion is stolen 
over 15 years.  Figure 54 depicts the average amounts of bribes by institutions in 
Afghanistan for 2017. 
 
Figure 54. Average Amount of Bribes in Afghani and their Approximate Value in the 
U.S. Dollar by Institution in Afghanistan in 2017 
Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2017. 
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 For foreign aid to be effective in winning public hearts and minds and the war on 
terror in the aid recipient countries, foreign actors and donors should use adequate time to 
prepare for peace agreements, regime change, and/or the design and development of  
programs and projects in consultation with local government and the people most directly 
concerned. Overconfidence in military or technical solutions to complex socio-political 
problems to the point of ignoring social order, local knowledge and cultural values or 
assuming local people are uninformed to know their own interest is a recipe for disaster. 
Since in a weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected society, the transfer, allocation, 
and distribution of aid materials, the design and delivery of development projects and 
programs, and aid itself are a source of socio-political influence and power, effective 
check and balance is required to ensure government officials, ethnic or local leaders, and 
warlords are not abusing power and/or benefiting themselves from foreign aid.  State 
weakness or fragility, overconfidence in military or technical solutions to the point of 
ignoring local dynamics and social order, and corruption are as much enemy in winning 
public hearts and minds and the war on “terror” in the aid recipient states as are the 
extremist organizations, leaders, and ideology.  The data and analysis from the four cases 
suggest that local politics, state strength and legitimacy, level of corruption in the 
government, and how foreign actors and/or powers initiate, design, and implement the 
regime change and/or the state-building process from the start greatly shape local 
attitudes and behaviors and their “buy in” in these initiatives and aid effectiveness in 
winning public hearts and minds in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies. In 
this light, future counterinsurgency, regime change, and/or state-building projects and 
initiatives should be more informed from the start about social order, local dynamics, 
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ownership and needs, more selective in choosing local partners, and placing more 
meaningful check and balance to win peace and public hearts and minds and the fight 
against extremism and terrorism in weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected 
societies.  The performance of the Afghan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraqi, and Kosovo 
states and their foreign donors and supporters to date provides a valuable insight into the 
application of the development aid theory and practice in winning public hearts and 
minds toward the aid recipient state and foreign donor(s). 
 In short, weak and failed states have long been a problem and responsibility of the 
international community, but given the greater globalized security threat that they pose 
today, weak and failed states are even a greater problem and responsibility of the 
international community in the 21st century. Terrorists and criminals use weak and failed 
states to lay the foundation of their networks, hatch plots and commit crimes all over the 
world, from human abuse and trafficking to drugs to terrorism. Winning the fight against 
insecurity, extremism, and terrorism is intimately linked to winning public hearts and 
minds through the provision of humanitarian and development aid.  The argument is that 
aid is an effective way to build state capacity, expand state control over its territory and 
to win the war against in security, extremism and terrorism compared to enduring the 
massive military costs of deployment to fight insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in 
weak, failing, and failed states, all over the world.  Although the United States and the 
international community have undertaken nation building, over a century, the data and 
results from the most recent cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo indicate that in the court of the public opinion, foreign aid has fallen short of 
winning public hearts and minds in these four causes.   
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 With heavy emphasis on engineering post-conflict state, institutions and society 
based on Western political and economic models and experience, the international 
community has neglected local dynamics, social order, and to take effective action 
against strong men, leaders and stakeholders, in or outside the government, whose 
economic and political malpractices are clearly contrary to the very principles of Western 
liberal democracy and state legitimacy, which has given rise to rampant corruption, 
ethnic rivalries and divisions, and political and economic challenges in these four cases.  
One reason for this negligence may be that the international community and donors 
understand that Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are not only 
making a difficult transition from a bloody war to peace, but also from a communist, 
authoritarian, and/or dictatorship to a democratic system.  However, whatever the reason, 
winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states and the war on terror are 
intimately linked to aid effectiveness in delivering public services consistent with the 
needs and expectations of citizens.  The data and findings from Afghanistan (2001 – 
2017), Iraq (2003 – 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 – 2017), and Kosovo (1999 – 
2017) indicate that in the court of the public opinion foreign aid has fallen short of 
winning public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign donors in these four aid 
recipient countries. These findings, however, should not be seen as suggesting that 
foreign aid is not a potentially viable tool in winning public hearts and minds toward the 
state, donors, and the war against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in the aid recipient 
states, but they should be rather seen as an evaluation of the current state of knowledge, 
peace and state-building measures and should guide scholarly debate and policy on 
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exploring alternative approaches to state and peacebuilding outside the existing top-down 
blueprints and practices. 
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 The research for this dissertation was designed in two parts, with the research 
methodology employing two types of survey approaches in a complementary fashion.  
Part I of the research was designed to use the existing data from national surveys and 
public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in 
Afghanistan (2001-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), and 
Kosovo (1999-2017) that address any issues associated with receiver country 
perspectives on foreign aid.  Part II of the research was designed to conduct a national 
survey in Afghanistan to address the gaps in existing data in Part I.   
 However, Afghanistan is a war zone with a very volatile security situations and 
one of the most dangerous countries in the world for conducting national surveys.  After 
widely consulting with locals and government officials, it quickly became clear that not 
only the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords and other anti-government warring factions 
that oppose the government and the international community in Afghanistan, but also 
government militias, warlords associated with government, and rogue government 
security forces and administrators could arrest, kidnap, imprison, and even kill survey 
administrators and participants for being part of a survey that is for a foreign country or 
institution or an individual associated with their arch-enemy--the United States.  Due to 
deterioration of the security situations in the country, which was posing potential risks 
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and harm to both survey administrators and survey participants, the survey management 
team had no choice but to scale back the planned scope of the national survey in 
Afghanistan consistent with the University of Southern Mississippi’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review Committee’s research guidelines.  As 
a result, the research had to use secondary survey data, as the only alternative, for the 
Afghan case, as it was doing with other cases. 
 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research undertook a first cut at assessing the relationship between foreign 
aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries of Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.  Assessing the link between foreign aid and 
winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries is important given the human 
costs associated with conflicts and terrorism, the security threat that they pose, and the 
billions of dollars annually devoted to humanitarian, development, and reconstruction 
programs and projects in unstable, weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected states.  
Case studies of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo indicate that for 
aid to win public hearts and minds toward the donor(s) and the aid recipient state and the 
war on terror, the state and its foreign supporters must deliver peace, stability and 
development at the individual level consist with public needs and expectations. The 
findings and data from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo indicate 
that state weakness, divisive initiatives to peace or state-building, and political corruption 
are counterproductive to aid effectiveness in winning public hearts and minds and the war 
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on terror.  Future research with larger sample size of cases and data should look into how 
foreign actors and aid recipient state can introduce better check and balance to effectively 
deliver public services from the start of the peace and/or state-building initiatives to make 
sure aid is effective in winning public hearts and minds and bringing about favorable 
counter-terrorism outcome. This will discourage elites in the aid recipient state to engage 
in systematic rent-seeking, abuse of power, corruption, and actively sponsoring terrorism 
in hopes of continued aid.   
 Lessons learned or unlearned from the United States’ and the international 
community’s involvement over a decade in peace and state-building in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo is a clear and depressing reminder that more 
research is needed to assess better and understand the link between foreign aid and 
winning public hearts and minds, foreign aid and counterinsurgency and terrorism, 
foreign aid and state legitimacy, foreign aid and political structure, and foreign aid and 
political corruption.  The data and findings indicate that public perceptions of aid and 
foreign actors are overwhelmingly negative in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The overwhelming majority of the public believe that little or 
nothing has been done, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future research should look 
into why in spite of the billions of dollars in aid, humanitarian, development, and 
reconstruction projects and programs, the pubic still does not believe that enough or a lot 
have been done in these countries.  More pointedly, what level(s) of development, 
security, reconstruction and/or state-building is needed for foreign aid to win public 
hearts and minds in the aid recipient country toward the donors of the foreign aid and the 
aid recipient state? 
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Policy Recommendations 
 State weakness, political corruption, insecurity, and criminality have undermined 
aid effectiveness, state legitimacy, and winning public hearts and minds toward the state 
and donors and the war against insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.  To reverse this trend in these four cases and 
beyond, the following policy measures, which should be of interest to foreign donors and 
policymakers involved in international security and development, are suggested:   
 First, build a legitimate state that can deliver services without fear or favor and 
stand up to insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, fragile, and failing states. A 
strategy of winning the war on terror, demands winning public hearts and minds in the 
aid recipient countries, which in turn demands aid effectiveness. Therefore, foreign aid, 
donors and policy practitioners should pay more attention to building a legitimate state 
that can win public confidence and support and stand up to insurgency, extremism, and 
terrorism in weak, fragile, and failing states. This policy should involve long turn 
approach and commitment to state-building, especially building state security and 
government institutions and capacity to stand on their own in defeating insurgency and 
extremism and delivering the much-needed services without fear or favor to win public 
hearts and minds.   
 Second, avoid ignoring corruption to buy peace, safeguard the state building 
process, and/or attend to “more pressing issues.” Ignoring corruption is storing problems 
for the future. Building a legitimate and capable state requires concessions and 
commitment from government and people to promote the rule of law, accountability, and 
transparency and to confront corruption, patronage, and political rivalry and infighting. 
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Therefore, corruption should be a focus of attention from the start of the peace 
agreement, regime change, and/or state-building initiatives to ensure aid effectiveness, 
state legitimacy, and service delivery consistent with public needs and demands and 
winning public hearts and minds toward the state and donors.   
 Third, harmonize foreign-led interference and state building initiatives with local 
institutions, culture, dynamics, ownership, needs, and social order to contend with public 
skepticism about the motives and objectives of foreign aid, foreign-led interference and 
public negative sentiments toward donors and state. One of the key issues for foreign 
donors and foreign interference in general and the United States in particular in the 
Muslim world and the Middle East, in particular, is to contend with public skepticism 
about the motives of foreign aid and foreign-led interference.  Therefore, foreign-led 
interference and state-building initiatives should be well informed from the start about 
local dynamics, ownership, needs, and social order and more selective in choosing and 
supporting local partners and leaders to subdue public criticism and ethnic and/or 
religious rivalry, balance, and competitions that terrorist and extremist organizations and 
leaders usually exploit. Half-hearted public diplomacy, top-down state-building 
approaches and initiatives, working outside the state, and working with local leaders and 
organizations with questionable past are counterproductive in aid effectiveness, winning 
public hearts and minds, war on terror and insurgency, and state legitimacy. 
 Fourth, avoid over confidence in the applicability of military and technical 
solutions to the very complex process of state building and transferability of the Western 
liberal institutions, values, and experiences to the very complex social, political, and 
economic problems in weak, fragile, and failing states. Foreign donors and policymakers 
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should avoid overconfidence in the applicability of military and technical solutions to the 
very complex process of state-building and transferability of the Western liberal 
institutions, values, and experiences to the very complex social, political, and economic 
problems in weak, fragile, and failing states. Overconfidence in military or technical 
solutions to complex economic, political, and/or social problems to the point of ignoring 
social order, local knowledge, and cultural values or assuming local people are 
uninformed to know their own interest is counterproductive in building legitimate state, 
aid effectiveness, local ownership, public confidence and support, and winning public 
hearts and minds toward the state and donors and the war on insecurity, insurgency, and 
extremism. 
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